Equality and information

Traditional outcome-orientated egalitarian principles require access to information about the size of individual holdings. Recent egalitarian political theory has sought to accommodate considerations of responsibility. Such a move may seem problematic, in that a new informational burden is thereby introduced, with no apparent decrease in the existing burden. This article uses a simple model with simulated data to examine the extent to which outcome egalitarianism and responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (‘luck egalitarianism’) can be accurately applied where information is incomplete or erroneous. It is found that, while outcome egalitarianism tends to be more accurately applied, its advantage is not overwhelming, and in many prima facie plausible circumstances luck egalitarianism would be more accurately applied. This suggests that luck egalitarianism cannot be rejected as utopian. Furthermore, while some argue that, in practice, luck egalitarianism is best realized indirectly, by securing equality of outcome, our evidence suggests that a luck egalitarian rule of regulation offers a far more accurate implementation of the luck egalitarian ideal than does an outcome egalitarian rule of regulation

What is grandfathering?

Emissions grandfathering maintains that prior emissions increase future emission entitlements. The view forms a large part of actual emission control frameworks, but is routinely dismissed by political theorists and applied philosophers as evidently unjust. A sympathetic theoretical reconsideration of grandfathering suggests that the most plausible version is moderate, allowing that other considerations should influence emission entitlements, and be justified on instrumental grounds. The most promising instrumental justification defends moderate grandfathering on the basis that one extra unit of emission entitlements from a baseline of zero emissions increases welfare to a greater extent where it is assigned to a high emitter than where it is assigned to a low emitter. Moderate grandfathering can be combined with basic needs and ability to pay considerations to provide an attractive approach to allocating emission entitlements

Benefiting from injustice and brute luck

Many political philosophers maintain that beneficiaries of injustice are under special obligations to assist victims of injustice. However, the examples favored by those who endorse this view equally support an alternative luck egalitarian view, which holds that special obligations should be assigned to those with good brute luck. From this perspective the distinguishing features of the benefiting view are (1) its silence on the question of whether to allocate special obligations to assist the brute luck worse off to those who are well off as a matter of brute luck but not as a result of injustice, and (2) its silence on the question of whether to allocate assistance to those who are badly off as a matter of brute luck but not as a result of injustice. In this new light, the benefiting view is harder to justify

In defence of cosmopolitanism

David Miller has objected to the cosmopolitan argument that it is arbitrary and hence unfair to treat individuals differently on account of things for which they are not responsible. Such a view seems to require, implausibly, that individuals be treated identically even where (unchosen) needs differ. The objection is, however, inapplicable where the focus of cosmopolitan concern is arbitrary disadvantage rather than arbitrary treatment. This 'unfair disadvantage argument' supports a form of global luck egalitarianism. Miller also objects that cosmopolitanism is unable to accommodate special obligations generated by national membership. Cosmopolitanism can, however, accommodate many special obligations to compatriots. Those which it cannot accommodate are only morally compelling if we assume what the objection claims to prove - that cosmopolitanism is mistaken. Cosmopolitanism construed as global luck egalitarianism is therefore able to withstand both of Miller's objections, and has significant independent appeal on account of the unfair disadvantage argument

Distributive luck

This article explores the Rawlsian goal of ensuring that distributions are not influenced by the morally arbitrary. It does so by bringing discussions of distributive justice into contact with the debate over moral luck initiated by Williams and Nagel. Rawls’ own justice as fairness appears to be incompatible with the arbitrariness commitment, as it creates some equalities arbitrarily. A major rival, Dworkin’s version of brute luck egalitarianism, aims to be continuous with ordinary ethics, and so is (a) sensitive to non-philosophical beliefs about free will and responsibility, and (b) allows inequalities to arise on the basis of option luck. But Dworkin does not present convincing reasons in support of continuity, and there are compelling moral reasons for justice to be sensitive to the best philosophical account of free will and responsibility, as is proposed by the revised brute luck egalitarianism of Arneson and Cohen. While Dworkinian brute luck egalitarianism admits three sorts of morally arbitrary disadvantaging which correspond to three forms of moral luck (constitutive, circumstantial, and option luck), revised brute luck egalitarianism does not disadvantage on the basis of constitutive or circumstantial luck. But it is not as sensitive to responsibility as it needs to be to fully extinguish the influence of the morally arbitrary, for persons under it may exercise their responsibility equivalently yet end up with different outcomes on account of option luck. It is concluded that egalitarians should deny the existence of distributive luck, which is luck in the levels of advantage that individuals are du

The injustice of discrimination

Discrimination might be considered unjust on account of the comparative disadvantage it imposes, the absolute disadvantage it imposes, the disrespect it shows, or the prejudice it shows. This article argues that each of these accounts overlooks some cases of unjust discrimination. In response to this state of affairs we might combine two or more of these accounts. A promising approach combines the comparative disadvantage and absolute disadvantage accounts

Transport, trading and retailing. QLIF subproject 6: Development of strategies to improve quality and safety and reduce costs along the food supply chain

One of the aims of QLIF subproject 6 was to provide a better understanding of the supply chain performance and the collaboration system of organic supply chains. A notable finding was that supply chain actors with a high collaboration index outperformed respondents with a lower collaboration in terms of overall, non-financial and financial performance. Also, there is evidence that the higher the perceived risk for quality and safety is, the higher the probability that collaborative practices were in place. Nevertheless, overall, the level of collaboration is still too low. In a second part of QLIF subproject 6, HACCP case studies and training courses have been developed with special reference to organic agriculture. A HACCP approach to food safety management can be applied throughout the food chain, from farm to fork. Although a HACCP approach is not a legal requirement in primary production in the EU, it is recognised as an effective and logical means for food safety control that is equally applicable to agriculture including organic and low-input production systems

Long baseline vector determinations and intercomparisons

The East Coast very long baseline interferometry (VLBI) group has performed about 60 experiments over the last 10 years in the process of developing and exploiting advanced VLBI techniques. Of those, the most recent 14 experiments are briefly described

Development of a software safety process and a case study of its use

The goal of this research is to continue the development of a comprehensive approach to software safety and to evaluate the approach with a case study. The case study is a major part of the project, and it involves the analysis of a specific safety-critical system from the medical equipment domain. The particular application being used was selected because of the availability of a suitable candidate system. We consider the results to be generally applicable and in no way particularly limited by the domain. The research is concentrating on issues raised by the specification and verification phases of the software lifecycle since they are central to our previously-developed rigorous definitions of software safety. The theoretical research is based on our framework of definitions for software safety. In the area of specification, the main topics being investigated are the development of techniques for building system fault trees that correctly incorporate software issues and the development of rigorous techniques for the preparation of software safety specifications. The research results are documented. Another area of theoretical investigation is the development of verification methods tailored to the characteristics of safety requirements. Verification of the correct implementation of the safety specification is central to the goal of establishing safe software. The empirical component of this research is focusing on a case study in order to provide detailed characterizations of the issues as they appear in practice, and to provide a testbed for the evaluation of various existing and new theoretical results, tools, and techniques. The Magnetic Stereotaxis System is summarized

Egalitarian justice and valuational judgment

Contemporary discussions of egalitarian justice have often focused on the issue of expensive taste. G.A. Cohen has recently abandoned the view that all chosen disadvantages are non-compensable, now maintaining that chosen expensive judgmental tastes—those endorsed by valuational judgment—are compensable as it is unreasonable to expect persons not to develop them. But chosen expensive brute taste—the main type of non-compensable expensive taste on the new scheme—cannot be described in such a way that there is a normative difference between it and chosen expensive judgmental taste. As there are related problems with denying compensation for the other kind of expensive taste that might remain non-compensable, Cohen's position on taste appears to be either implausible or virtually indistinguishable from that of equality of welfare. However, compensation for valuational judgment-based expensive taste might be justified on grounds of responsibility