Russian concessions to Europe are unlikely, and European concessions to Russia are useless

Is there any prospect of an end to the deterioration of relations between the EU and Russia? Irina Busygina explains that Vladimir Putin's strategy for maintaining domestic support has focused on the construction of external threats and the promotion of an image of 'Russian greatness' on the international stage. But by putting foreign policy in the service of domestic goals, Putin has created a situation where he can’t make any concessions to Europe, and where European concessions to Russia are useless

There are few political incentives for Russia and the EU to normalise their relations

Russia held parliamentary elections on 18 September. To coincide with the elections, we are running a number of articles on Russian politics and society. In this contribution, Irina Busygina writes on relations between Russia and the European Union. Following the Ukraine crisis, Russia and the EU are now further away from establishing stable relations with one another than at any time since the end of the Soviet Union. Given the general lack of political incentives on the Russian side to improve relations, this picture is unlikely to change in the coming years

Regional Governors, Moscow, and the War

The model of center-regional relations fully developed in Russia before the war has worked practically flawlessly to date. Current regional elites are just as interested in maintaining the stability of Putin's personal rule as the Kremlin itself. Neither unprecedented sanctions nor the transfer of additional responsibilities to the regions has produced a demand for institutional changes on the part of governors. The war against Ukraine has been publicly supported by regional authorities in all Russian regions without exception, even if the degree and specific forms of support by regional executives have varied across Russia. Moreover, the war has served to increase the cohesion of the country's population across regional borders. As any scenario of future change carries threats and risks for regional incumbents personally, it is unlikely that the governors will break away from Putin and inaugurate the transformation of the system

Russia-EU relations and the common neighborhood : coercion vs. authority

This title is published in Open Access with the support of the University of Helsinki.Examining Russia–EU relations in terms of the forms and types of power tools they use, this book argues that the deteriorating relations between Russia and the EU lie in the deep differences in their preferences for the international status quo. These different approaches, combined with economic interdependence and geographic proximity, means both parties experience significant difficulties in shaping strategy and formulating agendas with regards to each other. The Russian leadership is well aware of the EU’s "authority orientation" but fails to reliably predict foreign policy at the EU level, whilst the EU realizes Russia’s "coercive orientation" in general, but cannot predict when and where coercive tools will be used next. Russia is gradually realizing the importance of authority, while the EU sees the necessity of coercion tools for coping with certain challenges. The learning process is ongoing but the basic distinction remains unchanged and so their approaches cannot be reconciled as long as both actors exist in their current form. Using a theoretical framework and case studies including Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine, Busygina examines the possibilities and constraints that arise when the "power of authority" and the "power of coercion" interact with each other, and how this interaction affects third parties

Russia-EU relations and the common neighborhood

Examining Russia–EU relations in terms of the forms and types of power tools they use, this book argues that the deteriorating relations between Russia and the EU lie in the deep differences in their preferences for the international status quo. These different approaches, combined with economic interdependence and geographic proximity, means both parties experience significant difficulties in shaping strategy and formulating agendas with regards to each other. The Russian leadership is well aware of the EU’s "authority orientation" but fails to reliably predict foreign policy at the EU level, whilst the EU realizes Russia’s "coercive orientation" in general, but cannot predict when and where coercive tools will be used next. Russia is gradually realizing the importance of authority, while the EU sees the necessity of coercion tools for coping with certain challenges. The learning process is ongoing but the basic distinction remains unchanged and so their approaches cannot be reconciled as long as both actors exist in their current form. Using a theoretical framework and case studies including Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine, Busygina examines the possibilities and constraints that arise when the "power of authority" and the "power of coercion" interact with each other, and how this interaction affects third parties

Northern dimension: participant strategies

This article is devoted to the 'Northern Dimension' initiative of the EU which also includes North-West Russia, Norway and Iceland. It is noted that the 'Northern Dimension' in the theoretical perspective can be considered as part of strategic multi-level interactions between member-states of the EU and Russia. On this basis, the authors analyze implications and effects of the strategic interdepend-ence of all the EU-Russia relation levels

Stress-Inducing Situations and Psychological Security of the Penal System Staff

AbstractPsychological security necessary to accomplish professional activities depends not only on environment characteristics and stress-producing situations but also on individual stress resistance. It primarily concerns risk-fraught and extreme conditions of activities, in particular, activities of the penal system representatives. Due to it, the requirements for the penal system specialists’ personality capable of working under these conditions are much higher especially in terms of stress resistance than for “ordinary” citizens. The results by the penal system staff and civilians of stress resistance level analysis are compared and commented on