Why Terror Networks are Dissimilar: How Structure Relates to Function

Abstract Theories on international terrorist networks are wrought with contradiction. On the one hand, networks that support or facilitate politically motivated violent extremism are thought to pose a threat because they are centralized and hierarchical. On the other hand, the same networks are thought to pose a threat because they are decentralized and operate autonomously. Social networks analysis (SNA) makes it possible to resolve this apparent contradiction by controlling across countries for characteristics and structure of networks linked to the same terrorist organization relative to different functions that such networks perform. One terrorist organization for which sufficient open-source data exist to mount a systematic comparison is Al-Shabaab (AS). Comparing traits such as brokers, centrality characteristics of nodes, international linkages, and use of funds, the chapter compares AS networks as they relate to recruitment, fundraising and attacks across the United States and Australia with corroborating evidence from Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark. Although networks differ markedly across these attributes, unrelated networks performing similar functions are consistent in their nature and structure. These findings suggest that networks are functionally differentiated insofar as they serve as strategic repertoires. This is a significant finding. Knowing how a network's function is related strategically to its structure means being able to infer a network's function if only its structure is known and, conversely, being able to infer a network's structure if only its function is known. Not only does SNA thereby facilitate detection and dismantling of networks, it also suggests that recruitment, fundraising and attack networks require differentiated approaches by defence and security agencies insofar as SNA shows them to be distinct phenomena

Scaled distribution mapping: a bias correction method that preserves raw climate model projected changes

Commonly used bias correction methods such as quantile mapping (QM) assume the function of error correction values between modeled and observed distributions are stationary or time invariant. This article finds that this function of the error correction values cannot be assumed to be stationary. As a result, QM lacks justification to inflate/deflate various moments of the climate change signal. Previous adaptations of QM, most notably quantile delta mapping (QDM), have been developed that do not rely on this assumption of stationarity. Here, we outline a methodology called scaled distribution mapping (SDM), which is conceptually similar to QDM, but more explicitly accounts for the frequency of rain days and the likelihood of individual events. The SDM method is found to outperform QM, QDM, and detrended QM in its ability to better preserve raw climate model projected changes to meteorological variables such as temperature and precipitation

Demographic change and conflict in Northern Ireland: reconciling qualitative and quantitative evidence

Recent large-N quantitative studies have failed to uncover a link between demographic change and conflict. This seems to refute quite powerful qualitative evidence from small-scale case studies that such a relationship exists. This article attempts to reconcile the conflicting evidence by revealing how population change—in this case a major decline in the size of the Protestant majority—matters for violent conflict, but not in a direct way. In addition, relationships differ by level of geography. In the case of Northern Ireland, no significant quantitative association exists between ethnic change and violence. This holds across both geographic units and years. However, there is a significant association between ethnic demography and Protestant mobilization into the Orange Order across counties. This in turn is related to Protestant resistance to reforms aimed at extending civil rights to the Catholic population during the Stormont period. This stance was a major factor in generating Catholic support for IRA violence. Moreover, in specific locations, a direct link between Protestant population decline relative to Catholics and loyalist violence against Catholics is evident. Hence demography matters, but in conjunction with other factors, and several steps upstream from the outbreak of violence

Diverse perspectives on interdisciplinarity from members of the college of the Royal Society of Canada

Various multiple-disciplinary terms and concepts (although most commonly “interdisciplinarity,” which is used herein) are used to frame education, scholarship, research, and interactions within and outside academia. In principle, the premise of interdisciplinarity may appear to have many strengths; yet, the extent to which interdisciplinarity is embraced by the current generation of academics, the benefits and risks for doing so, and the barriers and facilitators to achieving interdisciplinarity, represent inherent challenges. Much has been written on the topic of interdisciplinarity, but to our knowledge there have been few attempts to consider and present diverse perspectives from scholars, artists, and scientists in a cohesive manner. As a team of 57 members from the Canadian College of New Scholars, Artists, and Scientists of the Royal Society of Canada (the College) who self-identify as being engaged or interested in interdisciplinarity, we provide diverse intellectual, cultural, and social perspectives. The goal of this paper is to share our collective wisdom on this topic with the broader community and to stimulate discourse and debate on the merits and challenges associated with interdisciplinarity. Perhaps the clearest message emerging from this exercise is that working across established boundaries of scholarly communities is rewarding, necessary, and is more likely to result in impact. However, there are barriers that limit the ease with which this can occur (e.g., lack of institutional structures and funding to facilitate cross-disciplinary exploration). Occasionally, there can be significant risk associated with doing interdisciplinary work (e.g., lack of adequate measurement or recognition of work by disciplinary peers). Solving many of the world’s complex and pressing problems (e.g., climate change, sustainable agriculture, the burden of chronic disease, and aging populations) demands thinking and working across long-standing, but in some ways restrictive, academic boundaries. Academic institutions and key support structures, especially funding bodies, will play an important role in helping to realize what is readily apparent to all who contributed to this paper—that interdisciplinarity is essential for solving complex problems; it is the new norm. Failure to empower and encourage those doing this research will serve as a great impediment to training, knowledge, and addressing societal issues

WegenerNet climate station network region Feldbach, Austria: network structure, processing system, and example results

The WegenerNet climate station network is a pioneering weather and climate observation experiment at very high resolution in southeastern Austria. The network comprises 151 meteorological stations within a limited area of approximately 20 km × 15 km centered near the town of Feldbach. Measurements include the parameters air temperature, relative humidity, precipitation amount, and others at selected stations (e.g. wind and soil parameters). The temporal sampling is 5 min except 30 min sampling of soil measurements. All data pass a Quality Control System and the provided data products include station data (~1.4 km × 1.4 km grid) and gridded data (1 km × 1 km and 0.01° × 0.01° grids) on various temporal scales (from 5 min to annual). For application purposes all data are available in near real time (data latency less than 1–2 h in standard operation) via the WegenerNet data portal (www.wegenernet.org)

Homegrown islamist radicalization in Canada: Process insights from an attitudinal survey

Theories of radicalization make implicit predictions about variation among attitudes in the communities from which radicals are drawn. This article subjects some popular theories to empirical testing. The precise process by which individuals come to sympathize with, provide material support for or actually engage in political violence is fully comprehensible only by longitudinal analysis, but much existing work tries to reconstruct the process by looking only at one part of its outcomes: those who have become radicalized. The result is a large number of theories and mechanisms, with little compelling empirical support. A cross-sectional snapshot of an at-risk community cannot definitively support a particular theory of radicalization, but it can rule out those whose predictions about attitudes are at variance with the empirical observations. We designed a survey instrument to measure attitudes to issues widely believed to be relevant to radicalization and deployed it among Muslim communities in Ottawa. The results are remarkably inconsistent with patterns of variation in attitudes predicted by popular theories of radicalization. Instead, they show variation of attitudes along three independent dimensions: social/economic/political satisfaction/dissatisfaction, moral/religious satisfacton/dissatisfaction, and a dimension that appears to be associated with radicalization. This suggests that governments may have less policy leverage to mitigate radicalization than generally supposed

Tracking the war of ideas: A poll of Ottawa Muslims

A 2008 poll of 430 Ottawa Muslims found predominantly negative views of the U.S. war on terrorism, including the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. This poll also assessed approval of Western powers (U.S., Canada, Israel, United Nations) and challengers of Western power (Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hizballah, government of Iran). Surprisingly, attitudes of Ottawa Muslims toward militant Muslim groups were unrelated to their attitudes toward Western governments. Discussion suggests that this pattern, if confirmed in other Muslim polls, would mean that the war of ideas against radical Islam must address not one target but two: favorable opinions of militants and unfavorable opinions of the U.S. Muslims who come to like the West more may not like Muslim militants any less