Guilt and Child Soldiers

The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is an increasing global concern. Although philosophers have examined whether child soldiers can be considered combatants in war, much less attention has been paid to their moral responsibility. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Here I argue that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate. The feelings of guilt that child soldiers experience are not self-censure; rather their guilt arises from their attempts to come to terms with what they see as their own morally ambiguous motives. Their guilt is appropriate because it reaffirms their commitment to morality and facilitates their self-forgiveness

Revisiting Folk Moral Realism

Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. According to one of the most prominent arguments in favour of this view, ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that realism is true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming is supported by psychological research on folk metaethics. While most recent research has been thought to contradict this claim, four prominent earlier studies (by Goodwin and Darley, Wainryb et al., Nichols, and Nichols and Folds-Bennett) indeed seem to suggest a tendency towards realism. My aim in this paper is to provide a detailed internal critique of these four studies. I argue that, once interpreted properly, all of them turn out in line with recent research. They suggest that most ordinary people experience morality as “pluralist-” rather than realist-seeming, i.e., that ordinary people have the intuition that realism is true with regard to some moral issues, but variants of anti-realism are true with regard to others. This result means that moral realism may be less well justified than commonly assumed

Does intra-individual variability in narration matter and for what?

Building on calls to examine intra-individual variability in personality, we examined such variability in narrative. In Study 1, participants (n = 553) provided three narratives (either self-defining, turning point, transgression, low point, or trauma memories; n = 1659 narratives). Narratives were coded for coherence, autobiographical reasoning, resolution, and emotional expression. Variability was highest for resolution, lowest for coherence, and was related to well-being, depending on narrative feature and event type. In Study 2, participants (n = 103) engaged in a ‘narrative recognition’ task to see if they could identify which narratives came from the same individual. Recognizability was substantial, but not related to variability or well-being. Results showcase the importance of addressing intra-individual variability by narrative feature and event type