Connected Coalition Formation and Voting Power in the Council of the European Union: An Endogenous Policy Approach. EIPA Working Paper 99/W/05

Resorting to political economy approaches, this paper attempts to associate the industrial structure in the European Union (EU) to the coalition formation process between European member states. Using a well-known measure of relative voting power, the (normalized) Banzhaf power index, we relax the common assumption that coalitions form randomly. Instead, we adopt the standard interest group model and look at the structure of European industry, mainly in terms of industrial concentration in the EU, as an indicator of its lobbying influence on domestic politics and governments’ preferences. This, in turn, influences the political stance, and thus the coalition building process, of the different member states in the Council. We derive estimates on members’ relative influence within the Council for different policy areas in the broader framework of industry and trade, on the basis of both weighted votes and likely patterns of coalition-formation in the Council

Monitoring economic partnership agreements: inputs to the negotiations and beyond

"The upcoming Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and regions are extremely challenging. Conceived as a follow-up to the non-reciprocal trade preferences granted to the ACP since 1975, the aim of the EPAs is sustainable development and poverty reduction through the establishment of a Free Trade Area. Many challenges and opportunities arise from this ambitious trade and development partnership between some of the world's poorest and richest countries. Throughout the negotiations, several stakeholders have expressed concerns about the possible negative effects in ACP countries that risk jeopardizing the developmental impacts of EPAs. The ambition, as well as the uncertainties around EPAs make a results-oriented monitoring of the agreements imperative. This study, commissioned by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, addresses the possible goals of EPA monitoring, drawing conclusions on what broad areas need to be monitored, which principles should be followed and which stakeholders involved. The study then outlines the challenges involved in implementing a results-oriented monitoring system: which steps need to be taken, how best to derive indicators, which characteristics the latter should have and how they may be identified. The study also presents a number of recommendations on how to ensure that monitoring is given due consideration in the EPA legal texts." (author's abstract

Past as global trade governance prelude: reconfiguring debate about reform of the multilateral trading system

This paper peers backwards into the history of the multilateral trading system and its development over the past half century as a means of considering what may lie beyond the horizon for the future of global trade governance. Its purpose is to underscore the necessity and urgency for root-and-branch reform of the multilateral trading system. It achieves this by comparing and contrasting the global trading system of 50 years ago with its modern-day equivalent and its likely future counterpart half-a-century hence. In so doing, the paper throws into sharp relief not only the inadequacies of global trade governance today but also the damaging consequences of not fundamentally reforming the system in the near future, with a particular emphasis on the past, present and future development of the world’s poorest and most marginalised countries

Competition Policy and the WTO: Is there a need for a multilateral agreement? EIPA Working Paper 98/W/02, September 1998

This paper discusses the arguments in favour of an International Competition Policy Agreement (ICPA) within the WTO framework. We argue that the only clear justification for an ICPA is in the presence of cross-border policy spillovers in competition policy. However, it is shown that such an agreement may lead both to a less competitive world trading system and, more importantly, to a lower level of world welfare. While recognizing the potential benefits that may arise from an ICPA, we recommend a cautious approach that acknowledges these drawbacks and other potential holes in such an agreement

Regionalism, Competition Policy and Abuse of Dominant Positions. EIPA Working Paper 98/W/01, May 1998

Co-ordination of competition policies within regional trade agreements (RTAs) seems desirable, especially within deeper forms of regional integration. This contributes to a healthy and stable regional trading system. We argue, however, that regional competition policies should be carefully elaborated not to neglect efficiency considerations linked to economies of scale/scope within a regional liberalisation program, in particular, in the case of dominant positions. We also suggest that, in the short term, a less stringent approach to competition policy should be adopted in RTAs among developing countries where market failures may be due not only to imperfect competition but also to credit and labour market constraints

L’intégration de la Suisse dans l’Europe: Les accords bilatéraux comme première étape? = The Integration of Switzerland into Europe: the bilateral accords as a first stage?

Dans la nuit du 8 au 9 décembre 1998, à Bruxelles, les négociations entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne (UE) pouvaient enfin s’achever. Ainsi se concluaient quatre années de longues et souvent difficiles négociations en vue d’accords sectoriels entre la Suisse et l’UE. Ces accords, paraphés par les négociateurs suisses et européens lors d’une cérémonie dans la capitale suisse le 26 février 1999 et officiellement signés le 21 juin 1999 à Luxembourg, portent sur les sept domaines suivants: les transports terrestres et aériens, la libre circulation des personnes, la recherche, les marchés publics, les obstacles techniques au commerce et l’agriculture. Leur entrée en vigueur est prévue, après ratification par la Suisse et l’UE, le 1er janvier 2001. Cet article présente brièvement les principales étapes de ces négociations et les accords conclus entre la Suisse et l’UE

"The probability of coalition formation: Spatial voting power indices"

This paper aims to include actor’s policy preferences into a probabilistic definition of two common indices of relative voting power: the Shapley-Shubik index and the (normalized) Banzhalf index. While we acknowledge the validity of standard indices and their strength in analyzing relative influence in institutions in an a priori, or ‘constitutional,’ perspective, we develop upon them here in an attempt to explicitly account for players’ policy preferences. Hence, we aim to partially combine spatial approaches of voting with power analysis. After elaborating a respective model for both uni-dimensional and multi-dimensional policy spaces, we suggest ways to test the predictive capacity of such models, either by directly incorporating data on preferences or by estimating such preferences, for example on the basis of theories of endogenous policy formation