31 research outputs found

    Network Cournot Competition

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    Cournot competition is a fundamental economic model that represents firms competing in a single market of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize its utility---a function of the production cost as well as market price of the product---by deciding on the amount of production. In today's dynamic and diverse economy, many firms often compete in more than one market simultaneously, i.e., each market might be shared among a subset of these firms. In this situation, a bipartite graph models the access restriction where firms are on one side, markets are on the other side, and edges demonstrate whether a firm has access to a market or not. We call this game \emph{Network Cournot Competition} (NCC). In this paper, we propose algorithms for finding pure Nash equilibria of NCC games in different situations. First, we carefully design a potential function for NCC, when the price functions for markets are linear functions of the production in that market. However, for nonlinear price functions, this approach is not feasible. We model the problem as a nonlinear complementarity problem in this case, and design a polynomial-time algorithm that finds an equilibrium of the game for strongly convex cost functions and strongly monotone revenue functions. We also explore the class of price functions that ensures strong monotonicity of the revenue function, and show it consists of a broad class of functions. Moreover, we discuss the uniqueness of equilibria in both of these cases which means our algorithms find the unique equilibria of the games. Last but not least, when the cost of production in one market is independent from the cost of production in other markets for all firms, the problem can be separated into several independent classical \emph{Cournot Oligopoly} problems. We give the first combinatorial algorithm for this widely studied problem

    Endogenous Risks and Learning in Climate Change Decision Analysis

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    We analyze the effects of risks and learning on climate change decisions. A two-stage, dynamic, climate change stabilization problem is formulated. The explicit incorporation of ex-post learning induces risk aversion among ex-ante decisions, which is characterized in linear models by VaR- and CVaR-type risk measures. Combined with explicit introduction of "safety" constraints, it creates a "hit-or-miss" type decision-making situation and shows that, even in linear models, learning may lead to either less-or more restrictive ex-ante emission reductions. We analyze stylized elements of the model in order to identify the key factors driving outcomes, in particular, the critical role of quantiles of probability distributions characterizing key uncertainties

    Opportunities for advances in climate change economics

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    There have been dramatic advances in understanding the physical science of climate change, facilitated by substantial and reliable research support. The social value of these advances depends on understanding their implications for society, an arena where research support has been more modest and research progress slower. Some advances have been made in understanding and formalizing climate-economy linkages, but knowledge gaps remain [e.g., as discussed in (1, 2)]. We outline three areas where we believe research progress on climate economics is both sorely needed, in light of policy relevance, and possible within the next few years given appropriate funding: (i) refining the social cost of carbon (SCC), (ii) improving understanding of the consequences of particular policies, and (iii) better understanding of the economic impacts and policy choices in developing economies

    Comment on Soregaroli and Wesseler: Minimum distance requirements and liability: implications for co-existence

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