Locating Public Facilities by Majority: Stability, Consistency and Group Formation

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of N agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. We show that there exist social choice correspondences that choose locations and assign agents to them in such a way that: (1) these decisions are Condorcet winners whenever one exists, (2) the majority of the users of each facility supports the choice of its location, and (3) no agent wishes to become a user of another facility, even if that could induce a change of its present location by majority voting.Social choice correspondences, condorcet rules, stability, Simpson Rule

Cooperative production and efficiency

We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.

Peace agreements without commitment

In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country. Only when the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently great, it could be that the "poor" country can stop the war by transfering part of its resources to the "rich" country.

Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production

In this paper we consider a model of cooperative production in which rational agents have the possibility to engage in sabotage activities that decrease output. It is shown that sabotage depends on the interplay between the degree of congestion, the technology of sabotage, the number of agents the degree of meritocracy and the form of the sharing rule. In particular it is shown that, ceteries paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems. We address two questions: The degree of meritocracy that is compatible with absence of sabotage and the existence of a Nash equilibrium with and without sabotage.

BUYING SEVERAL INDIVISIBLE GOODS

This paper studies economies where agents exchange indivisible goods and money. Agents have potential use for all indivisible goods and the indivisible goods are differentiated. We assume that agents have quasi-linear utilities in money, have sufficient money endowments to afford any group of objects priced below their reservation values, have reservation values which are submodular and satisfy the Cardinality Condition. This Cardinality Condition requires that for each agent the marginal utility of an object only depends on the number of objects to which it is added, not on their characteristics. Under these assumptions, we show that the set of competitive equilibrium prices is a non empty lattice and that, in any equilibrium, the price of an object is between the social value of the object and its value in its second best use.

Self-Selection Consistent Choices

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing allocation consistent rules which satisfy the Condorcet criterion and respect different notions of voluntarism.

Redistribution and Subsidies for Higher Education

The financing of higher education through public spending imposes a transfer of resources from taxpayers to university students and their parents. We provide an explanation for this phenomenon. Those who attend higher education will earn more income in the future and will pay more taxes. People whose children do not attend higher education, however should agree to help pay the cost of such education, providing that the taxes are sufficiently high to ensure that there will be an adequate redistribution in favor of their own children at some time in the future.Higher Education, Taxation, Redistribution

Evolución de la demanda energética en la España mediterránea, basada en el índice de grados-día de calentamiento enfriamiento

Ponencia presentada en: VI Congreso Internacional de la Asociación Española de Climatología celebrado en Tarragona del 8 al 11 de octubre de 2008.[ES]El índice de grados-día de calentamiento y el índice de grados-día de enfriamiento dan una estimación básica de la demanda doméstica de electricidad. En este trabajo se calcula la evolución de dichos índices para España en el período 1970-2004. Se estudia la incidencia que la evolución de la población puede tener en estos índices y se comparan los valores obtenidos para la región mediterránea con los calculados para todo el territorio nacional.[EN]The heating degrees-day index and the cooling degrees-day index are climatic indices that estimate the energy demand of the homes. In this work, we estimate both indices for Spain and the period 1970-2004. We study the impact that the population evolution (increase and redistribution) has on those indices, and we compare the indices computed for the mediterranean region only with those obtained for the whole Spain

Now, the part of intuition. Research, Art and Creation, 2018

Catálogo de Exposición del Máster en Investigación en Arte y Creación de la UCM. Muestra celebrada del 25 de septiembre al 10 de octubre de 2018 en la Sala de Exposiciones de la Facultad de Bellas Artes. C / Pintor el Greco 2, Ciudad Universitaria. 28040 Madrid. Comisariado de Javier Mañero Rodicio.Exhibition catalog of the Master in Art and Creation Research of the UCM. September 25 to October 10, 2018 in the Exhibition Hall of the Faculty of Fine Arts. C / Pintor El Greco 2, University City. 28040 Madrid. Curated by Javier Mañero Rodicio.Fac. de Bellas ArtesFALSEFacultad de Bellas Artes. Universidad Complutense de Madrid.pu