Erwarteter Bezug von Grundsicherung im Alter: Verhaltensunterschiede und Fehleinschätzungen

Means testing of social security helps with targeting benefits to those in need. However, it might also discourage individual savings and work effort. In Germany, social security in the old age, so called „Grundsicherung im Alter", is means-tested. We find that 38% of German households believe that they are very likely to be dependent on „Grundsicherung im Alter" in the future. Those households differ in their socio-economic characteristics, savings and labour market behaviour from households who do not expect to be dependent on this particular programme. Our analysis suggests that half of the households expecting to receive „Grundsicherung im Alter" misjudge their eligibility as they have already accumulated enough public pension rights today to place them above the threshold of the means test. Differences between the two groups exist with respect to their knowledge about the pension system as well as the degree of pessimism that might favour wrong expectations

The long shadow of socialism: On East-West German differences in financial literacy

We use the German reunification as a natural experiment to understand drivers of financial literacy accumulation. With the transformation from a planned to a market-based economy in 1990, the incentives to invest in financial literacy were changed exogenously for East Germans and remained the same for West Germans. Our results show that even 20 years after reunification there is evidence for a significant financial literacy gap between East and West. While some groups, for instance women and those who have migrated from the East to the West, show similar levels of financial literacy compared with their West German peers, others do not. Differences in financial literacy are present across all educational groups and at the top and the bottom of the income distribution. We decompose the financial literacy gap taking account of factors commonly integrated in theoretical models of financial literacy. Most of the gap remains unexplained. Extending empirical and theoretical models by including differences in attitudes and values might improve our understanding of financial literacy acquisition

Savings in times of demographic change: Lessons from the German experience

Pension reforms in many developed countries make individuals shoulder a bigger share of longevity and income risks. The desired response is that individuals accumulate private assets for retirement. Whether this actually takes place, is of paramount relevance for scientists and policy makers. We take Germany as an example: Twenty years of pension reform have transformed the monolithic German pension system into a multi-pillar system. Formerly generous public pension benefits are gradually being reduced, while substantial incentives are granted to occupational and private saving schemes. Has this transition worked out? We survey the reform steps and household’s reactions: How did individuals adjust their labor market behavior? How did private and occupational pension plans take off? How do behavioral adjustments vary in the population?Most Germans adapted to the new situation. Both actual and expected retirement decisions changedand the share of households without supplementary pensions decreased from 73% to 39% in little more than a decade. This is a remarkable success. Nonetheless, households with low education, low income and less financial education did neither adjust their retirement behavior nor pick up supplementary pension plans and are thus likely to face difficulties in bridging the gap arising in future pension income

Savings in times of demographic change: Lessons from the German experience

Pension reforms in many developed countries make individuals shoulder a bigger share of longevity and income risks. The desired response is that individuals accumulate private assets for retirement. Whether this actually takes place, is of paramount relevance for scientists and policy makers. We take Germany as an example: Twenty years of pension reform have transformed the monolithic German pension system into a multi-pillar system. Formerly generous public pension benefits are gradually being reduced, while substantial incentives are granted to occupational and private saving schemes. Has this transition worked out? We survey the reform steps and household’s reactions: How did individuals adjust their labor market behavior? How did private and occupational pension plans take off? How do behavioral adjustments vary in the population?Most Germans adapted to the new situation. Both actual and expected retirement decisions changedand the share of households without supplementary pensions decreased from 73% to 39% in little more than a decade. This is a remarkable success. Nonetheless, households with low education, low income and less financial education did neither adjust their retirement behavior nor pick up supplementary pension plans and are thus likely to face difficulties in bridging the gap arising in future pension income

Savings in times of demographic change: Lessons from the German experience

Pension reforms in many developed countries make individuals shoulder a bigger share of longevity and income risks. The desired response is that individuals accumulate private assets for retirement. Whether this actually takes place, is of paramount relevance for scientists and policy makers. We take Germany as an example: Twenty years of pension reform have transformed the monolithic German pension system into a multi-pillar system. Formerly generous public pension benefits are gradually being reduced, while substantial incentives are granted to occupational and private saving schemes. Has this transition worked out? We survey the reform steps and household’s reactions: How did individuals adjust their labor market behavior? How did private and occupational pension plans take off? How do behavioral adjustments vary in the population?Most Germans adapted to the new situation. Both actual and expected retirement decisions changedand the share of households without supplementary pensions decreased from 73% to 39% in little more than a decade. This is a remarkable success. Nonetheless, households with low education, low income and less financial education did neither adjust their retirement behavior nor pick up supplementary pension plans and are thus likely to face difficulties in bridging the gap arising in future pension income