ASSET MARKETS AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH PROVISION POINTS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

In this paper we report some experimental results on the effects that auctioning the right to play a public goods game with a provision point may have on equilibrium selection and efficiency. A control treatment reveals that, as in the experimental literature for similar environments, subjects' behavior converges to the inefficient outcome whenever they are endowed with the right to play the game. However, auctioning off such a right among a larger population of players has a significant efficiency-enhancing effect. Once the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in the second stage is reached, the auction price at the first stage increases to its upper limit, dissipating all players' gains associated with the provision of the public good. The full contribution equilibrium was extremely robust: individual subjects' deviations from the equilibrium strategy were not able to force lower market prices and did not affect provision of the public good in subsequent periods.Public Goods; Provision Points; Experimental Markets.

What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play.

A model is proposed to explain the results of recent experiments in which subjects repeatedly played a coordination game, with the right to play auctioned each period in a larger group. Subjects bid the market-clearing price to a level recoverable only in the efficient equilibrium and then converged to that equilibrium, although subjects playing the game without auctions converged to inefficient equilibria. The efficiency-enhancing effect of auctions is reminiscent of forward induction but is not explained by equilibrium refinements. The model explains it by showing how strategic uncertainty interacts with history-dependent learning dynamics to determine equilibrium selection

What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play.

A model is proposed to explain the results of recent experiments in which subjects repeatedly played a coordination game, with the right to play auctioned each period in a larger group. Subjects bid the market-clearing price to a level recoverable only in the efficient equilibrium and then converged to that equilibrium, although subjects playing the game without auctions converged to inefficient equilibria. The efficiency-enhancing effect of auctions is reminiscent of forward induction but is not explained by equilibrium refinements. The model explains it by showing how strategic uncertainty interacts with history-dependent learning dynamics to determine equilibrium selection. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.

Cognition And Behavior In Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study

This paper reports experiments designed to measure strategic sophistication, the extent to which players' behavior reflects attempts to predict others' decisions, taking their incentives into account. Subjects played normal-form games with various patterns of iterated dominance and unique pure-strategy equilibria without dominance, using a computer interface that allowed them to look up hidden payoffs as often as desired, one at a time, while automatically recording their look-ups. Monitoring information search allows tests of game theory's implications for cognition as well as decisions, and subjects' deviations from search patterns suggested by equilibrium analysis help to predict their deviations from equilibrium decisions

Asset markets and equilibrium selection in public goods games with provision points: an experimental study

In this paper we report some experimental results on the effects that auctioning the right to play a public goods game with a provision point may have on equilibrium selection and efficiency. A control treatment reveals that, as in the experimental literature for similar environments, subjects' behavior converges to the inefficient outcome whenever they are endowed with the right to play the game. However, auctioning off such a right among a larger population of players has a significant efficiency-enhancing effect. Once the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in the second stage is reached, the auction price at the first stage increases to its upper limit, dissipating all players' gains associated with the provision of the public good. The full contribution equilibrium was extremely robust: individual subjects' deviations from the equilibrium strategy were not able to force lower market prices and did not affect provision of the public good in subsequent periods

Asset Markets and Equilibrium Selection in Public Goods Games with Provision Points: An Experimental Study

We report experimental results on the effects that auctioning the right to play a public goods game with a provision point may have on equilibrium selection and individual behavior. Auctioning off such a right among a larger population of players strikingly enhances public good provision. Once public good provision is obtained, the auction price at the preliminary stage increases to its upper limit, dissipating all players' gains associated with the provision of the public good. Individual deviations from the equilibrium strategy are neither able to force lower market prices nor to affect provision of the public good in subsequent periods. (JEL C72, C92, H41) Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

SANS study of asphaltene aggregation: concentration and solvent quality effects

full contents available from authorInternational audienceThe structure of asphaltene solutions in toluene was studied by Small Angle Neutron Scattering (SANS) as a function of temperature and concentration. Temperature alters solvent quality, flocculation being expected at low temperature. SANS measurements were carried out at 4 different temperatures (from 73 degrees C down to 8 degrees) for solute (asphaltene) volume fractions \Phi ranging from 0.3% to 10\%. Asphaltenes were found to form nanometric aggregates, whose average masses M_w and radii of gyration R_G increased as temperature decreased. These parameters hardly varied with concentration in the dilute regime \Phi < 3-4\%, in which no evidence of dissociation was found. At higher \Phi, apparent values of the same parameters M_w and R_G decreased, as repulsive interactions or aggregate interpenetration reduced the normalized intensity, I/\Phi, a phenomenon reminiscent of the semi-dilute regime of polymers and fractal aggregates. At the two lowest temperatures studied, 8 and 20 deg. C, a strong scattering at low q signalled flocculation, as some of the asphaltenes formed dense domains of micronic size. This phenomenon occurred throughout the studied concentration range and entailed some limited hysteresis, for time scales of the order of a few hours

Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: an Experimental Study

‘‘Human experience, which is constantly contradicting theory, is the great test of truth.’’ �Dr. Johnson, quoted in James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson L.L.D. This paper reports experiments designed to study strategic sophistication, the extent to which behavior in games reflects attempts to predict others ’ decisions, taking their incentives into account. We study subjects ’ initial responses to normal-form games with various patterns of iterated dominance and unique pure-strategy equilibria without dominance, using a computer interface that allowed them to search for hidden payoff information, while recording their searches. Monitoring subjects ’ information searches along with their decisions allows us to better understand how their decisions are determined, and subjects ’ deviations from the search patterns suggested by equilibrium analysis help to predict their deviations from equilibrium decisions

Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games:An Experimental Study

This paper reports experiments designed to study strategic sophistication, the extent to which behavior in games reflects attempts to predict others' decisions, taking their incentives into account. We studied subjects' initial responses to normal-form games with various patterns of iterated dominance and unique pure-strategy equilibria without dominance, using a computer interface that allowed them to search for hidden payoff information, while recording their searches. Monitoring subjects' information searches along with their decisions allows us to better understand how their decisions are determined, and subjects' deviations from the search patterns suggested by equilibrium analysis help to predict their deviations from equilibrium decisions.noncooperative games; experimental economics; strategic sophistication; cognition.