Economic Analysis of Liability Apportionment Among Multiple Tortfeasors: A Survey, and Perspectives in Large-Scale Risks Management

The economic analysis of civil liability aims to demonstrate how the civil liability system can be set to provide the potential injurers with optimal incentives to regulate the level of risk they bear. However, despite a wide range of applications, there are few studies on the apportionment of liability between several tortfeasors. In this article, we especially focus on the case of an industrial activity involving a firm, whose activity is potentially harmful for the society, and one of its input providers. They both have an impact on the level of risk through an effort in care and quality. After highlighting the originality of our contribution within this literature, we propose an efficient sharing rule. We demonstrate that this rule of apportionment depends on the relative degree of solvency of the agents and, more importantly, it crucially depends on the market relationship that links the two contributors; thus calling for a collaboration between the competition agency, and the legislatures and courts

Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent seeking

This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors' exit option, distinguishing between \textquotedblright redistributive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblright productive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the \textquotedblright lost treasure\textquotedblright\ effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors' exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases.Rent-seeking; rent dissipation; Tullock's paradox

Crowding-out in Productive and Redistributive Rent-Seeking.

This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their pro- ductivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent- seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors' exit option, distinguishing between "redistributive rent-seeking"and "productive rent-seeking" situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the "lost treasure" effect), since valuable rents are left unex- ploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors' exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases.Rent-seeking, rent dissipation, Tullock' s paradox.

Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent seeking

This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors' exit option, distinguishing between \textquotedblright redistributive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblright productive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the \textquotedblright lost treasure\textquotedblright\ effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors' exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases

Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent seeking

This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors' exit option, distinguishing between \textquotedblright redistributive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblright productive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the \textquotedblright lost treasure\textquotedblright\ effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors' exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases

Etudes de quelques problèmes paraboliques non locaux

In this work, we study a class of nonlocal, nonlinear parabolic problems. In these equations, the coefficients depend on the solution itself through global quantities like the total mass, the total flux or the total energy (for problems coming from physics) and the total density (for problems coming from mathematical methods of population biology). We study, not only, the existence and uniqueness of the solutions but also their longtime behaviour and their stabilityCe travail consiste à étudier une catégorie de problèmes non locaux et non linéaires de type parabolique. Dans ces équations, les coefficients dépendent de la solution au travers de quantités globales, comme la masse totale du corps considéré, le flux ou l'énergie totale (pour les problèmes liés à la physique), ou encore la densité totale (en dynamique des populations). Outre l'existence et l'unicité des solutions locales et globales, nous établissons le comportement asymptotique de ces solutions et étudions leur stabilit