An Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure

For many prisoners, federal habeas corpus stands as the last opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of their convictions or sentences. Simply navigating through the procedural maze of habeas practice, however, is a formidable task for inmates proceeding pro se and prisoners represented by counsel. Tragically, those who have had a fundamentally unfair trial, and even those who are innocent, may easily stumble. Since 1867, habeas corpus, or the Great Writ, has been available to state prisoners in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States. The modern era of federal habeas corpus, however, did not begin until the Supreme Court\u27s decision in Brown v. Allen. In Brown, the Court held that the violation of a constitutional right is cognizable in federal habeas and that federal courts may independently review state court adjudications of federal questions, even if the state court\u27s treatment of those legal claims was full and fair. The potential scope of habeas corpus is vast. At its root is the principle that if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release. . . . Vindication of due process is precisely its historic office. However, despite the expansive tone of much of the language describing habeas corpus, its effective reach has been curtailed, especially in recent years. Motivated by concerns for the finality of convictions and federalism, the Court has erected a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of federal rights. The Court has even downplayed the role of habeas corpus itself. Congress may act to restrict habeas even further. To assist state inmates who confront the difficult task of a federal court challenge to the legality of their detention, we first outline the elementary steps in habeas corpus procedure. Next, we outline the State\u27s possible defenses. We then examine doctrines that affect the way a federal court treats the merits of claims presented in the petition. Finally, we address the special concerns of death-sentenced inmates who seek a stay of execution pending consideration of their habeas petitions. While an understanding of complex habeas corpus principles is important, it is perhaps secondary to the art of meaningful habeas corpus advocacy. The practitioner must convince the court that the inmate is a human being, not a remorseless criminal; that the inmate was denied a fundamentally fair trial and is not merely raising technical issues; and finally, that the inmate, rather than refusing to accept responsibility for misdeeds, did not receive basic justice in the state court

An Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure

For many prisoners, federal habeas corpus stands as the last opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of their convictions or sentences. Simply navigating through the procedural maze of habeas practice, however, is a formidable task for inmates proceeding pro se and prisoners represented by counsel. Tragically, those who have had a fundamentally unfair trial, and even those who are innocent, may easily stumble. Since 1867, habeas corpus, or the Great Writ, has been available to state prisoners in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States. The modern era of federal habeas corpus, however, did not begin until the Supreme Court\u27s decision in Brown v. Allen. In Brown, the Court held that the violation of a constitutional right is cognizable in federal habeas and that federal courts may independently review state court adjudications of federal questions, even if the state court\u27s treatment of those legal claims was full and fair. The potential scope of habeas corpus is vast. At its root is the principle that if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release. . . . Vindication of due process is precisely its historic office. However, despite the expansive tone of much of the language describing habeas corpus, its effective reach has been curtailed, especially in recent years. Motivated by concerns for the finality of convictions and federalism, the Court has erected a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of federal rights. The Court has even downplayed the role of habeas corpus itself. Congress may act to restrict habeas even further. To assist state inmates who confront the difficult task of a federal court challenge to the legality of their detention, we first outline the elementary steps in habeas corpus procedure. Next, we outline the State\u27s possible defenses. We then examine doctrines that affect the way a federal court treats the merits of claims presented in the petition. Finally, we address the special concerns of death-sentenced inmates who seek a stay of execution pending consideration of their habeas petitions. While an understanding of complex habeas corpus principles is important, it is perhaps secondary to the art of meaningful habeas corpus advocacy. The practitioner must convince the court that the inmate is a human being, not a remorseless criminal; that the inmate was denied a fundamentally fair trial and is not merely raising technical issues; and finally, that the inmate, rather than refusing to accept responsibility for misdeeds, did not receive basic justice in the state court

Harmless Error in Federal Habeas Corpus After Brecht v. Abrahamson

The law of habeas corpus has changed again. This time it was the law of harmless error. Before Brecht v. Abrahamson, the courts applied the same harmless error rule on direct appeal and in federal habeas corpus. Under that rule, embraced for constitutional errors in Chapman v. California, a conviction tainted by a constitutional error susceptible to harmless error analysis could be upheld only if the state demonstrated that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After Brecht, the venerable Chapman rule still applies to constitutional errors identified and reviewed on direct appeal, but an ostensibly less onerous standard applies to constitutional errors identified and reviewed on federal habeas corpus. Under this standard, derived from Kotteakos v. United States, and once used only for nonconstitutional errors, a conviction tainted by constitutional error “requires reversal only if it \u27had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury\u27s verdict.’” The Court was sharply divided in Brecht. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Stevens, who provided the critical fifth vote, wrote a separate concurring opinion to emphasize that the [Brecht] standard is appropriately demanding. Justice Stevens\u27 separate concurring opinion deserves careful attention because it diverges from that of the Chief Justice in several ways, making Justice Stevens\u27 version of the Brecht-Kotteakos test much more favorable to habeas petitioners than that advanced by the Chief Justice. The following Article provides a concise overview and analysis of Brecht, focusing especially on the opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens. It explores the structure of the Brecht-Kotteakos rule, both as articulated in the Brecht opinion and as interpreted thus far by the lower federal courts. Its principal conclusion is that on careful analysis the Brecht-Kotteakos rule and the Chapman rule, though doubtlessly different, turn out not to be that different. Finally, this Article examines various exceptions to the Brecht-Kotteakos rule, as well as the limited authority of the federal habeas courts to apply harmless error analysis to errors infecting the penalty phase of a capital trial

Centrality and Energy Dependence of Proton, Light Fragment and Hyperon Production

Recent results of the NA49 collaboration are discussed. These include the energy dependence of stopping and the production of the light fragments t and 3He. New data on the system size dependence of hyperon production at 40A and 158AGeV are also presented.Comment: 4 pages, Quark Matter 2006 proceeding

Particle Production at the SPS and the QCD Phase Diagram

Recent results of particle production in the energy regime of the CERN-SPS are reviewed. In order to collect information on the properties of the QCD phase diagram systematic studies of the system size and the energy dependence of particle production in heavy ion collisions have been performed. Net-baryon distributions and results on strangeness production are discussed. The system size dependence of many observables can be understood in the core-corona approach, which has implications on the possibility to use system size as a control parameter to study different areas of the phase diagram. Recent attempts to search for a critical point, such as multiplicity fluctuations and the transverse mass dependence of anti-baryon/baryon ratios are reviewed.Comment: Proccedings of 26th Winter Workshop on Nuclear Dynamics, 9 pages, 7 figure

Optimal, reliable estimation of quantum states

Accurately inferring the state of a quantum device from the results of measurements is a crucial task in building quantum information processing hardware. The predominant state estimation procedure, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), generally reports an estimate with zero eigenvalues. These cannot be justified. Furthermore, the MLE estimate is incompatible with error bars, so conclusions drawn from it are suspect. I propose an alternative procedure, Bayesian mean estimation (BME). BME never yields zero eigenvalues, its eigenvalues provide a bound on their own uncertainties, and it is the most accurate procedure possible. I show how to implement BME numerically, and how to obtain natural error bars that are compatible with the estimate. Finally, I briefly discuss the differences between Bayesian and frequentist estimation techniques.Comment: RevTeX; 14 pages, 2 embedded figures. Comments enthusiastically welcomed