Challenges of open innovation: the paradox of firm investment in open-source software

Open innovation is a powerful framework encompassing the generation, capture, and employment of intellectual property at the firm level. We identify three fundamental challenges for firms in applying the concept of open innovation: finding creative ways to exploit internal innovation, incorporating external innovation into internal development, and motivating outsiders to supply an ongoing stream of external innovations. This latter challenge involves a paradox, why would firms spend money on R&D efforts if the results of these efforts are available to rival firms? To explore these challenges, we examine the activity of firms in opensource software to support their innovation strategies. Firms involved in open-source software often make investments that will be shared with real and potential rivals. We identify four strategies firms employ – pooled R&D/product development, spinouts, selling complements and attracting donated complements – and discuss how they address the three key challenges of open innovation. We conclude with suggestions for how similar strategies may apply in other industries and offer some possible avenues for future research on open innovation

EPIdemiology of Surgery-Associated Acute Kidney Injury (EPIS-AKI) : Study protocol for a multicentre, observational trial

More than 300 million surgical procedures are performed each year. Acute kidney injury (AKI) is a common complication after major surgery and is associated with adverse short-term and long-term outcomes. However, there is a large variation in the incidence of reported AKI rates. The establishment of an accurate epidemiology of surgery-associated AKI is important for healthcare policy, quality initiatives, clinical trials, as well as for improving guidelines. The objective of the Epidemiology of Surgery-associated Acute Kidney Injury (EPIS-AKI) trial is to prospectively evaluate the epidemiology of AKI after major surgery using the latest Kidney Disease: Improving Global Outcomes (KDIGO) consensus definition of AKI. EPIS-AKI is an international prospective, observational, multicentre cohort study including 10 000 patients undergoing major surgery who are subsequently admitted to the ICU or a similar high dependency unit. The primary endpoint is the incidence of AKI within 72 hours after surgery according to the KDIGO criteria. Secondary endpoints include use of renal replacement therapy (RRT), mortality during ICU and hospital stay, length of ICU and hospital stay and major adverse kidney events (combined endpoint consisting of persistent renal dysfunction, RRT and mortality) at day 90. Further, we will evaluate preoperative and intraoperative risk factors affecting the incidence of postoperative AKI. In an add-on analysis, we will assess urinary biomarkers for early detection of AKI. EPIS-AKI has been approved by the leading Ethics Committee of the Medical Council North Rhine-Westphalia, of the Westphalian Wilhelms-University Münster and the corresponding Ethics Committee at each participating site. Results will be disseminated widely and published in peer-reviewed journals, presented at conferences and used to design further AKI-related trials. Trial registration number NCT04165369

Hierarchies of beliefs in decision theory

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre- DSC:D58902/87 / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

Why Isn’t the Accident Information Shared? A Coopetition Perspective

The purpose of this paper is to investigate both cooperative and competitive strategies of firms that may cause accidents. The firms may exchange information about the previous accidents associated with their products in order to reduce accident probabilities and the amount of damage. Thus, these firms may cooperate on this point. On the other hand, they compete on quantities after deciding whether accident information is to be disclosed. This situation is termed coopetition. In order to address the issue of disclosure of accident information, an economic model is developed and it derives two main conclusions. First, there is a unique equilibrium where firms choose to not disclose their accident information. Second, the equilibrium strategies of firms are Pareto inferior for them when the condition relating to marginal effort costs and potential demands is satisfied. Thus, whether the coopetitive situation that firms exchange their accident information cooperatively and choose their quantity levels competitively is desirable for firms depends on the magnitude of the cost reduction and demand reduction effects