Two-Stage Team Rent-Seeking: Experimental Analysis

This paper presents a two-stage team rent-seeking model with a contest prize that is not excludable among winning team members. When early effort is a perfect substitute for late effort, early actors can free ride on their late-moving teammates. However, when early and late efforts are complements, all team members exert positive effort levels. Asymmetries in early effort reduce effort choices for all late movers. The theory is tested with laboratory experimental methods. Although subjects overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium in all treatments, chosen effort levels provide limited support for the model. Early movers exerted higher effort in the complement treatment, and second-stage effort choices were broadly consistent with best response functions. Surprisingly, in both single-shot and repeated play environments, early movers in the substitute treatment did not free ride, choosing effort levels similar to those of late movers. [excerpt

Social Position and Distributive Justice: Experimental Evidence

Using a simple, double-blind dictator experiment, we examine the extent to which subjects\u27 choices of distributive shares are influenced by unearned social position. We measure social position by the initial distributive shares (resources) and the subjects\u27 ability to determine the final distributive shares (power). We find that subjects\u27 decisions are consistent with Rawls\u27 (1971) hypothesis that individuals expect a greater share when in a position with more power and initial resources. Finally, we test if subjects\u27 choices under a laboratory veil of ignorance are consistent with Rawls\u27 concept of distributive justice. Veiled individuals exhibit preferences that are less risk-averse and have greater variance than Rawls hypothesized. [excerpt

An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game

When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the exchange. This holdout problem is a common feature of the land-assembly literature because development frequently requires the assembly of multiple parcels of land. We use experimental methods to examine holdout behavior in a laboratory bargaining game that involves multi-person groups, complementary exchanges, and holdout externalities. The results of six treatments that vary the bargaining institution, number of bargaining periods, and cost of delay demonstrate that holdout is common across institutions and is, on average, a payoff-improving strategy for responders. Both proposers and responders take a more aggressive initial bargaining stance in multi-period bargaining treatments relative to single-period treatments, but take a less aggressive bargaining stance when delay is costly. Nearly all exchanges eventually occur in our multi-period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiency relative to the single-period treatments, both with and without delay costs. [excerpt

Endowment Effects and Contribution Strategies in Public Good Experiments

We investigate behavior in a laboratory public good experiment with unique endowment schemes that allow a wider range of contribution strategies than in standard voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) experiments. A baseline treatment follows a standard VCM design (subjects receive 10 tokens in each of 10 rounds that may be allocated between a private account and a group account). In a new carry-over treatment, any tokens not allocated to the group account in the current period are made available for contributions in future periods. Under full endowment, subjects receive 100 tokens in round one (rather than 10 tokens per round for each of 10 rounds). In the pledge treatment, subjects’ allocation decisions for an initial endowment of 100 tokens may be changed in any round and are binding only for the final round. We find that the size of the effective endowment and whether contributions are binding significantly impact subject decision making. Deviations from the free riding outcome are greater when subjects have a larger portion of their total endowment earlier in the experiment, and subjects contribute less when their contribution decisions are bindin

Statistical inference about the relative efficiency of a new survey protocol, based on paired-tow survey calibration data

Paired-tow calibration studies provide information on changes in survey catchability that may occur because of some necessary change in protocols (e.g., change in vessel or vessel gear) in a fish stock survey. This information is important to ensure the continuity of annual time-series of survey indices of stock size that provide the basis for fish stock assessments. There are several statistical models used to analyze the paired-catch data from calibration studies. Our main contributions are results from simulation experiments designed to measure the accuracy of statistical inferences derived from some of these models. Our results show that a model commonly used to analyze calibration data can provide unreliable statistical results when there is between-tow spatial variation in the stock densities at each paired-tow site. However, a generalized linear mixed-effects model gave very reliable results over a wide range of spatial variations in densities and we recommend it for the analysis of paired-tow survey calibration data. This conclusion also applies if there is between-tow variation in catchability

Marital status distribution of the U.K. military: Does it differ from the general population?

UK media suggest UK military personnel have high divorce rates; to date, these claims are not substantiated. Marital status distribution of the general population and military were compared using data from the Office for National Statistics marital projections (2008) and a military cohort study (2007 – 2009), respectively. Data from the military cohort study was collected via questionnaire with a response rate of 56% for the overall cohort questionnaire and 99.5% for the martial status question. Overall, military personnel (59.4%) were more likely to be married than the general population (49.3%) and less likely to be divorced (3.7%) than the general population (10.0%). Military females and military personnel married under 30 years of age are more likely to report divorce. Military welfare services might target these groups with programs assisting marital relationships

Biobanks in the United States: How to Identify an Undefined and Rapidly Evolving Population

As part of a larger organizational study, we sought to survey biobanks in the United States. However, we encountered two problems with this population. First, no common definition of biobanks exists. Second, no census is available of these facilities from which to sample in order to implement a survey. In light of these problems, we employed a multifaceted approach using electronic searches of PubMed, RePORTER, and Google. In addition, we systematically searched for biobanks housed within universities that have NIH-designated Clinical and Translational Science Awards (CTSA). We expanded this part of the search by looking for biobanks among all members of the American Association of Medical Colleges (AAMC). Finally, we added banks to our database found previously by other researchers and banks found via correspondence with our colleagues. Our search strategy produced a database of 624 biobanks for which we were able to confirm contact information in order to conduct our online survey. Another 140 biobanks were identified but did not respond to our requests to confirm their existence or contact information. In order to maximize both the uniqueness of banks found and the greatest return on effort for each search, we suggest targeting resources that are already organized. In our work, these included the CTSA, AAMC, and part of the Google searches. We contend that our search provides a model for analysis of new fields of research and/or rapidly evolving industries. Furthermore, our approach demonstrates that with the appropriate tools it is possible to develop a systematic and comprehensive database to investigate undefined populations

The UN in the lab

We consider two alternatives to inaction for governments combating terrorism, which we term Defense and Prevention. Defense consists of investing in resources that reduce the impact of an attack, and generates a negative externality to other governments, making their countries a more attractive objective for terrorists. In contrast, Prevention, which consists of investing in resources that reduce the ability of the terrorist organization to mount an attack, creates a positive externality by reducing the overall threat of terrorism for all. This interaction is captured using a simple 3×3 “Nested Prisoner’s Dilemma” game, with a single Nash equilibrium where both countries choose Defense. Due to the structure of this interaction, countries can benefit from coordination of policy choices, and international institutions (such as the UN) can be utilized to facilitate coordination by implementing agreements to share the burden of Prevention. We introduce an institution that implements a burden-sharing policy for Prevention, and investigate experimentally whether subjects coordinate on a cooperative strategy more frequently under different levels of cost sharing. In all treatments, burden sharing leaves the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure and Nash equilibrium of the game unchanged. We compare three levels of burden sharing to a baseline in a between-subjects design, and find that burden sharing generates a non-linear effect on the choice of the efficient Prevention strategy and overall performance. Only an institution supporting a high level of mandatory burden sharing generates a significant improvement in the use of the Prevention strategy

Stewardship Practices of U.S. Biobanks

Biobanks require new governance models that address their ethical and regulatory challenges. One model relies on stewardship of specimens throughout their life course. Here, we discuss findings from our survey of 456 U.S. biobank managers that addressed whether and how biobanks steward their specimens. The findings reveal that most bio-banks do not create ongoing relationships with contributors but do practice stewardship over storing and sharing of specimens. Biobanks now need guidance to fully articulate stewardship practices that ensure respect for contributors while facilitating research