The Risks of Election Observation: International Condemnation and Post-Election Violence

Research on international election observation shows that observation reduces fraud, encourages participation, and boosts confidence in the election. However, this conventional account misses the negative, violence-inducing potential of observer criticism. This is the first study examining how observer criticism influences post-election violence. Democracy depends on the loser’s consent, and the willingness of election losers to be governed by the winners can be influenced by observer criticism. When reputable observers criticize the credibility of an election, they can encourage losers to challenge the result. Observer criticism strengthens the electoral loser by legitimizing a challenge and serving as a focal point for mobilization. Using data on post-election violence in thirty-eight countries in sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, I show that internationally condemned elections are more likely to turn violent than not-condemned elections. These results are robust to various control variables (including observer presence and election fraud) and accounting for potential selection, spuriousness, endogeneity, and omitted variables.</jats:p

Resisting democracy assistance: Who seeks and receives technical election assistance?

Why are some developing countries less open to technical election assistance than to election observation? My argument about who seeks and receives technical election assistance is two-fold, taking into account the incentives of recipients and providers. On the recipient side, governments are less likely to request technical assistance when the political costs are high (autocracy) or the benefits low (strong electoral institutions). On the provider side, international organizations are less likely to provide such technical assistance when the government appears to lack political will for reform and full project implementation is unlikely. Statistical analyses of global data on technical election assistance by the United Nations covering 130 countries from 1990 to 2003 support this argument about political cost-benefit calculations in considering technical assistance. Case examples from Guyana, Indonesia, Haiti, and Venezuela illustrate some of these dynamics. My findings suggest that seemingly complementary international interventions (observation and technical support) can create different incentives for domestic and international actors. This helps explain why some countries tend to agree more often to election observation than to technical election assistance

When Do Withdrawal Threats Achieve Reform in International Organizations?

International organizations often come under pressure when states desire their reform. Some states threaten to leave international organizations unless their reform demands are met. But how often is threatening to withdraw associated with states demanding institutional reform? And under what conditions do states’ withdrawal threats actually achieve institutional reform? We argue that withdrawal threats are more likely to result in institutional reform when they (1) are made by powerful states and (2) are limited reform demands rather than calls for broader reform. We examine whether threatening to exit institutions can be a catalyst for institutional reform using an original dataset of withdrawal threats from all international organizations and states since 1980 (N = 130). The analysis supports our argument that withdrawal threats are more likely to lead to reforms when their associated demands are made by powerful states and are limited in scope. Further, we find that less than half of exit threats are linked to reform demands: many states threaten to withdraw due to conflicts with another state or for face-saving purposes, without making reform requests. This contrasts with the conventional understanding that exit threats often represent a backlash against international organizations. Perhaps surprisingly, the dynamics of bargaining over reform suggest that some organizations may emerge more, rather than less, resilient after states threaten to withdraw. We conclude with policy implications for rethinking multilateralism

The Rise of Sanctions Cooperation between Regional Organizations, the United States, and the EU

When a country is sanctioned for violating international rules today, it is usually targeted by several different entities. The degree to which sanctions by different senders overlap remains a largely unexplored phenomenon. In this paper, we examine the extent of sanctions cooperation, i.e. joint action among major sanctions senders (the US, the EU, and regional organizations) against identical targets. We then map regional patterns and evaluate one potential explanation for them. Our analysis leads to three major findings. First, sanctions overlap is predominant and has consistently increased over the last three decades. Twothirds of sanctions involve more than a single sender. Targets today are usually subject to punishment by at least three different sanctions senders (up from one in 1980) and sometimes up to six different senders. Second, world regions vary widely in the extent of sanctions cooperation, the profile of sanctions senders, and their interactions. Third, to explain variation in sanctions cooperation, we find that hegemonic stability theory does not provide much leverage. We conclude by outlining avenues for future research on sanctions cooperation relating to sanctions onset and effectiveness

Global Governance from Below: Regional Sanctions as Drivers of UN Sanctions

The imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC) is notoriously selective. Many crises have qualified for UNSC sanctions by endangering peace and security, yet the UN has imposed sanctions in only a few. Selectivity in UNSC sanctions is conventionally explained by conflict intensity or the interests of the Council’s permanent members. Complementing these accounts, we document a third explanation: pre-existing sanctions by regional organizations. We argue that the UNSC has incentives to sanction countries which are already under sanctions by regional organizations because regional sanctions embody neighborhood consensus on the legitimacy of these sanctions and reassure the Council about implementation. Statistical analyses of original data, text analyses, a case study, and interviews strongly support our argument: regional sanctions increase the likelihood of UNSC sanctions adoption, particularly when these are enacted by regional organizations composed of neighboring states. This study advances research on sanctions, conflict resolution, and regime complexity

Fear of campaign violence and support for democracy and autocracy

Election violence is common in many developing countries and has potentially detrimental implications for democratic consolidation. Drawing on political psychology, we argue that citizens’ fear of campaign violence undermines support for democracy while increasing support for autocracy. Using individual-level survey data from 21 electoral democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, we find robust support for our argument. Citizens fearing campaign violence are less likely to support democracy and multi-party competition, more likely to favor a return to autocracy, and less likely to turn out to vote. Our findings have important implications for democratic survival and provide further impetus for reducing electoral violence

Taking synthetic biology to the seas: from blue chassis organisms to marine aquaforming

Oceans cover 71 % of Earth's surface and are home to hundreds of thousands of species, many of which are microbial. Knowledge about marine microbes has strongly increased in the past decades due to global sampling expeditions, and hundreds of detailed studies on marine microbial ecology, physiology, and biogeochemistry. However, the translation of this knowledge into biotechnological applications or synthetic biology approaches using marine microbes has been limited so far. This review highlights key examples of marine bacteria in synthetic biology and metabolic engineering, and outlines possible future work based on the emerging marine chassis organisms Vibrio natriegens and Halomonas bluephagenesis. Furthermore, the valorization of algal polysaccharides by genetically enhanced microbes is presented as an example of the opportunities and challenges associated with blue biotechnology. Finally, new roles for marine synthetic biology in tackling pressing global challenges, including climate change and marine pollution, are discussed.Microbial Biotechnolog

Molecular Basis for the Anchoring of Proto-Oncoprotein Nup98 to the Cytoplasmic Face of the Nuclear Pore Complex

The cytoplasmic filament nucleoporins of the nuclear pore complex (NPC) are critically involved in nuclear export and remodeling of mRNA ribonucleoprotein particles and are associated with various human malignancies. Here, we report the crystal structure of the Nup98 C-terminal autoproteolytic domain, frequently missing from leukemogenic forms of the protein, in complex with the N-terminal domain of Nup82 and the C-terminal tail fragment of Nup159. The Nup82 β propeller serves as a noncooperative binding platform for both binding partners. Interaction of Nup98 with Nup82 occurs through a reciprocal exchange of loop structures. Strikingly, the same Nup98 groove promiscuously interacts with Nup82 and Nup96 in a mutually excusive fashion. Simultaneous disruption of both Nup82 interactions in yeast causes severe defects in mRNA export, while the severing of a single interaction is tolerated. Thus, the cytoplasmic filament network of the NPC is robust, consistent with its essential function in nucleocytoplasmic transport