Easy Knowledge Makes No Difference: Reply to Wielenberg

We have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in cases of ‘easy-knowledge.’ Erik Wielenberg argues that there are cases of easy knowledge thatour proposal cannot handle. In this note we reply to Wielenberg, arguing that our proposal does indeed handle his cases

The causal and the moral

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2003.Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-92).My dissertation is about the following two questions: The causal question: When is something a cause of something else? The moral question: When is someone morally responsible for something? I examine the way in which these questions overlap. I argue that, in some important respects, the relation between the causal and the moral question is tighter than people have taken it to be, but, in other important respects, it is looser than people have taken it to be. The dissertation consists of three chapters. Each of the chapters is a self-contained paper, but the three papers are interconnected in various ways. Chapters 1 and 2 are concerned with how the causal question and the moral question intersect, and Chapter 3 is concerned with how they come apart. In Chapter 1, I lay out a view of causation according to which causing is a particular way of making a difference. I show that an advantage of this view is that it carves up a concept of cause that is particularly well suited for the work causation does in moral theory. In Chapter 2, I argue that a moral asymmetry that exists between actions and omissions has a causal basis. I argue that the conditions under which actions and omissions make us morally responsible are different, and that this is so because the causal powers of actions and omissions are different. In Chapter 3, I argue against the received view about the relation between causation and moral responsibility, according to which being responsible for something requires causing it. I offer an alternative picture according to which causation is a necessary condition for the transmission of responsibility, although not for the existence of responsibility itself.by Ana Carolina Sartorio.Ph.D

El concepto de observación en las Ciencias Naturales

El concepto de observación en el ámbito de las ciencias naturales nos parece un tema promisorio de investigación filosófica La epistemología tradicional ha descuidado varios aspectos importantes de la práctica observacional científica, y como consecuencia de ello, la noción de observación empleada por los filósofos frecuentemente no corresponde a la actividad de la ciencia real. Para evitar esta dificultad establecemos como punto de partida general dos criterios de adecuación para un concepto filosófico de observación: A) Debe servir para elaborar una teoría epistemológíca tan explicativa, simple, y fértil como sea posible. B) Debe proveer .una reconstrucción racional del concepto científico de observación que sea lo más cercana posible a los usos y prácticas de ese concepto en la ciencia rea

Sobre los distintos alcances del argumento de la teoría de modelos

I criticize what seems to be a common assumption of the precedent papers, namely, that the model-theoretic argument has similar consequences for the different realms of language. In particular, I argue that while the argument does not have serious consequences for natural languages, this is not the case with the language of mathematics

The concept of responsibility in the ethics of self-defense and war

The focus of this paper is an influential family of views in the ethics of self-defense and war: views that ground the agent’s liability to be attacked in self-defense in the agent’s moral responsibility for the threat posed (“Responsibility Views”). I critically examine the concept of responsibility employed by such views, by looking at potential connections with the contemporary literature on moral responsibility. I start by uncovering some of the key assumptions that Responsibility Views make about the relevant concept of responsibility, and by scrutinizing those assumptions under the lens of more general theorizing about responsibility. I identify an important conflict that arises at that point. The problem is that the concept presupposed by Responsibility Views is in tension with the standard way of understanding the connection between the neutral and non-neutral forms of moral responsibility. I draw attention to a particular strategy that could be used to address this challenge, but I also identify some important obstacles that stand in the way. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature.12 month embargo; published: 03 February 2021This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

PAP-Style Cases

Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model, which states that acting freely consists (at least partly) in being able to do otherwise, and, more recently, the actual-sequence model, which states that acting freely is exclusively a function of the actual sequence of events issuing in our behavior. In general, a natural strategy when trying to decide between two models of a certain concept is to look for examples that support one model and undermine the other. Frankfurt-style cases have been used for this kind of purpose, to challenge the alternative-possibilities view and support the actual-sequence view. In this paper I examine the prospects of the counterparts of Frankfurt-style cases: “PAP-style” cases, or cases that could be used to support the alternative-possibilities view and challenge the actual-sequence view. I argue that there are no successful PAP-style cases.12 month embargo; published November 2016This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

Vihvelin on Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Actual-Sequence View

This is a critical discussion of Vihvelin's recent book Causes, Laws, and Free Will. I discuss Vihvelin's ideas on Frankfurt-style cases and the actual-sequence view of freedom that is inspired by them.12 month embargo. First available online 11 November 2014.This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

Actual Causes and Free Will

1. Introduction The focus of this paper is the contrast between two models of metaphysical freedom. One of the models is the classical view, which takes freedom to require the ability to do otherwise, or the agent’s access to alternative possibilities of action. This idea is commonly known as the “principle of alternative possibilities” or PAP. The opposing model is the conception spearheaded by Harry Frankfurt’s famous attack on PAP (Frankfurt 1969), and it takes freedom to be only a functio..