Investment Sharing in Broadband Networks

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent firm and an Other Licensed Operator (OLO) in the broadband market, where the incumbent has an investment option to build a Next Generation network (NGN) and it can do so by making an investment sharing agreement with the OLO, or alone. Two different kinds of investment sharing contractual forms are analysed, a basic investment sharing, where no side-payment is given for the use of the NGN between co-investors, and joint-venture, where a side-payment is set by the co-investing firms. Results show that investment sharing can potentially be beneficial in terms of competition and investments, but the number of firms involved matters and so does the choice of the NGN access price, for insiders and outsiders of the agreement. Even when the presence of firms outside of the agreement force insiders to compete more fiercely, there might be a concern with the potential exclusion of the outsiders from the NGN

Cooperation for Innovation in Payment Systems: The Case of Mobile Payments

In this paper, we provide a definition of mobile payments and we analyze the markets that could be targeted by mobile payment service providers, both in developed and in developing countries. Focusing on the case of developed countries, we introduce five cooperation models that have emerged or could emerge between banks, mobile network operators, and payment systems, for the development of this payment method.mobile payments; payment systems; mobile banking; mobile commerce.

Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets

In this paper, we consider an unregulated incumbent who owns a broadband infrastructure and decides on how much access to provide to a potential entrant. The level of access, i.e., the network elements that are shared in the provision of competing broadband services, not only determines the amount of investment the entrant needs to undertake to enter the market, but also the intensity of post-entry competition. We consider an access scheme that determines an access level and an associated two-part tariff. We show that the equilibrium level of access is higher when the sensitivity of product differentiation to the level of access is lower, and when the marginal investment cost is higher. We also show that the unregulated incumbent sets a suboptimally low (high) level of access if the degree of service differentiation is sufficiently high (low).

An Economist's Guide to Local Loop Unbundling

This guide provides a critical review of the economics literature on the desirability and the effects of unbundling the local loop. Firstly, we discuss recent contributions, which aim to quantify the effect of unbundling regulations on the development of broadband services. Secondly, we review the literature on the potential impact of unbundling on investment and innovation incentives. Finally, we conclude this paper by offering some suggestions for further research.Unbundling; broadband diffusion; investment and innovation

An Economist's Guide to Local Loop Unbundling

This guide provides a critical review of the economics literature on the desirability and the effects of unbundling the local loop. Firstly, we discuss recent contributions, which aim to quantify the effect of unbundling regulations on the development of broadband services. Secondly, we review the literature on the potential impact of unbundling on investment and innovation incentives. Finally, we conclude this paper by offering some suggestions for further research.Unbundling; broadband diffusion; investment and innovation

Access regulation and the transition from copper to fiber networks in telecoms

In this paper we study the impact of different forms of access obligations on firms' incentives to migrate from the legacy copper network to ultra-fast broadband infrastructures. We analyze three different kinds of regulatory interventions: geographical regulation of access to copper networks-where access prices are differentiated depending on whether or not an alternative fiber network has been deployed; access obligations on fiber networks and its interplay with wholesale copper prices; and, finally, a mandatory switch-off of the legacy copper network-to foster the transition to the higher quality fiber networks. Trading-off the different static and dynamic goals, the paper provides guidelines and suggestions for policy makers' decision

National FTTH plans in France, Italy and Portugal

In this paper, we analyze the specific national broadband plans which have been developed by some European governments to foster the deployment of next generation access networks, namely in France, Italy, and Portugal. In particular, we discuss the strategies adopted to achieve wide fibre coverage and encourage co-investment between competing operators. Finally, we highlight the similarities and differences between the strategies followed in these three countries.broadband; fibre; next generation access networks; regulation

National FTTH plans in France, Italy and Portugal

In this paper, we analyze the specific national broadband plans which have been developed by some European governments to foster the deployment of next generation access networks, namely in France, Italy, and Portugal. In particular, we discuss the strategies adopted to achieve wide fibre coverage and encourage co-investment between competing operators. Finally, we highlight the similarities and differences between the strategies followed in these three countries.broadband; fibre; next generation access networks; regulation.

Access Pricing, Competition, and Incentives to Migrate From "Old" to "New" Technology

In this paper, we analyze the incentives of an incumbent and an entrant to migrate from an "old" technology to a "new" technology, and discuss how the terms of wholesale access affect this migration. We show that the coverage of the new technology varies non-monotonically with the access price of the old technology: a higher access charge on the legacy network pushes the entrant firm to invest more, but has an ambiguous effect on the incumbent's investments, due to two conflicting effects: the wholesale revenue effect, and the retail-level migration effect. When the new technology is also subject to access provision, we find that migration from the old to the new generation network at the wholesale level can be incentivized if a positive correlation between the access prices (to the two old and new generation networks) is maintaine