On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: The importance of credible claims

What makes a bargaining proposal credible? We study how hard leverage (binding commitment) influences soft leverage (appealing to a focal point) in a rich-context bargaining game known to exhibit competing claims to focality. In three treatments, our experiment varies one bargainer's ability to commit, holding the soft leverage condition fixed. As in previous studies, we observe that opening offers are consistent with the available soft leverage. The influence of hard leverage is most evident in the concessionary stage. Hard and soft leverage interact to influence outcomes: Hard leverage advantages its holder, yet settlements largely stay between the two focal points. We posit that focal points induce mutual expectations of bargainer social preferences that, when combined with the Nash bargaining solution, imply the comparative statics concerning the settlements observed. A similarly modified version of the Zeuthen–Harsanyi model of the bargaining process, agrees with the comparative statics on opening offers and concessions. © 2016 Elsevier Inc

The Multidimensional Study of Viral Campaigns as Branching Processes

Viral campaigns on the Internet may follow variety of models, depending on the content, incentives, personal attitudes of sender and recipient to the content and other factors. Due to the fact that the knowledge of the campaign specifics is essential for the campaign managers, researchers are constantly evaluating models and real-world data. The goal of this article is to present the new knowledge obtained from studying two viral campaigns that took place in a virtual world which followed the branching process. The results show that it is possible to reduce the time needed to estimate the model parameters of the campaign and, moreover, some important aspects of time-generations relationship are presented.Comment: In proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Social Informatics, SocInfo 201

Customer emotions in service failure and recovery encounters

Emotions play a significant role in the workplace, and considerable attention has been given to the study of employee emotions. Customers also play a central function in organizations, but much less is known about customer emotions. This chapter reviews the growing literature on customer emotions in employee–customer interfaces with a focus on service failure and recovery encounters, where emotions are heightened. It highlights emerging themes and key findings, addresses the measurement, modeling, and management of customer emotions, and identifies future research streams. Attention is given to emotional contagion, relationships between affective and cognitive processes, customer anger, customer rage, and individual differences

Observations of the High Redshift Universe

(Abridged) In these lectures aimed for non-specialists, I review progress in understanding how galaxies form and evolve. Both the star formation history and assembly of stellar mass can be empirically traced from redshifts z~6 to the present, but how the various distant populations inter-relate and how stellar assembly is regulated by feedback and environmental processes remains unclear. I also discuss how these studies are being extended to locate and characterize the earlier sources beyond z~6. Did early star-forming galaxies contribute significantly to the reionization process and over what period did this occur? Neither theory nor observations are well-developed in this frontier topic but the first results presented here provide important guidance on how we will use more powerful future facilities.Comment: To appear in `First Light in Universe', Saas-Fee Advanced Course 36, Swiss Soc. Astrophys. Astron. in press. 115 pages, 64 figures (see http://www.astro.caltech.edu/~rse/saas-fee.pdf for hi-res figs.) For lecture ppt files see http://obswww.unige.ch/saas-fee/preannouncement/course_pres/overview_f.htm

Measuring Motivations for the Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game.

We report on an experiment that uses a simple dilemma game to compare two characterizations of reciprocal behavior, differing on whether it is necesary to account for intentions in order to accurately predict and measure reciprocal actions. The design of the experiment allows us to study both positive and negative reciprocity in a simple framework. We find little evidence that intentions matter. Knowing the preferences for relative payoffs is sufficient to predict nearly all the reciprocity we observe.BEHAVIOUR