Syria and the red lines of international law. CEPS Commentary, 4 September 2013

As the US and its allies France and Turkey dither over whether or not to punish Assad for having used sarin gas to kill his own people, the crucial question is: What response might the outside world legally take without the authority of the UN Security Council, which remains blocked by two veto-wielding members, Russia and China? Sadly, international law provides no clear-cut answers to this dilemma. To respond to what US Secretary of State John Kerry has rightly called a “moral obscenity”, this commentary explores ways in which formal interpretations of international law might give way to a more pragmatic approach to punish the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons

Introduction: Principles and Practices of EU External Representation.

With this working paper, CLEER aims to offer a better insight into selected legal aspects concerning the European Union’s redefined diplomatic persona. In particular, the working paper will address issues pertaining to the Lisbon Treaty’s organising principles of EU external action, both under EU law and international law, and the growing practice of external representation of the European Union, especially in the context of other international organisations and bodies. Many questions remain unanswered in this respect, for instance: how can we best understand the relationship between the way the EU decides upon international positions and organises its external representation on the one hand, and its influence, performance and/or effectiveness on the other hand? Does the European Union’s formal status as a subject of international law justify an upgraded observer status within international organisations, a seat additional to that of the EU Member States, or should the EU replace them? Does it matter who speaks for the EU, and in what way? How should we square the emergence of the European External Action Service (EEAS), a hybrid organ consisting of EU civil servants and seconded diplomats from the Member States, with the traditionally state-centred body of international diplomatic law? And what can be expected from the High Representative, the EEAS and its vast network of diplomatic representations in third countries and multilateral settings in the pursuit of the Treaty’s external objectives

The UK-Canada Agreement on mutual support of missions abroad: loyalty compromised? CEPS Commentary, 18 October 2012

The UK and Canada recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at allowing the two countries to optimise their respective diplomatic resources by sharing embassy and consulate sites, the joint acquisition, supply and use of services, as well as collaboration on crisis response, consular services, security, diplomatic mail, information management and IT. This CEPS Commentary argues that the MoU on Mutual Support of Missions Abroad runs counter to the spirit of loyal cooperation, in particular in the realm of EU foreign policy. It also raises challenges to coherence, consistency and effectiveness of EU action in policy areas concerning visas, trade and consular protection. Moreover, the agreement may throw a spanner in the works of EU solidarity and the creation of a stronger EU identity, both internally and externall

A Jumbo Financial Instrument for EU External Action? Bertelsmann Stiftung Commentary 19 February 2019

By proposing to integrate 11 existing financial instruments into a unified Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), the European Commission hopes to both simplify its spending on external action under the EU’s general budget for 2021-2027 and make it more effective. Can the NDICI – by overcoming unnecessary budgetary fragmentation and overlap – also be an instrument facilitating the Union’s ‘integrated approach’ to external conflict and crisis? As the proposal now stands, there are still a number of blind spots that could undermine its effective contribution to a multidimensional, multi-level, multilateral and multi-phased approach to address fragility and instability in third countries. The current external financing instruments of the EU, as established under the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF), have struggled to provide enough coherence and flexibility in responding to today’s quickly shifting context. In the face of mounting instability in the neighbourhood (and beyond) and a sharp increase in refugee flows and migration, the key finding of a mid-term self-assessment by the Commission was the need for “more strategic and overarching programming” and “coherent interactions at the operational level in the renewed international context”. The need for flexibility and the problem of silo approaches similarly figure in an externally evaluated Coherence report and the European Parliament’s implementation assessment. In an effort to address these recommendations, the Commission has come up with a new and bold proposal for future spending on issues relating to the neighbourhood, development and international cooperation. By merging the 11 existing instruments outlined below (cf. Table 1) into one financial instrument, the NDICI seeks to increase simplification, coherence, responsiveness and strategic direction in EU external action

A post-mortem of the Vilnius Summit: not yet a 'Thessaloniki moment' for the Eastern Partnership

In assessing the third Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit at Vilnius on November 28-29th, this CEPS Commentary concludes that the event fell far short of its initial ambition to define the geopolitical finalité of EU-EaP relations by projecting a path towards future accession to the EU for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences about right, so far’. EPIN Working Paper No. 35, October 2013

The first in a series for a CEPS-EPIN project entitled “The British Question and the Search for a Fresh European Narrative” this paper is pegged on an ambitious ongoing exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union. The intention is that this should provide a basis for informed debate before the referendum on the UK remaining in the EU or not, which is scheduled for 2017. This paper summarises the first six reviews, each of which runs to around 80 pages, covering foreign policy, development policy, taxation, the single market, food safety, and public health. The present authors then add their own assessments of these materials. While understandably giving due place to British interests, they are of general European relevance. The substantive conclusions of this first set of reviews are that the competences of the EU are judged by respondents to be ‘about right’ on the whole, which came as a surprise to eurosceptic MPs and the tabloid media. Our own view is that the reviews are objective and impressively researched, and these populist complaints are illustrating the huge gap between the views of informed stakeholders and general public opinion, and therefore also the hazard of subjecting the ‘in or out’ choice for decision by referendum. If the referendum is to endorse the UK’s continuing membership there will have to emerge some fresh popular narratives about the EU. The paper therefore concludes with some thoughts along these lines, both for the UK and the EU as a whole

How is EU cooperation on the Covid-19 crisis perceived in member states? CEPS Commentary 21 April

The crisis caused by the spread of Covid-19 has demonstrated how difficult European cooperation can be, especially in policy areas where the EU has only a legal competence to support member states. Some commentators have suggested that this marks the death knell of European integration, and even the most optimistic of them recognise it as one of the greatest challenges the EU has ever faced in terms of crisis management and demonstrating supranational added value. In general, all member states were initially inward-looking in their reactions; they unilaterally closed borders and focused on crisis management at home. European solidarity has largely been absent. Ultimately, however, the lockdown realities across Europe are quite similar. This instinctive self-preservation tells only one side of the story, however. As the virus affected all EU countries – albeit at different stages on the infection curve – it began to threaten the basics of the European economy and its financial system. In this second phase of the crisis there is a need for crisis management at the European level. But the measures decided so far appear marginal – at least in terms of their impact on public opinion in member states, as the EPIN country reports show. All that the EU’s 27 national leaders were able to agree upon so far was a joint bid to improve the procurement of personal protective equipment, increased funding for vaccine research, and relaxed regulatory enforcement. The Commission has also proposed the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative (CRII), to be financed through unused cohesion policy funds, but this requires approval by member state

Europe ́s Coherence Gap in External Crisis and Conflict Management The EU’s Integrated Approach between Political Rhetoric and Institutional Practice. November 2019

The European Union (EU) aspires to play a part in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peace- building through civil and/or military operations, through stabilisation efforts, and by building resilience at home and abroad. To bring this ambition to fruition, EU institutions have gradually expanded their ‘comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis’ (CA) to become a full-fledged ‘integrated approach to conflict and crisis’ (IA).1 In their most basic form, CAs seek coordination and coherence in responding to external conflicts and crises by adopting a system-wide ‘whole-of-government approach’ (WGA). In their more elaborate form, IAs have incorpo- rated non-traditional security concepts, variously known as conflict transformation, (non-liberal) peacebuilding and human-security approaches. In their most expansive form, IAs may even be understood to apply to external action writ large

Preparing for a post-Assad Syria: What role for the European Union? CEPS Commentary, 2 August 2012

In this CEPS Commentary, Steven Blockmans notes that a prolonged period of instability lies ahead for Syria, with an on-going risk of spill-over effects affecting the entire region. The author argues that the EU’s plans for a post-Assad Syria should extend beyond the half-hearted responses to the monumental changes that have ripped through other parts of the Arab world. In recognition of the geostrategic shifts in the Middle East and the Gulf, and pursuant to the obligation imposed upon it by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU should plan for the creation of a regional space of shared security. Such a plan would fit well into the current efforts to revamp the European Security Strategy

Towards a Eurasian economic Union: the challenge of integration and unity

otherwise – without the prior permission of CEPS