Who participates in tax amnesties? Self-selection of risk-averse taxpayers

In this paper we model taxpayer participation in an unanticipated tax amnesty which can be entered by paying a fixed amount. Taxpayers are characterized by a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function and differ in relative risk aversion coefficient and in income. With minor changes the same model also describes a FATOTA (Fixed Amount of Taxes or Tax Audit) system. Our results show that amnesties may fail as a self-selective device to fully separate large-scale from small-scale tax evaders and to extract resources from the former. Only taxpayers whose relative risk aversion falls within a given interval participate, while those whose evasion is too small or too large do not enter. The model is used to estimate relative risk aversion and tax evasion of participants in the 1991 and 1994 Italian income tax amnesties.tax amnesty, tax evasion, relative risk aversion, self-selection

Risk Attitudes and the Shift of Liability from the Principal to the Agent.

This paper studies the problem of illegal behavior within a principal-agent framework. The agent performs an illegal activity which benefits the principal, and can exert an effort that negatively affects the likelihood of detection of the violation.Two opposite legal regimes are considered: in the first, only the risk neutral principal is strictly liable; in the second, only the risk averse agent is The monetary sanction and the probability of detection function are the same in both cases. Our models shows that shifting the liability upon the risk averse agent reduces the principal net benefit, thus favoring deterrence of wrongdoing; however, it can also either increase or reduce the agent effort in cheating. For a specific model we are able to characterize cases in which a reduction in cheating prevails, and shifting the liability upon the agent has clear-cut beneficial effects on compliance.

Tax evasion in a principal-agent model with self-protection

Gatekeepers have an increasing role in taxation and regulation. While burdening them with legal liability for misconducts that benefit those who resort to their services actually discourages wrongdoings — as will be clarified in the paper — an alienation effect can also arise. That is, the gatekeeper might become more interested in covering up the illegal behavior and in cooperating with the perpetrator. Such perverse effects are difficult to detect and to measure. This paper studies the problem with respect to tax evasion by firms, by building upon the classical Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model and by providing a more detailed description of the "concealment costs" than that available in the literature, which often simply makes assumptions about their existence and their functional form. The relationship between a risk neutral firm owner aiming at evading taxes and a risk averse gatekeeper is described through a simple principal-agent framework. The paper highlights the role of legal rules pertaining to liability for tax evasion in shaping the parties choices, since concealment costs vary according to whether the risk neutral principal or the risk averse agent are held responsible when tax evasion is detected. The main result of the analysis is that there are simple conditions under which one can easily infer whether harnessing the agent is socially beneficial.tax evasion, firm, agency, risk aversion

Taxpayers Attitudes Toward Risk and Amnesty Participation: Economic Analysis and Evidence for the Italian Case.

This paper provides a simple model, based on expected utility theory, for rationalizing taxpayer's reaction to an unexpected amnesty offer. The model is estimated through a deterministic approach, with reference to data pertaining to the 1991 and 1994 Italian tax amnesties. Results seem sound and suggest that standard critiques to the use of expected utility theory for describing taxpayer behavior do not apply when participation in amnesties is considered. However, the model fails in explaining the behavior of full compliers (who refuse the amnesty). Their behavior can be better rationalized by resorting to the expected utility with rank dependent probability approach.tax amnesty, plea bargaining, risk aversion, Italian tax system

What's in a Sign? Trademark Law and Economic Theory

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to summarise the extant theory as it relates to the economics of trademark, and to give some suggestions for further research with reference to distinct streams of literature. The proposed line of study inevitably looks at the complex relationship between signs and economics. Trademark is a sign introduced to remedy a market failure. It facilitates purchase decisions by indicating the provenance of the goods, so that consumers can identify specific quality attributes deriving from their own, or others', past experience. Trademark holders, on their part, have an incentive to invest in quality because they will be able to reap the benefits in terms of reputation. In other words, trademark law becomes an economic device which, opportunely designed, can produce incentives for maximising market efficiency. This role must, of course, be recognised, as a vast body of literature has done, with its many positive economic consequences. Nevertheless, trademark appears to have additional economic effects that should be properly recognized: it can determine the promotion of market power and the emergence of rent-seeking behaviours. It gives birth to an idiosyncratic economics of signs where very strong protection tends to be assured, even though the welfare effects are as yet poorly understood. In this domain much remains to be done and the challenge to researchers is open

Endogenous economic growth with disembodied knowledge

Mainstream endogenous growth models assume that new knowledge is embodied into either new intermediate or final goods, monopolistically supplied by the patent holder. Recent technological progress, however, often gives rise to pure intellectual contents, such as software codes or business models, directly usable in the production of final goods. Once a content of this type has been produced, it is in fixed supply, that is, the inventor can only rent it out (or sell it) or not; hence the quantity restriction typical of monopoly cannot arise, while competition is viable (Chantrel et al. 2012; Marchese and Privileggi 2016). We show that, however, as long as the inventor owning a patent can control through licence activation devices the access to the intellectual content of the workers using her invention in the final goods production, monopolistic exploitation becomes viable and will occur. It turns out that in this framework the income share of labor is smaller than in the Lab-Equipment economy, which represents the setting closest to our model. Moreover, with elastic labor supply also labor employment is negatively impacted. This implies that some standard public policies devised for correcting inefficiencies in development may perform poorly in this framework

A competitive idea-based growth model

In this paper we present a model in which endogenous growth arises in competitive markets. Knowledge is described as a factor used directly in the final goods' production. Firms demand both basic nonrival knowledge contents, which are supplied jointly and inelastically with raw labor, and further contents supplied by patent holders. This fact, together with Lindahl prices for knowledge, allows competition to work, while it also implies that workers' income share declines overtime. In a first version of the model with constant cost of knowledge production the first best is attained. In a further version of the model, in which the cost of knowledge production is allowed to change over time and thus intertemporal externalities arise, in a decentralized economy a second best equilibrium occurs in the transitional period, while in the long run there is convergence to efficiency