A note on the power divergence in lattice calculations of ΔI=1/2\Delta I = 1/2 K→ππK\to\pi\pi amplitudes at MK=MπM_{K}=M_{\pi}

In this note, we clarify a point concerning the power divergence in lattice calculations of $\Delta I = 1/2$ $K\to\pi\pi$ decay amplitudes. There have been worries that this divergence might show up in the Minkowski amplitudes at $M_{K}=M_{\pi}$ with all the mesons at rest. Here we demonstrate, via an explicit calculation in leading-order Chiral Perturbation Theory, that the power divergence is absent at the above kinematic point, as predicted by CPS symmetry.Comment: 5 pages, 2 figure

National Pastime(s)

In his new book, Baseball as a Road to God, New York University President and Professor of Law John Sexton submits that baseball can serve as a vehicle for living a more conscious life that elevates the human experience for lawyers and non-lawyers. This Essay examines the credibility of the book’s thesis in a world where human intelligence, human deliberation, and human action is being replaced by artificial intelligence, mathematical models, and mechanical automation. It uses the preeminent national pastime of baseball, and the less eminent pastimes of law and finance as case studies for the book’s thesis. It concludes that a more conscious and meaningful life is much harder to foster, but also much more important to cultivate in light of modern advances. This Essay ultimately offers a different narrative for lawyers and non-lawyers to think anew about modern law and society in light of ongoing changes in baseball, law, finance, and beyond

Business Warfare

Businesses are under attack. State and non-state adversaries are assaulting companies using drones, mercenaries, cyberweapons, sanctions, and restrictions. Instead of military installations and government institutions, private firms are often the preferred targets in this mode of warfare. Instead of soldiers and squadrons with bullets and bombs, the weapons of choice are frequently economic hostilities and cyberattacks. This is the new war on business. This Article offers an original examination of contemporary business warfare, its growing importance to national and corporate affairs, and the need for better pragmatic approaches to understanding and addressing its rising threat to our economic stability, national security, and social welfare. It begins by providing an overview of the business theater of war, investigating the combatants, targets, and weapons. Next, this Article analyzes recent episodes of business warfare involving the United States, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China to ground the theoretical discussion in the real world. These case studies illustrate the complex matrix of considerations posed by business warfare. The Article then contends with the fundamental legal and practical tensions of economic impact, business hostilities, cyberattacks, and non-state actors that emanate from business warfare. Finally, moving from problems to solutions, this Article proposes three workable initiatives to better protect firms and nations against the risks of business warfare. Specifically, it argues for robust business war games, smart cybersecurity guidance and incentives, as well as greater supply chain and market diversification. Ultimately, this Article aspires to provide a practical blueprint for government and corporate leaders to reflect, plan, and act with more urgency about the consequential realities of business warfare

Executive Trade Secrets

The law discriminates among a corporation’s secrets. In the eyes of the law, commercial secrets of corporations are legitimate secrets that deserve legal protection and nondisclosure, but personal secrets of executives are not as deserving of legal protection and nondisclosure. This divergent treatment of secrets has resulted in a legal landscape of perplexing, paradoxical paths for corporations and executives concerning executive disclosures — a precarious landscape that has left corporations and investors dangerously susceptible to revelations of private facts that shock market valuation and institutional stability.This Article explores this divergent treatment of secrets in the context of public corporations and the private individuals who manage them, and offers a new way of thinking about corporate and personal secrets. This Article conceives the concept of Executive Trade Secrets as a pragmatic theoretical framework for unlocking this paradox of secrets and addressing the challenges surrounding executive disclosures. This Article is the first to use trade secrets law to address the interdisciplinary legal issues surrounding executive disclosures. It re-conceptualizes private matters of executives as legally protectable trade secrets by unfolding the hidden symmetry between commercial secrets and personal secrets. It reveals Executive Trade Secrets as faithful to the first principles of the laws of trade secrets, privacy, securities, and corporations, and explains how such fidelity protects the privacy interests of executives and the corporate interests of shareholders. This Article, ultimately, constructs a way to think anew about executive disclosures and the larger issues at the modern nexus of secrecy, privacy, and commerce

The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives

This Essay explores the special corporate governance challenges posed by iconic executives. Iconic executives are complex, bittersweet figures in corporate governance narratives. They are alluring, larger-than-life corporate figures who often govern freely. Iconic executives frequently rule like monarchs over their firms, offering lofty promises to shareholders, directors, and managers under their reign. But like many stories of powerful and influential figures, the narratives of iconic executives also contain adversity and danger. Part of the acquiescence and enchantment with such figures is rooted in the virtuous promises embodied by their presence, promises of unity, accountability, and effectiveness in corporate governance. Unfortunately, for many shareholders, these promises turn out to be illusory, empty, and full of peril. The threatening hollowness of such promises exists because the virtues of unity, accountability, and effectiveness pledged by iconic executives also contain the vices of excessive deference, overconfidence, and licentiousness. Given such dangerous duplicity, this Essay calls for greater governance of iconic executives

A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk

This article provides the first critical analysis and redesign of the existing securities risk disclosure framework given new insights from the emerging, interdisciplinary field of behavioral economics. Disclosure is the principle at the heart of federal securities regulation. Beneath that core principle of disclosure is the basic assumption that the reasonable investor is the idealized über-rational person of neoclassical economic theory. Therefore, once armed with the requisite information investors presumably can protect themselves through rational choice. Descriptively, however, real investors are not like their rational, neoclassical kin. This article examines this incongruence between the idealized rational investor and the imperfect actual investor, explores the consequences of this incongruence on risk assessment in investments, and highlights several shortcomings of risk disclosures as a result of it. Then, to address these shortcomings, this article argues for a better capture of the advantages of disclosure-based risk regulations, and proposes a new behavioral framework for securities risk disclosure built on relative likelihood and relative impact of dynamic risks. In doing so, this article challenges the conventional wisdom that securities risk management should be done primarily through increased government oversight and enforcement, and promotes the underappreciated utility of disclosure as a powerful, complementary risk management tool in the modern financial regulatory landscape. In advocacy of this contention, this article closes with a discussion of key implications of the proposed framework, namely how it could improve disclosure drafting, simplify transparency, increase financial literacy, lower information costs, and enhance financial arbitrage

Too Big to Fail, Too Blind to See

Too Big to Fail by Andrew Ross Sorkin offers a meticulous re-telling of one of the most important periods in recent history. As regulators, bankers, lawyers, scholars, and other interested parties sift through the rubble in search of knowledge about the crash, Too Big to Fail serves both as a chronicle of the recent past and a cautionary tale for the immediate future. Acknowledging past missteps, uncovering root causes, and correcting systemic shortcomings to prevent similar failure is arguably the key economic and regulatory challenge of our time. Part I of this Essay summarizes key episodes of the financial crisis as covered by Too Big to Fail. Part II examines a potential explanation of the crisis unexplored in the book in light of the decline of neoclassical economic theory and the emergence of behavioral economic theory

The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives

This Essay explores the special corporate governance challenges posed by iconic executives. Iconic executives are complex, bittersweet figures in corporate governance narratives. They are alluring, larger-than-life corporate figures who often govern freely. Iconic executives frequently rule like monarchs over their firms, offering lofty promises to shareholders, directors, and managers under their reign. But like many stories of powerful and influential figures, the narratives of iconic executives also contain adversity and danger. Part of the acquiescence and enchantment with such figures is rooted in the virtuous promises embodied by their presence, promises of unity, accountability, and effectiveness in corporate governance. Unfortunately, for many shareholders, these promises turn out to be illusory, empty, and full of peril. The threatening hollowness of such promises exists because the virtues of unity, accountability, and effectiveness pledged by iconic executives also contain the vices of excessive deference, overconfidence, and licentiousness. Given such dangerous duplicity, this Essay calls for greater governance of iconic executives

Too Big to Fail, Too Blind to See

Too Big to Fail by Andrew Ross Sorkin offers a meticulous re-telling of one of the most important periods in recent history. As regulators, bankers, lawyers, scholars, and other interested parties sift through the rubble in search of knowledge about the crash, Too Big to Fail serves both as a chronicle of the recent past and a cautionary tale for the immediate future. Acknowledging past missteps, uncovering root causes, and correcting systemic shortcomings to prevent similar failure is arguably the key economic and regulatory challenge of our time. Part I of this Essay summarizes key episodes of the financial crisis as covered by Too Big to Fail. Part II examines a potential explanation of the crisis unexplored in the book in light of the decline of neoclassical economic theory and the emergence of behavioral economic theory