Reallocation Mechanisms

We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of the players is their value for every possible subset of the resources. The goal is to redistribute resources among agents to maximize efficiency. Monetary transfers are allowed, but participation is voluntary. We develop incentive-compatible, individually-rational and budget balanced mechanisms for several classic settings, including bilateral trade, partnership dissolving, Arrow-Debreu markets, and combinatorial exchanges. All our mechanisms (except one) provide a constant approximation to the optimal efficiency in these settings, even in ones where the preferences of the agents are complex multi-parameter functions

Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that in optimal mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies in, as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the communication complexity only by a linear factor

Intentional Job Discrimination-New Tools for Our Oldest Problem

The roots of employment discrimination lie deep in our history. By the 18th century, race slavery was the underpinning of wealth in the southern colonies. Black slaves were considered property - subhumans who had no rights in themselves or their offspring. In 1765, the British imposed stamp taxes on the colonies; the colonies resisted. In 1766, Parliament claimed the power to govern the colonies in all matters, but by 1770 it had repealed almost all the taxes that offended the colonists. Business as usual returned to the relations between the colonies and Britain

Networks of Complements

We consider a network of sellers, each selling a single product, where the graph structure represents pair-wise complementarities between products. We study how the network structure affects revenue and social welfare of equilibria of the pricing game between the sellers. We prove positive and negative results, both of "Price of Anarchy" and of "Price of Stability" type, for special families of graphs (paths, cycles) as well as more general ones (trees, graphs). We describe best-reply dynamics that converge to non-trivial equilibrium in several families of graphs, and we use these dynamics to prove the existence of approximately-efficient equilibria.Comment: An extended abstract will appear in ICALP 201

Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

It is the thesis of this article that job segregation and wage discrimination are not separate problems, but rather are intimately related. Wherever there is job segregation, the same forces which determine that certain jobs or job categories will be reserved for women or minorities also and simultaneously determine that the economic value of those jobs is less than if they were white or male jobs. Thus, those women and minorities who are channelled into segregated jobs are not only deprived of initial hiring opportunities in other jobs and meaningful transfer opportunities, but are also paid wages for the jobs that they get which are discriminatorily depressed

The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship

This article will examine the extent to which, and the methods by which, individual rights are protected in each of these three phases of union activity. We will see that the employee is well protected in his right to oppose political action of the union and has considerable legal protection for his rights to engage in internal union political struggles, but the employee has received little protection for his economic interests in collective bargaining between unions and employers. A recent decision by the NLRB, which will be examined in some detail, suggests that additional protection for individual economic rights in the collective bargaining process may be in the offing