La noción de "Dios" en el Timeo de Platón

Resumen temporalmente no disponible. La presente obra no cuenta con resumen provisto por el autor.Fil: Carone, Gabriela Roxana. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras

Self‐Motion and Cognition: Plato's Theory of the Soul

I argue that Plato believes that the soul must be both the principle of motion and the subject of cognition because it moves things specifically by means of its thoughts. I begin by arguing that the soul moves things by means of such acts as examination and deliberation, and that this view is developed in response to Anaxagoras. I then argue that every kind of soul enjoys a kind of cognition, with even plant souls having a form of Aristotelian discrimination (krisis), and that there is therefore no completely unintelligent, evil soul in the cosmos that can explain disorderly motions; as a result, the soul is not the principle of all motion but only motion in the cosmos after it has been ordered by the Demiurge