Classical causal models for Bell and Kochen-Specker inequality violations require fine-tuning

Nonlocality and contextuality are at the root of conceptual puzzles in quantum mechanics, and are key resources for quantum advantage in information-processing tasks. Bell nonlocality is best understood as the incompatibility between quantum correlations and the classical theory of causality, applied to relativistic causal structure. Contextuality, on the other hand, is on a more controversial foundation. In this work, I provide a common conceptual ground between nonlocality and contextuality as violations of classical causality. First, I show that Bell inequalities can be derived solely from the assumptions of no-signalling and no-fine-tuning of the causal model. This removes two extra assumptions from a recent result from Wood and Spekkens, and remarkably, does not require any assumption related to independence of measurement settings -- unlike all other derivations of Bell inequalities. I then introduce a formalism to represent contextuality scenarios within causal models and show that all classical causal models for violations of a Kochen-Specker inequality require fine-tuning. Thus the quantum violation of classical causality goes beyond the case of space-like separated systems, and manifests already in scenarios involving single systems.Comment: 9 pages, 14 figures. Modified title, discussion and presentatio

Causation, decision theory, and Bell's theorem: a quantum analogue of the Newcomb problem

I apply some of the lessons from quantum theory, in particular from Bell's theorem, to a debate on the foundations of decision theory and causation. By tracing a formal analogy between the basic assumptions of Causal Decision Theory (CDT)--which was developed partly in response to Newcomb's problem-- and those of a Local Hidden Variable (LHV) theory in the context of quantum mechanics, I show that an agent who acts according to CDT and gives any nonzero credence to some possible causal interpretations underlying quantum phenomena should bet against quantum mechanics in some feasible game scenarios involving entangled systems, no matter what evidence they acquire. As a consequence, either the most accepted version of decision theory is wrong, or it provides a practical distinction, in terms of the prescribed behaviour of rational agents, between some metaphysical hypotheses regarding the causal structure underlying quantum mechanics.Comment: Cross-posted in http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004872