Risk Classification in Insurance Contracting

Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby reduce asymmetric information. An efficient risk classification system generates premiums that fully reflect the expected cost associated with each class of risk characteristics. This is known as financial equity. In the health sector, risk classification is also subject to concerns about social equity and potential discrimination. We present different theoretical frameworks that illustrate the potential trade-off between efficient insurance provision and social equity. We also review empirical studies on risk classification and residual asymmetric information.Adverse selection, classification risk, diagnostic test, empirical test of asymmetric information, financial equity, genetic test, health insurance, insurance rating, insurance pricing, moral hazard, risk classification, risk characteristic, risk pooling, risk separation, social equity

Redistribution by Insurance Market Regulation: Analyzing a Ban on Gender-Based Retirement Annuities

This paper shows how models of insurance markets with asymmetric information can be calibrated and solved to yield quantitative estimates of the consequences of government regulation. We estimate the impact of restricting gender-based pricing in the United Kingdom retirement annuity market, a market in which individuals are required to annuitize tax-preferred retirement savings but are allowed considerable choice over the annuity contract they purchase. After calibrating a lifecycle utility model and estimating a model of annuitant mortality that allows for unobserved heterogeneity, we solve for the range of equilibrium contract structures with and without gender-based pricing. Eliminating gender-based pricing is generally thought to redistribute resources from men to women, since women have longer life expectancies. We find that allowing insurers to offer a menu of contracts may reduce the amount of redistribution from men to women associated with gender-blind pricing requirements to half the level that would occur if insurers were required to sell a single pre-specified policy. The latter "one policy" scenario corresponds loosely to settings in which governments provide compulsory annuities as part of their Social Security program. Our findings suggest that recognizing the endogenous structure of insurance contracts is important for analyzing the economic effects of insurance market regulations. More generally, our results suggest that theoretical models of insurance market equilibrium can be used for quantitative policy analysis, not simply to derive qualitative findings.

Adverse Selection in Annuity Markets: Evidence from the British Life Annuity Act of 1808

We study adverse selection using data from an 1808 Act of British Parliament that effectively opened a market for life annuities. Our analysis indicates significant selection effects. The evidence for ad- verse selection is strongest for a sub-sample of annuitants whose an- nuities were purchased by profit-seeking speculators, a sub-sample in which “advantageous selection” resulting from multi-dimensional het- erogeneity is unlikely to have been significant. These results support the view that adverse selection can be masked by advantageous se- lection in empirical studies of standard insurance markets. JEL N23 D82

Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games: A Comment

Kajii and Morris (J. Econ. Theory 1998, 267-276) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for two priors to be strategically close. The restrictiveness of these con- ditions establishes that strategic behavior can be highly sensitive to the assumed prior. Their results thus recommend care in the use of priors in economic modelling. Unfortunately, their proof of a central proposition fails for zero probability types. This comment corrects their proof to account for these cases

Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking

We develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities, where private and social products coincide, and in rent-seeking activities, where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre-existing rents or because they reduce the returns to traditional work. We characterize Pareto optimal non-linear taxes when the government does not observe the shares of an individual's income earned in each of the two activities. We show that the optimal externality correction typically deviates from the Pigouvian correction that would obtain if rent-seeking incomes could be perfectly targeted, even at income levels where all income is from rent-seeking. If rent-seeking externalities primarily affect other rent-seeking activity, then the optimal externality correction lies strictly below the Pigouvian correction. If the externalities fall mainly on the returns to traditional work, the optimal correction strictly exceeds it. We show that this deviation can be quantitatively important

Reintegrating the Social Sciences: The Dahlem Group

Social science disciplines see themselves as distinct, with their own territory, their own methods, and their own framework. Within such an environment multidisciplinary work involves enormous conflict and translation problems. This situation is no longer acceptable. Dealing with modern problems requires researchers with broad transdisciplinary knowledge and with the ability to communicate with other social science researchers in a way that will allow them to arrive at transdisciplinary recommendations. Complex issues such as healthcare, income distributions, crime prevention, industrial policy, agriculture require not only insights from multiple social disciplines, but the integration of those insights. This document offers a proposal for training social science researchers. Specifically, it proposes reintegrating the social sciences by modifying the current system of training—which provides completely separate training for researchers in each sub-discipline—to incorporate a common first year “core"of training for all social science researchers. If implemented, the proposal will reduce the babble that currently characterizes much of the interdisciplinary conversations.

The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Human Groups

The scale and complexity of human cooperation is an important and unresolved evo- lutionary puzzle. This article uses the finitely repeated n person Prisoners’ Dilemma game to illustrate how sapience can greatly enhance group-selection effects and lead to the evolutionary stability of cooperation in large groups. This affords a simple and direct explanation of the human “exception.

Optimal taxation with rent-seeking

We develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities, where private and social products coincide, and in rent-seeking activities, where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre-existing rents or because they reduce the returns to traditional work. We characterize Pareto optimal income taxes that do not condition on how much of an individual's income is earned in each of the two activities. These optimal taxes feature an externality-corrective term, the magnitude of which depends both on the Pigouvian correction that would obtain if rent-seeking incomes could be perfectly targeted and on the relative impact of rent-seeking externalities on the private returns to traditional and to rent-seeking activities. If rent-seeking externalities primarily affect other rent-seekers, for example, the optimal correction lies strictly below the Pigouvian correction. A calibrated model indicates that the gap between the Pigouvian and optimal correction can be quantitatively important. Our results thus point to a hefty informational requirement for correcting rent-seeking externalities through the income tax code

Sins of the Sons of Samuelson: Vision, Pedagogy, and the Zig-Zag Windings of Complex Dynamics

The standard economics text is centered on a vision of a naturally self-regulated, dynamically stable system with a unique global attractor. This paper discusses how we got there and how recent developments in the study of dynamical systems allow us to go beyond that. It traces the evolution of the teaching of economics from Alfred Marshall, who built his supply-and-demand framework within a complexity vision of the economy. It suggests that that complexity vision was lost as economists formalized the supply- demand framework and extended it to the entire economy. This paper argues that the current textbook presentation of economics should not and cannot serve as the only intellectual frame we provide to our students

Risk Classification and Health Insurance

Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby reduce asymmetric information. With perfect risk classification, premiums fully reflect the expected cost associated with each class of risk characteristics and yield efficient outcomes. In the health sector, risk classification is also subject to concerns about social equity and potential discrimination. We present an analytical framework that illustrates the potential trade-off between efficient insurance provision and social equity. We also review empirical studies on risk classification and residual asymmetric information that inform this trade-off