China's trade-off between economic benefits and sulfur dioxide emissions in changing global trade

China has been suffering from air quality degradation since its ascension into the World Trade Organization in 2001. The unequal exchange that occurs with international trade—that is, developed countries obtaining larger shares of trade‐related value added relative to the shares of trade‐related air pollution incurred locally—may obstruct the greening of global supply chains. In this study, we conduct a multi‐regional input‐output analysis to examine the change in the distribution of economic benefits and sulfur dioxide emissions underlying China's international trade from 2002 to 2015. The results show that both net trade‐related economic benefits and SO2 emissions in China rapidly increased from 2002 to 2007 and then decelerated after 2007 due to changes in China's green development strategy. In the past 13 years, China has suffered from economic‐environmental inequality due to trade with most developed countries, for example, the United States, the European Union, East Asia, and Canada. East Asia, particularly Japan and South Korea, became both an economic and environmental winner while trading with China in 2015. China has also outsourced emissions to less developed regions, such as Sub‐Saharan Africa. We propose policy implications to further reduce the economic‐environmental inequality underlying China's international trade

Energy’s Thirst for Water in China

Water scarcity and uneven water distribution pose significant challenges to sustainable development and energy production in China. Based on the International Energy Agency (IEA)’s energy strategy scenarios for China, we evaluated the water withdrawal for energy production from 2011 to 2030. The results show that the amount of water withdrawal will be increased by 77% in 2030, which will aggravate China’s water scarcity risk under current energy strategy. We also observed that 67% of the energy production in China occurs in areas that are facing water scarcity. Moreover, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan of Energy Development does not change the existing energy strategies, and the planned total energy production is much higher than the IEA’s projection, which will result in an increased demand for water resources. However, if China were to apply broad policies to reduce CO₂ emissions, the amount of water withdrawal would also decline compared with current energy strategy. Thus, reforming China’s energy structure and reducing energy usage are not only urgent because of climate challenges and air pollution but also essential to reducing the pressure of water scarcity

Correction to “Tension of Agricultural Land and Water Use in China’s Trade: Tele-Connections, Hidden Drivers and Potential Solutions”

The background color of Southwest in Figure 1f has been corrected. The numbers in Figure 5a [refer to net flows in 2012 (AWU)] have been corrected. The following numbers in the text that relate to the data in Figure 5a have also been corrected. (Figure Presented). Lines 1−3 of the right column of page 5371 should read as follows: The net virtual AWU export of Northeast, Northwest, and Central would increase by 72%, 172%, and 146%, respectively. Lines 5−8 of the right column of page 5371 should read as follows: The net virtual AWU export of the Northeast, Northwest, and Central would be reduced by 72%, 74%, and 61%, respectively, compared with those of 2012. Lines 10−12 of the right column of page 5371 should read as follows: The net virtual AWU export of Northeast, Northwest, and Central would be reduced by 55%, 24%, and 11%, respectively, when compared with SW3 of 2012. Lines 35−38 of the right column of page 5372 should read as follows: The increase of net virtual AWU export accounted for 8%, 26%, and 3% of the total water resources of Northeast, Northwest, and Central, respectively, in 2012 under possible economic growth scenarios until 2035. Lines 57−63 of the right column of page 5372 should read as follows: Upon combination of the possible economic development and reduction of water use intensity, the total virtual AWU flows would increase compared with SW2 (see SW3). The net virtual AWU export of Northeast, Northwest, and Central in SW3 would account for 5%, 11%, and 2%, respectively, of the total regional water resources in 2012.</p

Drivers of virtual water flows on regional water scarcity in China

Previous studies had shown that the virtual water flows had intensified local water scarcity of China. There is an urgent need to identify the drivers of virtual water flows and provide the potential options to reduce the impact of virtual water flows on regional water scarcity. Based on the multi-regional input-output model and structural decomposition analysis, we evaluated the redistribution of water withdrawal within China in 2002, 2007 and 2012, and then revealed the hidden driving forces of the changes in virtual water flows. For a specific province, the drivers had been divided into local and the rest of China. Here we found that: (1) The share of virtual water flows in interregional trade to total water withdrawal had increased (from 20.1% to 40.5%) during the study period. (2) The direction of virtual water flows has reversed between some Chinese regions. Northwest and Northeast regions have become the major virtual water exporters. (3) The virtual water flows hidden in traded products of agriculture, electricity and the chemical industry accounted for more than 83% of total virtual water flows. (4) Local efficiency gains and consumption pattern changes in other provinces were the main drivers for changes in virtual water flows. The water-scarce Northwest and Northeast of China had further increased virtual water export to the water-rich provinces in southern China. This trend could be curbed by improving water use efficiency and restraining water-intensive consumption. Our results could pinpoint areas to invest in water use efficiency and provide guidance for areas to restrain water-intensive consumption