Are emotions reliable guides for policy making? An evolutionary perspective

Technology has become all-important in modern society. For each application, it is crucial for society to have a good understanding of the risks and benefits involved. However, experts tend to assess the risks very differently than the public. One of the main reasons is that experts tend to rely on an objective analysis of the facts, whereas laypeople’s judgment is also based on other factors, including emotional responses. The question remains however whether that is a good thing. Some argue that emotions lead to biases and should be treated with great suspicion; others claim that the laypeople’s approach to risk is much richer and should also be taken into consideration. In this paper, I explore how we can answer that important question from an evolutionary perspective. First, I briefly outline the role of emotions in judgment and decision making. Next, I discuss two approaches that have defended the rationality of emotions: Roeser’s concept of emotions as trustworthy indicators of moral risks and Kahan’s cultural evaluator theory. Subsequently, I briefly discuss the evolution of emotions and their impact on risk assessment. I conclude from that account that emotions are not trustworthy guide for policy making

Catholic responses to evolution, 1859-2009: local factors and mid-scale patterns

This article discusses Catholic responses to evolution between 1859, the year of publication of Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species, and 2009, the year in which the scientific world celebrated its 150th anniversary. Firstly, I will discuss how the Vatican initially responded to evolution in the period between 1859 and 1907, the year in which Pope Pius X issued the encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis. Secondly, I will explore the responses of Catholic authorities and intellectuals and identify the local factors that influenced their responses. Also, I will demonstrate that, gradually, Catholics have shifted towards a more lenient position concerning evolution. Thirdly, I will demonstrate that, in the end, the Vatican has complied with this pattern. In general, this article shows that not only Protestants, but Catholics too have struggled to come to terms with evolution and evolutionary theory and that local factors had an impact on these negotiations

Creationism and evolution

In Tower of Babel, Robert Pennock wrote that “defenders of evolution would help their case immeasurably if they would reassure their audience that morality, purpose, and meaning are not lost by accepting the truth of evolution.” We first consider the thesis that the creationists’ movement exploits moral concerns to spread its ideas against the theory of evolution. We analyze their arguments and possible reasons why they are easily accepted. Creationists usually employ two contradictive strategies to expose the purported moral degradation that comes with accepting the theory of evolution. On the one hand they claim that evolutionary theory is immoral. On the other hand creationists think of evolutionary theory as amoral. Both objections come naturally in a monotheistic view. But we can find similar conclusions about the supposed moral aspects of evolution in non-religiously inspired discussions. Meanwhile, the creationism-evolution debate mainly focuses — understandably — on what constitutes good science. We consider the need for moral reassurance and analyze reassuring arguments from philosophers. Philosophers may stress that science does not prescribe and is therefore not immoral, but this reaction opens the door for the objection of amorality that evolution — as a naturalistic world view at least — supposedly endorses. We consider that the topic of morality and its relation to the acceptance of evolution may need more empirical research

Grist to the mill of anti-evolutionism: the failed strategy of ruling the supernatural out of science by philosophical fiat

According to a widespread philosophical opinion, science is strictly limited to investigating natural causes and putting forth natural explanations. Lacking the tools to evaluate supernatural claims, science must remain studiously neutral on questions of metaphysics. This (self-imposed) stricture, which goes under the name of ‘methodological naturalism’, allows science to be divorced from metaphysical naturalism or atheism, which many people tend to associate with it. However, ruling the supernatural out of science by fiat is not only philosophically untenable, it actually provides grist to the mill of anti-evolutionism. The philosophical flaws in this conception of methodological naturalism have been gratefully exploited by advocates of Intelligent Design Creationism to bolster their false accusations of naturalistic bias and dogmatism on the part of modern science. We argue that it promotes a misleading view of the scientific endeavor and is at odds with the foremost arguments for evolution by natural selection. Reconciling science and religion on the basis of such methodological strictures is therefore misguided

The modern versus extended evolutionary synthesis : sketch of an intra-genomic gene's eye view for the evolutionary-genetic underpinning of epigenetic and developmental evolution

Studying the phenotypic evolution of organisms in terms of populations of genes and genotypes, the Modern Synthesis (MS) conceptualizes biological evolution in terms of 'inter-organismal' interactions among genes sitting in the different individual organisms that constitute a population. It 'black-boxes' the complex 'intra-organismic' molecular and developmental epigenetics mediating between genotypes and phenotypes. To conceptually integrate epigenetics and evo-devo into evolutionary theory, advocates of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) argue that the MS's reductive gene-centrism should be abandoned in favor of a more inclusive organism-centered approach. To push the debate to a new level of understanding, we introduce the evolutionary biology of 'intra-genomic conflict' (IGC) to the controversy. This strategy is based on a twofold rationale. First, the field of IGC is both ‘gene-centered’ and 'intra-organismic' and, as such, could build a bridge between the gene-centered MS and the intra-organismic fields of epigenetics and evo-devo. And second, it is increasingly revealed that IGC plays a significant causal role in epigenetic and developmental evolution and even in speciation. Hence, to deal with the ‘discrepancy’ between the ‘gene-centered’ MS and the ‘intra-organismic’ fields of epigenetics and evo-devo, we sketch a conceptual solution in terms of ‘intra-genomic conflict and compromise’ – an ‘intra-genomic gene’s eye view’ that thinks in terms of intra-genomic ‘evolutionarily stable strategies’ (ESSs) among numerous and various DNA regions and elements – to evolutionary-genetically underwrite both epigenetic and developmental evolution, as such questioning the ‘gene-de-centered’ stance put forward by EES-advocates

Linguistic reference in science : problems and progress

The crucial role that mathematical notation systems have played in the success of the hard or mathematical sciences is well known and richly documented: the origin of the history of these sophisticated notation systems more or less coincides with the birth of modern science. The role of our linguistic notation systems (as applied to, or used in, the scientific study of nature), by contrast, is hardly documented at all, at least not in a systematic way. We distinguish between (metaphorical and non-metaphorical) meta-scientific terms and scientific terms and, as far as the latter is concerned, between methodology and content terms. It is the latter sort of terms that interest us here. Five different dysfunctions in the relationship between scientific linguistic tokens and their referents will be presented and illustrated: scientific terms or phrases can not only be imprecise, they can also be meaningless, indiscriminate, inapt and ambiguous. By correcting or alleviating such dysfunctions, our linguistic notation systems have, in the course of the past four centuries, become more refined and functional scientific tools. This simple, illustrated taxonomy is not only historically relevant, it may also help contemporaneous scientists to identify and avoid possible pitfalls, associated with the use of language in science

Irreducible incoherence and intelligent design : a look into the conceptual toolbox of a pseudoscience

The concept of Irreducible Complexity (IC) has played a pivotal role in the resurgence of the creationist movement over the past two decades. Evolutionary biologists and philosophers have unambiguously rejected the purported demonstration of “intelligent design” in nature, but there have been several, apparently contradictory, lines of criticism. We argue that this is in fact due to Michael Behe's own incoherent definition and use of IC. This paper offers an analysis of several equivocations inherent in the concept of Irreducible Complexity and discusses the way in which advocates of the Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC) have conveniently turned IC into a moving target. An analysis of these rhetorical strategies helps us to understand why IC has gained such prominence in the IDC movement, and why, despite its complete lack of scientific merits, it has even convinced some knowledgeable persons of the impending demise of evolutionary theory