Designing institutions for financial stability: Regulation and supervision by objective for the Euro area

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market regulation and supervision and we present a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory and supervisory agencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments are consistent with both new theories and effective behaviour of financial intermediaries in industrialized countries. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities, both at the domestic and the European level. According to this perspective, the three objectives of supervision - microeconomic stability, investor protection and proper behaviour, efficiency and competition - should be assigned to three distinct European authorities, each one at the centre of a European system of financial regulators and supervisors specialized in overseeing the entire financial market with respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized similarly to the European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the central bank which would remain the institution responsible for price and macroeconomic stability. We suggest a plausible path to build our 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.Financial regulation, supervisory authorities, european financial integration

Financial Regulation and Supervision in the Euro Area: A Four-Peak Proposal

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market regulation and supervision and we present a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory and supervisory agencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments are consistent with both new theories and effective behaviour of financial intermediaries in industrialized countries. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities, both at the domestic and the European level. According to this perspective, the three objectives of supervision - microeconomic stability, investor protection and proper behaviour, efficiency and competition - should be assigned to three distinct European authorities, each one at the centre of a European system of financial regulators and supervisors specialized in overseeing the entire financial market with respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized similarly to the European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the central bank which would remain the institution responsible for price and macroeconomic stability. We suggest a plausible path to build our 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.

Electro-mechanical properties of REBCO coated conductors from various industrial manufacturers at 77 K, self-field and 4.2 K, 19 T

Rare-earth-barium-copper-oxide (REBCO) tapes are now available from several industrial manufacturers and are very promising conductors in high field applications. Due to diverging materials and deposition processes, these manufacturers' tapes can be expected to differ in their electro-mechanical and mechanical properties. For magnets designers, these are together with the conductors' in-field critical current performance of the highest importance in choosing a suitable conductor. In this work, the strain and stress dependence of the current carrying capabilities as well as the stress and strain correlation are investigated for commercial coated conductors from Bruker HTS, Fujikura, SuNAM, SuperOx and SuperPower at 77 K, self-field and 4.2 K, 19 T

Financial Market Regulation: The Case of Italy and a Proposal for the Euro Area

The objective of the present work is to sketch a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory arrangements and supervisory agencies in the European financial markets. This proposal is formulated in light of the evolution of the role of intermediaries and aims at speeding the ongoing process of integration of financial markets in the Euro area. It is based on previous experiences in the matter of financial regulation at both national and international level. We start by reviewing objectives and theoretical models for the regulation of financial systems. We then move to highlight some features of financial market regulation in Italy that we consider somehow problematic as a consequence of the recent evolution in the financial intermediaries, instruments and markets. A proposal is then formulated for a new configuration for supervising the domestic financial market through the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities. This perspective would thus entrust the three objectives of supervision -- stability, transparency and proper behaviour, competition -- to three distinct authorities designed to oversee the entire financial market regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. We think that our proposal could be transferred (with some benefit) to the Euro area. This requires to explicitly address what is probably the weakest point and the more evident problem of the European Union construction, that of who takes care of financial stability. In particular, one has to re-examine the issue of the need for a lender of last resort and of the proper relationship of the European Central Bank with other financial market regulators. We propose to establish a European System of Financial Supervisors, with three distinct independent authorities (plus the ECB) at the European level. They will provide incentives for and co-ordinate the work of the three corresponding national authorities in each member country.

Financial Regulation and Supervision in the Euro Area: A Four-Peak Proposal

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market regulation and supervision and we present a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory and supervisory agencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments are consistent with both new theories and effective behaviour of financial intermediaries in industrialized countries. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities, both at the domestic and the European level. According to this perspective, the three objectives of supervision - microeconomic stability, investor protection and proper behaviour, efficiency and competition - should be assigned to three distinct European authorities, each one at the centre of a European system of financial regulators and supervisors specialized in overseeing the entire financial market with respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized similarly to the European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the central bank which would remain the institution responsible for price and macroeconomic stability. We suggest a plausible path to build our 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market regulation and supervision and we present a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory and supervisory agencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments are consistent with both new theories and effective behaviour of financial intermediaries in industrialized countries. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities, both at the domestic and the European level. According to this perspective, the three objectives of supervision - microeconomic stability, investor protection and proper behaviour, efficiency and competition - should be assigned to three distinct European authorities, each one at the centre of a European system of financial regulators and supervisors specialized in overseeing the entire financial market with respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized similarly to the European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the central bank which would remain the institution responsible for price and macroeconomic stability. We suggest a plausible path to build our 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl

Designing Institutions for Financial Stability: Regulation and Supervision by Objective for the Euro Area

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market regulation and supervision and we present a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory and supervisory agencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments are consistent with both new theories and effective behaviour of financial intermediaries in industrialized countries. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities, both at the domestic and the European level. According to this perspective, the three objectives of supervision - microeconomic stability, investor protection and proper behaviour, efficiency and competition - should be assigned to three distinct European authorities, each one at the centre of a European system of financial regulators and supervisors specialized in overseeing the entire financial market with respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized similarly to the European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the central bank which would remain the institution responsible for price and macroeconomic stability. We suggest a plausible path to build our 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market regulation and supervision and we present a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory and supervisory agencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments are consistent with both new theories and effective behaviour of financial intermediaries in industrialized countries. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities, both at the domestic and the European level. According to this perspective, the three objectives of supervision - microeconomic stability, investor protection and proper behaviour, efficiency and competition - should be assigned to three distinct European authorities, each one at the centre of a European system of financial regulators and supervisors specialized in overseeing the entire financial market with respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized similarly to the European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the central bank which would remain the institution responsible for price and macroeconomic stability. We suggest a plausible path to build our 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl

Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility for banking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated by the Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macro and microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems are classified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that the inflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries where the Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides, although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them, they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to more sophisticated liabilities as a funding source. The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries. We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulation and supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independent European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to the ESCB.Banking supervision, financial stability, regulatory arrangements

Stroke in the Very Old: A Systematic Review of Studies on Incidence, Outcome, and Resource Use

Background and Purpose. Stroke incidence increases with age and is likely to increase in the aging populations. We investigated incidence, outcome, and resource use in very old subjects with stroke. Methods. We performed a systematic review of available data through electronic search of the literature databases and manual search of reference lists. Data were extracted for the age groups of over 80, 80 to 84 years old, and over 85. Overall incidence rates, expressed as the number of first strokes per 1000 person-years, were estimated using Poisson regression analysis. Odds ratios for the comparisons between subjects over and under 80 were calculated with the Mantel-Haenszel method. Results. We found a high incidence of stroke in the very old. The estimated incidence rates were 20.78 (95% CI 19.69 to 21.87) in subjects over 80, 17.23 (95% CI 15.97 to 18.49) for those 80 to 85 years old, and 20.78 (95% CI 16.74 to 23.78) for those over 85. Subjects over 80 contributed 29.95% of strokes; rates were similar among genders. Thirty-day case fatality rate and occurrence of dependency were higher in subjects over 80, although associated with less frequent hospital and stroke unit admission and less diagnostic resource use. Conclusions. The contribution of very old subjects to the global burden of stroke is relevant and may require efficient dedicated stroke services