Constitutions and Policy Comparisons

Voters in democracies can learn from the experience of neighbouring states: about policy in a direct democracy (`policy experimentation'), about the quality of their politicians in a representative democracy (`yardstick competition'). Learning between states creates spillovers from policy choice, and also from constitutional choice. I model these spillovers in a simple principal-agent framework, and show that voter welfare may be maximized by a mixture of representative and direct democratic states. Because of this, empirical work examining voter welfare under direct democracy may need to be reinterpreted. Also, I show that the optimal mix of constitutions cannot always be achieved in a constitutional choice equilibrium involving many states. </jats:p

Was it worth it? : the territorial reform in the canton of Glarus

This paper examines the financial impact of the 2011 reform of the local governments and jurisdictions in the canton of Glarus. After a popular vote 70 public entities were reorganized to form three large uniformed communes. Previous research showed that amalgamations do not automatically lead to savings in public expenditures and economies of scale. We empirically apply the synthetic control method and show that the territorial reform realized some savings in public expenditure. However, the effect of the reorganization of tasks and responsibilities between the canton and the communes was more influential. The reform must be understood as a horizontal and vertical venture that encompasses both the communes and the canton, much more far-reaching than a pure local territorial reform

&ldquor;Kosten der Kleinheit&rdquor; und die Föderalismusdebatte in der Schweiz

This article discusses the smallness of subsidiary jurisdictions as a third dimension of centrality, besides vertical centrality and fragmentation (horizontal centrality). A panel analysis concerning all 26 Swiss cantons (from 1990 to 2003) shows that public expenditure per capita increases with the number of inhabitants of a canton. This holds for the aggregate expenditure level and for six expenditure categories of the Government Finance Statistics. The positive elasticity of per capita expenditure with respect to population size can be understood as an indicator for increasing government failure in jurisdictions with bigger population size. Copyright 2008 der Autor Journal compilation 2008, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government

Controlling government is a primary focus of the politico-economic literature. Recently, various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective, most importantly balanced budget rules, fiscal federalism, and direct democracy. However, one type of institution has been neglected so far: elected competitors to the government. Such institutional competition between the government and an independent agency can be found at the Swiss local level, where finance Commissions compete with the government. In some parts of Switzerland, local finance commissions can ex ante criticize government projects and bring alternative policy proposals onto the political agenda, which are then voted on by the citizens. Thus, they become strong competitors to the government. We econometrically investigate this institutional setting by comparing the 26 Swiss cantons. We find the power of the local finance commission to have an economically relevant, statistically significant and robust negative effect on the tax burden and on public expenditures. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007Political economics, Political control institution, Institutional competition, Audit court,

Palynostratigraphy of dinosaur footprint-bearing deposits from theTriassic–Jurassic boundary interval of Sweden

The Triassic–Jurassic boundary (c. 200 Ma) marks one of the five largest Phanerozoic mass extinction events and is characterized by a major turnover in biotas. A palynological study of sedimentary rock slabs bearing dinosaur footprints from Rhaeto–Hettangian strata of Skåne, Sweden was carried out. The theropod dinosaur footprints (Kayentapus soltykovensis) derive from the southern part of the abandoned Vallåkra quarry (Höganäs Formation) and were originally dated as earliest Jurassic (Hettangian) based on lithostratigraphy. Our results reveal that two of the footprints are correlative with the latest Triassic (latest Rhaetian) disaster zone typified by a high abundance of the enigmatic gymnosperm pollen Ricciisporites tuberculatus and Perinopollenites elatoides together with the key taxon Limbosporites lundbladii and fern spores. Two footprints are dated to correlate with the Transitional Spore-spike Interval. One footprint is interpreted as Hettangian in age based on the relatively high abundance of Pinuspollenites spp. together with the presence of the key taxa Retitriletes semimuris and Zebrasporites intercriptus. Our new palynological study suggests that the Kayentapus ichnogenus already appeared in the end of Triassic, and our study highlights the use of palynology as a powerful tool to date historical collections of fossils in museums, universities and elsewhere. The Hettangian footprint reflects a marine influence while all other studied ichnofossil specimens occur in non-marine (floodplain and delta interdistributary) sediments. The sediments associated with the Hettangian footprint include a significant proportion of charcoal transported from land after wildfires. The Rhaeto–Hettangian vegetation was otherwise characterized by multi-storey gymnosperm–pteridophyte communities

The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy

Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives’ potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the European Parliament is not sufficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU level. The introduction of elements of direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent assignment of competencies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power. A European federation should be organized according to the principles of competitive federalism. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005