Which Firms Have a Soft Loan ? Managers' Believes in a Cross-Country Survey in Transition Economies

This paper is an empirical work grounded in the soft budget constraint literature. A loan is soft when a bank cannot commit to hold an enterprise to a fixed initial budget and/or the timing of repayment. Using data collected by the EBRD (BEEPS 2002) in 26 transition economies, we analyze the determinants of managers' expectations to have a soft loan. We show that managers' believes integrate some of the decision criteria of the banks: managers' expectations to have soft loans are lower when the initial financing requires collateral, higher for big firms and higher when firms had recently experienced financial distress. ...French Abstract : Ce papier empirique s'inscrit dans la littérature sur la contrainte budgétaire lâche. Un prêt est lâche quand la banque ne peut pas s'engager, de manière crédible, à maintenir le prêt à un certain montant et/ou à certaines échéances. A l'aide de données collectées par la BERD (BEEPS 2002) dans 26 pays en transition, on analyse les croyances des managers d'obtenir un prêt lâche. Les managers intègrent dans leurs croyances les critères de décision des banques. Les anticipations d'avoir un prêt lâche sont plus faibles quand le financement engage un collatéral. Les grandes firmes et les firmes qui ont connu des difficultés financières ont, elles, des anticipations plus élevées.SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT; EASTERN EUROPE

Cross-border coordination in the Madagascar-EU lychee chain: the role of GlobalGAP

Madagascar has a tradition of agricultural trade (coffee, vanilla, cloves). In the 90s, the country started developing non-traditional exports, such as lychees, to the European Union (EU), thereby generating substantial cash revenues for small producers. In 2005, access to the EU market became more difficult, due to more stringent quality requirements and to the growing use of the private retailer standard GlobalGAP. Whereas the empirical literature on private standards presents GlobalGAP either as a success story or a threat for small producers, the case of Madagascar exhibits a specific dynamics: after booming in 2007, GlobalGAP is actually collapsing. The aim of this article is to disentangle the mechanisms of this evolution and to draw some conclusions regarding market access enhancement through private standards. This work is based on semi-structured interviews carried out with all stakeholders of the export chain, government agencies and programs supporting lychee production and on weekly data on lychee trade flows (2001-2010). Using a global value chain approach, we first show the importance of the chain structure: importers are identified as lead-firms (conversely to most studies dealing with private certification) in an environment characterized by low competition at the international level. We then evaluate the role of donors and trade facilitators as actors of the chain. After giving evidence for the collapse of GlobalGAP, we assess what is left of the GlobalGAP procurement system once it has been abandoned: stabilization of the relationship between exporters and producers and thus enhanced traceability, upgrading of private marketing infrastructures, improved management discipline. We conclude that in the Madagascar lychee chain, although GlobalGAP had little impact on market access.PRIVATE CERTIFICATION; GLOBAL CHAINS; NON-TARIFF MEASURES; FOREIGN AID; NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS

Learning process in marketing contract choice: the case of cereals in the Paris Basin

In the last two decades, the institutional environment of European cereal markets remarkably evolved, faced to the deregulation of the agricultural common markets and the subsequent emergence of new forms of internal and external competition. Until the beginning of the 20th century, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was implemented as a buffer protecting producers against price volatility on international commodity markets thanks to guaranteed floor prices. Since the reform of this regulation, we observe the development of various types of contracts aiming at managing risk and uncertainty for the different stakeholders in the chain. This article aims to contribute to the scarce empirical literature dealing with marketing contract choices. Drawing on a large original data base describing the transactions between cereal producers and a French cooperative over 10 years (2007-2016) in the Paris Basin, we describe the strategies of producers and conclude that inertial behaviors are a very important factor explaining marketing choices. However, determinants relative to quality and performance matter, in an increasingly competitive international context. Acknowledgement

Heterogeneous efforts in voluntary programmes on food safety

In this article, we discuss the efforts made by importers of fresh produce within a voluntary programme on food safety. We show theoretically that the larger the firms the lower their efforts directed at food safety. We test this proposition using original primary data from a voluntary programme implemented by French importers of fresh produce. Our results contrast with evidence from environmental economics that large firms are more likely to be proactive with respect to environmental safeguards. Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2010; all rights reserved. For permissions, please email [email protected], Oxford University Press.

Les structures de gouvernance dans les investissements directs à l'étranger en agriculture : le cas des fruits et légumes au Maroc

Communication écriteInternational audienceCet article a pour objet d’étudier les logiques du choix des structures de gouvernance chez les firmes européennes, investissant en production agricole au Maroc afin d’approvisionner le marché européen de fruits et légumes. Au-delà du matériel empirique collecté auprès des acteurs institutionnels du secteur marocain des fruits et légumes, cette étude s’appuie sur 15 études de cas de firmes réalisées en juin 2009. Trois éléments émergent de notre étude. Tout d’abord, le choix entre une production en propre et une production contractuelle par les entreprises étrangères peut être expliqué par leur coeur de métier (production agricole, transformation ou/et commercialisation) et les exigences de leurs processus de la production et de la commercialisation. Ensuite, les modes de production chez les entreprises étrangères peuvent être modulés selon leurs contraintes organisationnelles internes et celles de sécurisation de l’approvisionnement. Enfin, face aux contraintes institutionnelles d’accès aux ressources locales (le foncier agricole et les crédits), les firmes peuvent privilégier le choix d’une joint venture en collaboration avec un partenaire local. This article aims to explore the logical choice of governance structures among European firms investing in production in Morocco on this basis to supplying the European market of fruits and vegetables. Beyond the empirical material collected from institutional actors in the sector of Moroccan fruits and vegetables, this study draws on 15 case studies of firms conducted in June 2009. Three elements emerge from our study. First, the choice between own production and contract farming can be explained by their core business (agricultural production, processing and / or marketing) and the requirements of their production technology and marketing choices.Then, the production process in foreign companies are adjusted according to their performance and working constraints. Finally, to face the institutional constraints of access to local resources (land or credit), the firms may favor the choice of a joint venture in collaboration with a local partner

Investissements des firmes européennes et modes d'organisation de la production : le cas de la filière maraîchère d'exportation du Maroc

International audienceThis article analyses the rationale of production and commercialisation decisions made by foreign-owned agricultural enterprises that invest in Morocco. We conducted qualitative surveys in the fresh fruit and vegetable export sector. We depict the forms of investment and unfold the choice to procure a portion of the marketed produce by local producers. The results highlight the large variety of firm's strategies, and relate them to the characteristics of the firms and the specificities of the produce.L'article s'intéresse aux différents modes de production et de commercialisation des firmes étrangères investissant dans le secteur maraîcher d'exportation au Maroc. On étudie, sur la base d'enquêtes qualitatives, les logiques d'implantation et les choix d'approvisionnement de ces firmes en matières premières : production en propre et agriculture contractuelle. Les résultats montrent que, malgré des objectifs communs, il existe une diversité des situations qui relèvent à la fois des profils des investisseurs et de la spécificité des produits concernés

Restructuring of agrifood chains in Turkey: the produce sector (A)

International audienceThis report examines the supply chain restructuring and trends in the food market in Turkey, in particular in the fresh produce sector, to reveal the driving factors behind this restructuring (demand side, supply side, policies, and institutions) and the threats (opportunities) to (for) the exclusion (inclusion) of small scale farmers in modern marketing channels. Using the tomato market as a case study, the report analyses the restructuring of the fresh produce markets from three dimensions. The drivers that cause the exclusion/inclusion of small farmers in the restructured fresh produce market are also explored. The actual inclusion/exclusion of small farmers in the restructured fresh produce market is also evaluate

Modern Food Retailers and Traditional Markets in Developing Countries: Comparing Quality, Prices, and Competition Strategies in Thailand

Supermarkets and hypermarkets are expanding rapidly in many developing countries. While consequences for farmers and consumers were analyzed recently, little is known about the implications for traditional retail formats such as wet markets. Using data from a market survey in Thailand and hedonic regressions, we analyze quality and prices for fresh vegetables from different retail outlets. Compared to wet markets, modern retailers sell higher quality at higher prices, indicating that they are primarily targeting better-off consumers, and not directly competing for the same market segments. Yet there are signs that modern and traditional markets will gradually converge. Policy implications are discussed. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.