Modeling Sample Selection for Durations with Time-Varying Covariates, With an Application to the Duration of Exchange Rate Regimes

We extend existing estimators for duration data that suffer from non-random sample selection to allow for time-varying covariates. Rather than a continuous-time duration model, we propose a discrete-time alternative that models the effects of sample selection at the time of selection across all subsequent years of the resulting spell. Properties of the estimator are compared to those of a naive discrete duration model through Monte Carlo analysis and indicate that our estimator outperforms the naive model when selection is non-trivial. We then apply this estimator to the question of the duration of monetary regimes and find evidence that ignoring selection into pegs leads to faulty inferences.exchange rates; de facto regimes; duration; selection models; monetary policy

Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making

Important conceptualizations of both interest groups and bureaucratic agencies suggest that these institutions provide legislatures with greater information for use in policy making. Yet little is known about how these information sources interact in the policy process as a whole. In this paper we consider this issue analytically, and develop a model of policy making in which multiple sources of information – from the bureaucracy, an interest group, or a legislature’s own in-house development – can be brought to bear on policy. Lobbyists begin this process by selecting a venue – Congress or a standing bureaucracy – in which to press for a policy change. The main findings of the paper are that self-selection of lobbyists into different policy making venues can be informative per se; that this self-selection can make legislatures willing to delegate more authority to ideologically distinct bureaucratic agents; and that delegation of authority, while it takes advantage of agency expertise, can nevertheless lead to an increase in the legislature’s own in-house information gathering (e.g., hearings). Changes within the Federal Trade Commission during the 1970s are reinterpreted in the context of our model.Delegation, Lobbying, Bureaucracy, Venue Choice, Discretion

Where the Good Signatures Are: The Number and Validity Rates of Initiative Petition Signatures Gathered in California Counties

One of the biggest hurdles to qualifying an initiative for the ballot is gathering the required number of signatures. Yet little is known about these signatures' representativeness or demographic origin. Using data from eight recent California initiatives, we study the distribution of signatures across counties. We ten conduct regression analysis to study how characteristics of counties relate to the number of signatures gathered there. Besides the sources of petition signatures, we also study the results of checks performed by county officials on these signatures to determine whether there are sufficient valid signatures (i.e., from registered voters) in order to qualify the petition for the ballot. We then conduct regression analysis of validity rates by county. Our findings indicate that a variety of social and political factors influence both the number and validity rate of signatures across counties, though the results are more consistent for the former. Finally, we demonstrate that signature gathering campaigns have consequences for outcomes by relating the intensity of the signature campaign within a county to ballot roll-off

The Influence of Initiative Signature Gathering Campaigns on Political Participation

Does direct democracy increase political participation? Rather than focus on state-level effects of the initiative process, this paper studies the effect of signature gathering campaigns on participation within a state. To this end we test whether parts of the state that are subject to more intense signature gathering campaigns, measured by the number of signatures gathered per capita, experience greater levels of political participation. We examine three measures of participation: registration, turnout, and ballot rolloff. Our key variable is the intensity of the signature gathering campaign across eight specific ballot measure or across measures for four specific elections. Grouped logit analysis demonstrates that the intensity of signature gathering campaigns is strongly related to these measures of political participation. In addition, we also study how signature gathering intensity influences vote choice on associated measures, finding that on average increased signature gathering intensity increases support for a measure

The Influence of Initiative Signature Gathering Campaigns on Political Participation (II)

Does direct democracy increase political participation? Rather than focus on state-level effects of the initiative process, this paper studies the effect of signature gathering campaigns on participation within a state. To this end we test whether parts of the state that are subject to more intense signature gathering campaigns, measured by the number of signatures gathered per capita, experience greater levels of political participation. We examine three measures of participation: registration, turnout, and ballot rolloff. Our key variable is the intensity of the signature gathering campaign across eight specific ballot measure or across measures for four specific elections. Grouped logit analysis demonstrates that the intensity of signature gathering campaigns is strongly related to these measures of political participation. In addition, we also study how signature gathering intensity influences vote choice on associated measures, finding that on average increased signature gathering intensity increases support for a measure

Persistent Policy Pathways: Inferring Diffusion Networks in the American States

The transmission of ideas, information, and resources forms the core of many issues studied in political science, including collective action, cooperation, and development. While these processes imply dynamic connections among political actors, researchers often cannot observe such interdependence. One example is public policy diffusion, which has long been a focus of multiple subfields. In the American state politics context, diffusion is commonly conceptualized as a dyadic process whereby states adopt policies (in part) because other states have adopted them. This implies a policy diffusion network connecting the states. Using a dataset of 187 policies, we introduce and apply an algorithm that infers this network from persistent diffusion patterns. The results contribute to knowledge on state policy diffusion in several respects. Additionally, in introducing network inference to political science, we provide scholars across the discipline with a general framework for empirically recovering the latent and dynamic interdependence among political actors

How partisan gridlock in state legislatures encourages the use of citizen initiatives.

While partisan gridlock has become a common occurrence in the US Congress, this is also often the case in many state legislatures. In new research, Frederick J. Boehmke, Tracy L. Osborn, and Emily U. Schilling look at one consequence of legislative rules that encourage legislative paralysis – the increasing use of ballot initiatives by citizens. Using data from the American states, they find that as ‘pivotal legislators’ – gatekeepers whose support is needed to overcome a legislative filibuster or gubernatorial veto – become ideologically farther away from the state’s median voter, initiative use increases due to those lawmakers thwarting legislative action to secure preferred outcomes in the form of ballot measures

A Diffusion Network Event History Estimator

Research on the diffusion of political decisions across jurisdictions typically accounts for units’ influence over each other with (1) observable measures or (2) by inferring latent network ties from past decisions. The former approach assumes that interdependence is static and perfectly captured by the data. The latter mitigates these issues but requires analytical tools that are separate from the main empirical methods for studying diffusion. As a solution, we introduce network event history analysis (NEHA), which incorporates latent network inference into conventional discrete-time event history models. We demonstrate NEHA’s unique methodological and substantive benefits in applications to policy adoption in the American states. Researchers can analyze the ties and structure of inferred networks to refine model specifications, evaluate diffusion mechanisms, or test new or existing hypotheses. By capturing targeted relationships unexplained by standard covariates, NEHA can improve models, facilitate richer theoretical development, and permit novel analyses of the diffusion process

Measuring the indirect effect: Voter initiatives and legislative production in the American states

Accepted ManuscriptRecent research has identified important policy differences between voter initiative states and pure representative states despite a lack of enough observable voter initiative campaigns to explain the policy differences. This paper investigates the indirect effects of the voter initiative process on legislative production by estimating the number of bill enacted in the American states. The results indicate that legislators in voter initiative states enact more legislation as the difficulty in qualifying a voter initiative for the ballot decreases, as the legislature is less able to alter the effects of successful voter initiatives, and as the average number of voter initiatives that appear on the ballot increases. These results provide some statistical evidence of the indirect effect of the voter initiative and are consistent with the theory that policy differences in voter initiative states are the result of the indirect effect of the voter initiative process.Randolph, G.M. (2010). Measuring the indirect effect: Voter initiatives and legislative production in the American states. Public Finance Review, 38(6), 762-786

Explaining Institutional Change: Why Elected Politicians Implement Direct Democracy

In existing models of direct democratic institutions, the median voter benefits, but representative politicians are harmed since their policy choices can be overridden. This is a puzzle, since representative politicians were instrumental in creating these institutions. I build a model of direct democracy that explains why a representative might benefit from tying his or her own hands in this way. The key features are (1) that voters are uncertain about their representative's preferences; (2) that direct and representative elections are complementary ways for voters to control outcomes. The model shows that some politicians benefit from the introduction of direct democracy, since they are more likely to survive representative elections: direct democracy credibly prevents politicians from realising extreme outcomes. Historical evidence from the introduction of the initiative, referendum and recall in America broadly supports the theory, which also explains two empirical results that have puzzled scholars: legislators are trusted less, but reelected more, in US states with direct democracy. I conclude by discussing the potential for incomplete information and signaling models to improve our understanding of institutional change more generally