MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONTRACTS-IMPLIED POWER TO BARGAIN WITH A LABOR UNION

Under the Ohio Constitution the City of Cleveland had the power to own and operate a street railway system. The city charter authorized the Transit Board to supervise, manage and control the transit system. The authorization included the power to establish wages and working conditions in accordance with the provisions of the charter. An action for a declaratory judgment was brought in order to determine whether the board had the power to contract with a union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the transit system employees, or the power to contract with a union for arbitration of disputes, and finally, whether the board had the power to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a union. Held, the Transit Board had no express power, nor could one be implied, to contract with any union. City of Cleveland v. Division 268 Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, 30 Ohio Op. 395 (1945)

TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-REVERSIONARY INTERESTS UNDER THE RULE OF THE HALLOCK CASE-VALUATION

In 1929 the decedent established a trust, reserving a life estate in the income. On the termination of this life estate, the income was payable in equal amounts to the decedent\u27s daughters. If either daughter died, that part of the corpus supporting the share of income of the deceased daughter was to go to her descendants; if none, then to the other daughter or her descendants. If both of the daughters died without issue, the corpus was to be paid to such persons as decedent appointed by will; if no appointment was made, the corpus was to go to certain charities. Decedent exercised her power of appointment at the time she executed her will in 1930. Both daughters survived the decedent, and both had issue. An estate tax was levied on the entire property of the trust. The executors paid the tax, and filed a refund claim on the theory that the values of the life estates in the daughters and the remainders in their issue should not have been included in the trust assets as part of the taxable estate. Held, the entire corpus of the inter vivos trust was subject to the estate tax since the settlor by means of the reserved power of appointment had retained a reversionary interest in the same. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108, 65 S.Ct. 508 (1945)

TAXATION-INCOME TAX-DEDUCTIONS-EXPENSES INCURRED IN THE PURSUIT OF BUSINESS-COMMUTER EXPENSE

The taxpayer, a lawyer, had resided in Jackson, Mississippi for approximately thirty-five years, and had maintained a law office there for more than twenty years. In 1927 he accepted a position as general solicitor for a railroad whose main office was in Mobile, Alabama. Although the taxpayer\u27s work was devoted entirely to the railroad\u27s business, he refused to abandon his long established connections in Jackson because his position was yearly, appointive, and therefore uncertain. Arrangements were made with the railroad whereby the taxpayer allocated his time between the two cities, but also bore the traveling expenses between, and the living expenses in, both cities. While the taxpayer\u27s main post of business was in Mobile, he worked most of the time in Jackson during the tax years in question, 1939 and 1940. He took deductions for the expenses incurred in making seventy-three trips between the cities, and also for the living expenses while in Mobile. The circuit court reversed the Tax Court\u27s disallowance of the deductions. Certiorari was granted because of a conflict in lower court decisions as to the meaning of the word home. Held, whether or not the expenses were incurred while away from home, they were not incurred in the pursuit of business, and therefore were not deductible from gross income under Section 23 (a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code. Commissioner v. Flowers, (U.S. 1946) 66 S.Ct. 250

CORPORATIONS --VOTING TRUSTS -- NON-COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE AS A BASIS FOR JUDICIAL TERMINATION

It is not the purpose of this comment to discuss the history of the voting trust, to recapitulate the controversy over its legality, or to examine the many grounds for termination of the trust. It is sufficient to say that in all but perhaps three states this important business device has been made legal by statute or by judicial decision. We are here concerned with finding the degree of statutory compliance necessary in order that the voting trust will be sustained

CORPORATIONS-EXTENT OF POWERS TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY IN WINDING UP ITS AFFAIRS UNDER STATUTES EXTENDING CORPORATE EXISTENCE

According to the common law a dissolved corporation ceased to exist for all purposes. Whether the dissolution was voluntary or involuntary, the effect of the dissolution was to deprive the corporation of all powers either de jure or de facto. It was necessary, therefore, that corporations facing dissolution proceed without delay toward a final liquidation and distribution of assets. Disregarding the old theory that personal property of dissolved corporations escheated to the state, and that its real estate reverted to the original granter or his heirs, and that debts due the corporation were extinguished, it is still apparent that hurried liquidation is not conducive to a realization of the true value of assets. Where the corporation could foresee dissolution, for example, the expiration of its charter at a time certain, and prudently initiated its winding up procedure in adequate time for a judicious disposal of its assets, it had to sacrifice a valuable part of its remaining corporate life which might otherwise have been used in carrying on the business for which it was formed

LABOR UNIONS-SUABILITY OF UNINCORPORATED LABOR UNION IN ITS COMMON NAME

Plaintiff brought suit in a district court of the United States against the defendant union in its common name, and officers of the union for an alleged libel. The union was not incorporated, no substantive right protected by federal law was involved, and the state wherein the suit was brought, Illinois, did not have a statute permitting actions at law against an unincorporated association in its own name. The district court dismissed the action against the union on the ground that it was not a legal entity; the plaintiff appealed. Held, under the common law of Illinois, an unincorporated association was not suable in its common name. Dissent, the National Labor Relations Act made the union a legal entity suable in its own name, and the Illinois courts are bound by the federal law. Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Company v. Local Union No. 2928 of United Steelworkers of America, CIO, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 152 F. (2d) 493

Modulation of motor-meaning congruity effects for valenced words

We investigated the extent to which emotionally valenced words automatically cue spatio-motor representations. Participants made speeded button presses, moving their hand upward or downward while viewing words with positive or negative valence. Only the color of the words was relevant to the response; on target trials, there was no requirement to read the words or process their meaning. In Experiment 1, upward responses were faster for positive words, and downward for negative words. This effect was extinguished, however, when words were repeated. In Experiment 2, participants performed the same primary task with the addition of distractor trials. Distractors either oriented attention toward the words’ meaning or toward their color. Congruity effects were increased with orientation to meaning, but eliminated with orientation to color. When people read words with emotional valence, vertical spatio-motor representations are activated highly automatically, but this automaticity is modulated by repetition and by attentional orientation to the words’ form or meaning

The Influence of Communicative Context on Aphasic Speakers' Use of Pronouns

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Types of Errors in Multiple-Sentence Reading Comprehension of Aphasic Adults

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