841 research outputs found
Programming, optimal pricing and partnership contract for infrastructures in PPPs
The development of various forms of public-private partnerships for the financing, building and operating of public infrastructure has not fundamentally altered the economic calculations involved. This chapter examines to what extent it is necessary, however, to change the way that government uses socio-economic and financial evaluations, whether to optimise investment programming or pricing. Ensuring a coherent match between these two types of optimisation can provide a principle for determining the optimal programming price. We begin by showing that when projects are financed by both users (toll revenues) and taxpayers (subsidies), it is socially beneficial to plan these investments on the basis of the net present value (NPV) provided by each unit of public money invested. This NPV/subsidy ratio must obviously be higher than the public-funding scarcity coefficient or else the investment would destroy more wealth than it would produce. One of the ways of improving this ratio is also to optimise the toll level, since increasing it can lower the subsidy but has an adverse impact on the user surplus, it is essential to set the optimal toll. In the case of an approved project considered in isolation, we show that the optimal toll depends upon the public-funding scarcity coefficient. If there is no scarcity, the optimal toll is zero. As public-funding becomes scarcer, the optimal toll draws closer to the toll that optimises revenue. In the case of a programme of several projects subject to budget constraint, we show that the optimal toll no longer depends upon the public-funding scarcity coefficient and that there are several scenarios depending on the relative values of the maximum revenue and the total cost of the project: â when, whatever the toll, revenue can no longer cover over half of the cost, it is socially beneficial to choose not to levy any toll; â when there is a toll that covers the total cost, the operator may be left free to set it at the level he sees fit, with the issue of how the profits are to be shared between the franchisee and the franchisor being settled separately; â when the maximum revenue of the project falls between half and all of the total cost, the value of the toll that maximises the welfare function is lower than the revenue-maximising toll and must therefore be set for the private operator by government. Thus, the partnership contract must be given a different content in these three cases of optimal pricing.PPP ; Programming ; Financing ; Pricing
Ranking Transport Projects by their Socioeconomic Value or Financial Interest rate of return?
This paper discusses the choice by the public authority of the most efficient programme of infrastructure investments. More specifically, it studies the optimal ranking of the projects implementations when these projects are partially self-financed by their own revenues such as tolled highways. In this case, the optimal investment programme must be defines under a constraint of annual subsidies. This paper demonstrates that the optimal ranking is not necessarily the ranking of decreasing socio-economic IRR. This counter-intuitive result can be demonstrated by a general approach. Analytical calculations are not useful in the discrete problems because each programme is an ordered subset of projects. Therefore, there is no continuous variation linking the various programmes and the usual tools of optimisation are useless, such as differential calculus. Thus, we adopt here a discrete optimisation analysis based on standard techniques in the physics area, such as Monte Carlo sampling.Transport Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Investments ; Transportation Financing ; Appraisal ; Economic Calculation ; Transport project evaluation ; Public-private partnership ; Socio economic net present value
Programming, optimal pricing and partnership contract for infrastructures in PPPs
ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PROVISION OF TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTUREInternational audienceThe development of various forms of public-private partnerships for the financing, building and operating of public infrastructure has not fundamentally altered the economic calculations involved. This chapter examines to what extent it is necessary, however, to change the way that government uses socio-economic and financial evaluations, whether to optimise investment programming or pricing. Ensuring a coherent match between these two types of optimisation can provide a principle for determining the optimal programming price. We begin by showing that when projects are financed by both users (toll revenues) and taxpayers (subsidies), it is socially beneficial to plan these investments on the basis of the net present value (NPV) provided by each unit of public money invested. This NPV/subsidy ratio must obviously be higher than the public-funding scarcity coefficient or else the investment would destroy more wealth than it would produce. One of the ways of improving this ratio is also to optimise the toll level, since increasing it can lower the subsidy but has an adverse impact on the user surplus, it is essential to set the optimal toll. In the case of an approved project considered in isolation, we show that the optimal toll depends upon the public-funding scarcity coefficient. If there is no scarcity, the optimal toll is zero. As public-funding becomes scarcer, the optimal toll draws closer to the toll that optimises revenue. In the case of a programme of several projects subject to budget constraint, we show that the optimal toll no longer depends upon the public-funding scarcity coefficient and that there are several scenarios depending on the relative values of the maximum revenue and the total cost of the project: â when, whatever the toll, revenue can no longer cover over half of the cost, it is socially beneficial to choose not to levy any toll; â when there is a toll that covers the total cost, the operator may be left free to set it at the level he sees fit, with the issue of how the profits are to be shared between the franchisee and the franchisor being settled separately; â when the maximum revenue of the project falls between half and all of the total cost, the value of the toll that maximises the welfare function is lower than the revenue-maximising toll and must therefore be set for the private operator by government. Thus, the partnership contract must be given a different content in these three cases of optimal pricing
L'évaluation des investissements dans un contexte de pauvreté - Conférence introductive
L'une des expressions les plus significatives du sous-dĂ©veloppement est la contradiction entre l'importance des besoins en investissement et la faible capacitĂ© Ă les financer. Cela vaut Ă©videmment pour la sphĂšre privĂ©e mais la contradiction est beaucoup plus forte encore pour la sphĂšre publique, le secteur des transports et ses infrastructures Ă©tant tout particuliĂšrement concernĂ©s. Il en rĂ©sulte une obligation trĂšs ordinaire en Ă©conomie : plus rare est la ressource, plus il importe d'en faire un usage optimal. Ce principe s'est concrĂ©tisĂ© par le fait que pendant des dĂ©cennies, les Ă©valuations des projets imposĂ©es par les bailleurs de fond ont Ă©tĂ© plus mĂ©ticuleuses dans les pays en dĂ©veloppement que celles que s'imposaient les pays industrialisĂ©s. Pour autant, le bilan de ces dĂ©cennies n'est pas extraordinairement positif. L'une des principales raisons tient au fait que les dettes contractĂ©es pour le financement des projets n'ont pas toujours pu ĂȘtre amorties par les surplus Ă©conomiques dĂ©gagĂ©s par les projets, que ces surplus se soient perdus dans les sables ou qu'ils aient Ă©tĂ© moins importants que prĂ©vus. La consĂ©quence la plus visible de ces expĂ©riences est l'affaissement des crĂ©dits affectĂ©s aux grands projets d'infrastructure. Cependant, une autre consĂ©quence n'est pas moins importante, qui consiste en une Ă©volution progressive vers des modes de financement diffĂ©rents : celui-ci peut ĂȘtre en tout ou partie assurĂ© par l'usager et non plus seulement par les finances publiques. Cette communication montre que cette Ă©volution conduit Ă modifier radicalement la logique de l'Ă©valuation des projets et, par consĂ©quent, de l'Ă©laboration des programmes d'investissement. C'est ainsi que la rentabilitĂ© financiĂšre se rĂ©vĂšle un meilleur critĂšre que la rentabilitĂ© socio-Ă©conomique pour dĂ©terminer l'ordre de programmation des projets qui produit le meilleur rendement social.Besoins en investissement ; financement des projets ; programmes d'investissement ; secteur des transports ; Ă©valuation des projets
Solvent free method for intense vaporization of solid molecular and inorganic compounds
New tools have been developed for vaporization of solid precursors to meet the demands of high feed rate for CVD, ALD and other deposition processes
Le choix entre voiture et transport collectif
Dans les discours et dans les esprits, la voiture et les transports publics entretiennent des relations compliquĂ©es. Elles s'inscrivent dans une distribution de rĂŽle oĂč il y a les bons et les mĂ©chants, et alimentent ainsi une piĂšce toujours animĂ©e dont le scĂ©nario prĂ©sente des scĂšnes rĂ©currentes comme la bataille pour l'usage de la voirie, la compĂ©tition entre les modes de transport sur le marchĂ© des dĂ©placements ou les arbitrages dans les investissements publics. Comme dans tout bon thĂ©Ăątre, les acteurs vivent des contradictions redoutables : les citoyens qui se dĂ©placent sont, pour plus de deux tiers, selon un sondage europĂ©en, favorables au dĂ©veloppement des transports publics mais ne les choisissent que pour moins d'un quart de leurs dĂ©placements ; les Ă©lus s'engagent Ă respecter cette prĂ©fĂ©rence affichĂ©e par l'Ă©lecteur mais ne peuvent pas oublier qu'il est d'abord un automobiliste et un contribuable ; ainsi les villes tentent d'Ă©chapper aux difficultĂ©s de la congestion comme Ă celle du financement. Elles doivent manĆuvrer entre ces deux crises en jouant avec les cinq commandes du systĂšme de transport urbain : les lois de financement, la tarification, la rĂ©glementation, l'Ă©valuation des investissements et leur programmation.politique des transports urbains ; mesures de rĂ©gulation ; Ă©talement urbain ; mobilitĂ© urbaine ; utilisation de l'automobile ; usage des transports collectifs
Les modĂšles de l'Ă©conomie des transports
Comme dans les autres domaines de l'Ă©conomie, l'usage des modĂšles emprunte deux voies qui parfois se croisent mais qui mĂ©ritent d'ĂȘtre distinguĂ©es : celle des fictions thĂ©oriques, qui gĂ©nĂšrent des concepts et jouent avec, dans des situations stylisĂ©es, et celle des modĂšles opĂ©rationnels, qui ajoutent aux conditions de cohĂ©rence et de pertinence des modĂšles thĂ©oriques une exigence de mesurabilitĂ©. L'article survole chacune de ces dĂ©marches en insistant sur les innovations mĂ©thodologiques qui ont dĂ©bordĂ© de beaucoup l'Ă©conomie des transports.Economie des transports ; modĂ©lisation ; thĂ©orie Ă©conomique
Les infrastructures de transport et la logique financiÚre du partenariat public-privé : quelques paradoxes
L'implication d'opĂ©rateurs privĂ©s dans le financement, la construction et l'exploitation d'infrastructures publiques sont de plus en plus frĂ©quemment explorĂ©es par la puissance publique. Cette tendance a ses raisons, dont le souci de minimiser la dĂ©pense publique qui est souvent Ă©voquĂ©. Mais quelles sont les consĂ©quences d'une faible rentabilitĂ© financiĂšre du projet sur le choix entre opĂ©rateur public ou privĂ© ? Le choix du privĂ© n'est-il pertinent que lorsque cette rentabilitĂ© est forte ?La rĂ©ponse Ă ces questions tient, en particulier, Ă un paradoxe de la rentabilitĂ© financiĂšre : en supposant que les opĂ©rateurs publics et privĂ©s aient la mĂȘme efficience, tout projet qui ne peut ĂȘtre autofinancĂ© requiert plus de subvention si le privĂ© est choisi, mais le surcoĂ»t correspondant pour les finances publiques est d'autant plus faible que la rentabilitĂ© du projet est elle-mĂȘme faible.Cet article propose une dĂ©monstration de ce paradoxe et en dĂ©cline quelques consĂ©quences, y compris en cas de meilleure efficience de la part de l'opĂ©rateur privĂ©.infrastructures de transport ; financement ; rentabilitĂ© financiĂšre ; partenariat public-privĂ©
Under which conditions is a PPP relevant for public spending?
Public authorities increasingly involve the private sector in financing, building and operating new infrastructures. Many reasons are usually given to justify private sector involvement. One of them claims that private operators can manage project construction and operation more efficiently. Nevertheless, whether a public or a private operator, there is a target IRR, very close to the standard notion of Weighted Average Capital Cost (WACC), which is higher in the case of the private alternative because it must also include the operator's profit. The fundamental issue is the result of two opposite effects: on the one hand, the effect of the higher efficiency of the private operator; on the other hand, the effect of a lower WACC for the public operator. This paper proposes a model of the determination of the need of public financing which formalizes these two effects and allows analysing the conditions under which the PPP would be advantageous for the public finances. Simulations estimate the efficiency gain from private operators needed to compensate their higher WACC. Results confirmed the so-called âparadox of financial profitabilityâ: recourse to PPP is more relevant for public funds when the profitability of the project is lower
Complémentarité ou concurrence des aéroports : l'exemple du Grand Sud-Est
Les complĂ©mentaritĂ©s de l'offre de transport aĂ©rien dans la rĂ©gion du grand Sud-Est et les possibilitĂ©s de coordination qu'elles suggĂšrent entre les quatre aĂ©roports principaux de Lyon, Marseille, Nice et Montpellier sont examinĂ©es. Les complĂ©mentaritĂ©s des dessertes concernent peu les acteurs : les autoritĂ©s aĂ©roportuaires se situent dans une logique de concurrence, les compagnies ne raisonnent en termes de complĂ©mentaritĂ© que lorsqu'elles conservent la maĂźtrise de la clientĂšle et l'administration reste prĂȘte Ă favoriser tous les investissements, y compris dans les petits aĂ©roports au risque d'affaiblir les aĂ©roports rĂ©gionaux. L'Europe a souhaitĂ© se doter d'un systĂšme de rĂ©gulation fondĂ© sur la concurrence. Il n'est pas Ă©tonnant que les territoires concernĂ©s deviennent un terrain sur lequel des stratĂ©gies autonomes s'affrontent et il n'est pas prouvĂ© que ce soit au dĂ©triment des usagers.Transport aĂ©rien ; aĂ©roport rĂ©gionaux ; complĂ©mentaritĂ© ; Grand Sud-Est
- âŠ