Combining quantifications for flexible query result ranking

Databases contain data and database systems governing such databases are often intended to allow a user to query these data. On one hand, these data may be subject to imperfections, on the other hand, users may employ imperfect query preference specifications to query such databases. All of these imperfections lead to each query answer being accompanied by a collection of quantifications indicating how well (part of) a group of data complies with (part of) the user's query. A fundamental question is how to present the user with the query answers complying best to his or her query preferences. The work presented in this paper first determines the difficulties to overcome in reaching such presentation. Mainly, a useful presentation needs the ranking of the query answers based on the aforementioned quantifications, but it seems advisable to not combine quantifications with different interpretations. Thus, the work presented in this paper continues to introduce and examine a novel technique to determine a query answer ranking. Finally, a few aspects of this technique, among which its computational efficiency, are discussed

How to determine fining behaviour in court? Game theoretical and empirical analysis

We build a structural model to understand the fine set in court, which is described as the outcome of a two-stage game between defendant, public prosecutor and judge. The equilibrium fine depends on the harm caused, the costs to society and the probalility that the quilty party is punished. This fine influences the severity of prosecution and the defence expenditures. Next we empirically analyse the fines pronounced by the Court of Appeal in Ghent (Belgium) for water related criminal offences. We investigate whether the seriousness of the violation and past convictions, as well as some other characteristics, increase the penalty.

Using emission standards under incomplete compliance

Using the case study of water pollution in the Flemish textile industry, we discuss three empirical questions concerning the use of emission standards. We find that the Becker result ("maximal fine / minimal inspection") does not hold if we include rule making, implementation and enforcement costs into the model. There is a balance between the fine and the inspection variables. Making enforcement more stringent does not mean to put the fine levels as high as possible and only then increase the inspections. We have also shown that is extremely important to have correct estimates of people's willingness to pay for environmental improvement. These WTP estimates determine in great part the optimal environmental strategy and its associated optimal monitoring and enforcement policy. Moreover, it really pays off to optimise the monitoring and enforcement strategy associated with an emission standard. This optimisation does not necessarily mean that monitoring and enforcement should be as stringent as possible. It is often possible to obtain the desired result by some intermediate value of the monitoring and enforcement parameters. This is due to the balancing of costs and benefits associated with monitoring and enforcement.Environmental Law; Illegal behaviour; Enforcement of Law

Judicial policy lines in the criminal sanctioning of environmental offenses: an empirical study.

We analyze judicial policy lines concerning criminal environmental sanctioning using a unique European dataset of individual criminal cases, including case-specific information on offenses and offenders. We investigate policy choices made by criminal judges in lower courts as well as the relevant court of appeal. The sanctioning policy of judges proofs to be varied as well as consistent. Judges decide to postpone convictions for cases they deem less important. They carefully balance effective and suspended sanctions, in general using them as substitutes, but in specific cases opting to use them cumulatively. Overall, judges in lower courts balance environmental and classic criminal law and aim at protecting individuals and their possessions as well as the environment.