Rechtspopulismus in Westeuropa: aktuelle Entwicklungen und politische Bedeutung

'In den letzten Jahren hat die populistische Rechte in Westeuropa eine umfassende Ideologie entwickelt. Die Hauptmerkmale dieser Ideologie sind eine starke Betonung des Begriffs der Differenz sowie der Verteidigung kultureller Eigenheit. Die populistische Rechte benutzt beide Begriffe, um damit ihren Kampf gegen die ihrer Meinung nach zwei größten Bedrohungen der europäischen Kultur und der westlichen Werte zu legitimieren: die Globalisierung und den Islam. Diese Ideologie richtet sich an eine breite potentielle WählerInnenschaft, die weit über diejenigen Gruppen hinausgeht, die objektiv oder zumindest subjektiv am meisten von wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Modernisierungsprozessen betroffen sind. Zwar erzielte die populistische Rechte in den letzten Jahren vor allem in der ArbeiterInnenschaft überproportionale Zugewinne; diese Entwicklung bestätigt jedoch noch nicht die Modernisierungsverliererthese. Zum Verständnis der Bedeutung der rechtspopulistischen Mobilisierungserfolge in Westeuropa ist es vor allem notwendig, Identitätspolitik ernst zu nehmen. Der Interpretationsansatz von Nancy Fraser könnte sich dabei für die Analyse der programmatischen Entwicklungstendenzen der populistischen Rechten als nützlich erweisen.' (Autorenreferat)'In recent years, the radical populist right in Western Europe has developed a comprehensive ideological position. The central characteristics of this ideology are a strong emphasis on difference and on the defense of cultural particularity. Both are utilized to mobilize support against what the populist right sees as the twin threats to the survival of European culture and Western values: globalization and Islam. With this ideology, the populist right has appealed to a broad voter potential well beyond those groups objectively ond subjectively most threatened by economic, social, and cultural modernization. Although the populist right has increased its support particularly among working-class voters, this does not necessarily support the modernization victim thesis. In order to understand the significance of the recent right-wing populist upsurge in Western Europe, it is necessary to take identity politics seriously, as suggested recently by Nancy Fraser. Her interpretative framework might serve as a useful tool to analyze the new programmatic direction taken by the contemporary populist right.' (author's abstract

#Nationalism: the ethno-nationalist populism of Donald Trump’s Twitter communication

In this article, we explore the ethno-nationalist populism of Donald Trump’s Twitter communication during the 2016 presidential campaign. We draw on insights from ethno-symbolism – a perspective within nationalism studies – to analyse all 5,515 tweets sent by Trump during the campaign. We find that ethno-nationalist and populist themes were by far the most important component of Trump’s tweets, and that these themes built upon long-standing myths and symbols of an ethnic conception of American identity. In sum, Trump’s tweets depicted a virtuous white majority being threatened by several groups of immoral outsiders, who were identified by their foreignness, their religion, and their self-interestedness. The struggle against these groups was framed as a mission to restore America to a mythical golden age – to “Make America Great Again.

Late 1920s film theory and criticism as a test-case for Benjamin’s generalizations on the experiential effects of editing

This article investigates Walter Benjamin’s influential generalization that the effects of cinema are akin to the hyper-stimulating experience of modernity. More specifically, I focus on his oft-cited 1935/36 claim that all editing elicits shock-like disruption. First, I propose a more detailed articulation of the experience of modernity understood as hyper-stimulation and call for distinguishing between at least two of its subsets: the experience of speed and dynamism, on the one hand, and the experience of shock/disruption, on the other. Then I turn to classical film theory of the late 1920s to demonstrate the existence of contemporary views on editing alternative to Benjamin’s. For instance, whereas classical Soviet and Weimar theorists relate the experience of speed and dynamism to both Soviet and classical Hollywood style editing, they reserve the experience of shock/disruption for Soviet montage. In order to resolve the conceptual disagreement between these theorists, on the one hand, and Benjamin, on the other, I turn to late 1920s Weimar film criticism. I demonstrate that, contrary to Benjamin’s generalizations about the disruptive and shock-like nature of all editing, and in line with other theorists’ accounts, different editing practices were regularly distinguished by comparison to at least two distinct hyper-stimulation subsets: speed and dynamism, and shock-like disruption. In other words, contemporaries regularly distinguished between Soviet montage and classical Hollywood editing patterns on the basis of experiential effects alone. On the basis of contemporary reviews of city symphonies, I conclude with a proposal for distinguishing a third subset – confusion. This is an original manuscript / preprint of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Early Popular Visual Culture on 02 Aug 2016 available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/17460654.2016.1199322

Modern American populism: Analyzing the economics behind the Silent Majority, the Tea Party and Trumpism

This article researches populism, more specifically, Modern American Populism (MAP), constructed of white, rural, and economically oppressed reactionarianism, which was borne out of the political upheaval of the 1960’s Civil Rights movement. The research looks to explain the causes of populism and what leads voters to support populist movements and politicians. The research focuses on economic anxiety as the main cause but also examines an alternative theory of racial resentment. In an effort to answer the question, what causes populist movements and motivations, I apply a research approach that utilizes qualitative and quantitative methods. There is an examination of literature that defines populism, its causes and a detailed discussion of the case studies, including the 1972 election of Richard Nixon; the Tea Party election of 2010; and the 2016 election of Donald Trump. In addition, statistical data analysis was run using American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys associated with each specific case study. These case studies were chosen because they most represent forms of populist movements in modern American history. While ample qualitative evidence suggested support for the hypothesis that economic anxiety is a necessary condition for populist voting patterns that elected Nixon, the Tea Party and Trump, the statistical data only supported the hypothesis in two cases, 2010 and 2016, with 1972 coming back inconclusive. The data also suggested that both economic anxiety and racial resentment played a role in 2010 and 2016, while having no significant effect in 1972 in either case. This suggests that further research needs to be conducted into additional populist case studies, as well as an examination into the role economic anxiety and economic crises play on racial resentment and racially motivated voting behavior

Do radical right populist parties matter? The case of the European welfare state

In this paper, we address three largely unanswered questions about the welfare state consequences of the significant rise in electoral support and government participation of radical rightwing populist (RRWP) parties in western Europe. First, does RRWP party success contribute to the maintenance or expansion of core social insurance programs? Second, do RRWP party electoral success and government cabinet portfolios lead to retrenchments of programs that disproportionately benefit immigrants and other “underserving” groups? Finally, do electorally successful and governing RRWP parties reshape the structure of the welfare state by diminishing universalism? Through extensive analysis of 1975-to-2015 data, we show that the answer to all three questions is yes. We also find support for our argument that the mechanism linking RRWP party success and welfare state outcomes rests with the competition between an ascendant radical populist right and social and Christian democratic parties for votes of core constituencies and how these mainstream parties strategically respond to RRWP party challenges. We conclude by discussing the implications for our findings for sociocultural polarization, political instability, and threats to democratic institutions

Globalization, institutions of social solidarity, and radical right-wing populism in Western Europe

We rejoin the question of whether globalization contributes to the electoral success of the radical populist right in Western Europe. We also advance and test the hypothesis that institutions of social solidarity directly weaken support for the radical right and moderate the electoral impact of globalization. In empirical analysis of national elections in 16 European polities from 1981 to 2015, we find that merchandise imports from developing nations, capital mobility, and, especially, inflows of refugees and asylum seekers are positively associated with the radical right-wing populist party vote. In addition, a universalistic welfare state directly depresses the vote for radical right-wing populist parties and conditions the linkages between immigration on the one hand, and electoral support for the radical populist right on the other. We also find that employment protection laws and encompassing, centralized union movements mitigate the positive effects of economic globalization and immigration on national vote shares of right-wing populist parties. In conclusion, we consider our findings’ implications for understanding the domestic political effects of globalization and sources of right-wing populism. We also reflect on the potentially significant, indirect effect of globalization on political instability that comes through international liberalization’s adverse impacts on institutions of social solidarity

Contre la mondialisation : xénophobie, politiques identitaires et populisme d’exclusion en Europe occidentale

Ces dernières années, la droite radicale populiste en Europe de l’Ouest a élaboré une position idéologique plus précise, laquelle est caractérisée par l’évocation du droit à la différence et une défense du particularisme culturel. Ces deux aspects sont employés afin de mobiliser un électorat contre la perception de deux grandes menaces externes à la culture et aux valeurs des sociétés européennes, soit la mondialisation et l’Islam. Par cette idéologie, la droite populiste a réussi à étendre sa clientèle au-delà des soi-disant groupes menacés par la modernisation économique, sociale et culturelle des sociétés occidentales. En raison de l’importance accrue des enjeux politiques de type culturel, notamment le thème de l’identité collective dans l’espace politique contemporain, l’idéologie populiste de droite constitue un défi de taille pour les démocraties pluralistes.In recent years, the radical populist right in Western Europe developed a comprehensive ideological position. The central characteristics of this ideology are a strong emphasis on difference and on the defense of cultural particularity. Both are used to mobilize support against what the populist right sees as the twin threats to the survival of European culture and Western values: globalization and Islam. With this ideology, the populist right has appealed to a broad range of the electorate, which goes well beyond those groups objectively and subjectively most threatened by economic, social, and cultural modernization. Given the growing importance of cultural issues and particularly questions of collective identity in contemporary politics, the populist right is bound to continue to pose a considerable challenge to liberal democracies for the foreseeable future