Tables, Memorized Semirings and Applications

We define and construct a new data structure, the tables, this structure generalizes the (finite) $k$-sets sets of Eilenberg \cite{Ei}, it is versatile (one can vary the letters, the words and the coefficients). We derive from this structure a new semiring (with several semiring structures) which can be applied to the needs of automatic processing multi-agents behaviour problems. The purpose of this account/paper is to present also the basic elements of this new structures from a combinatorial point of view. These structures present a bunch of properties. They will be endowed with several laws namely : Sum, Hadamard product, Cauchy product, Fuzzy operations (min, max, complemented product) Two groups of applications are presented. The first group is linked to the process of "forgetting" information in the tables. The second, linked to multi-agent systems, is announced by showing a methodology to manage emergent organization from individual behaviour models

Different goals in multiscale simulations and how to reach them

In this paper we sum up our works on multiscale programs, mainly simulations. We first start with describing what multiscaling is about, how it helps perceiving signal from a background noise in a ?ow of data for example, for a direct perception by a user or for a further use by another program. We then give three examples of multiscale techniques we used in the past, maintaining a summary, using an environmental marker introducing an history in the data and finally using a knowledge on the behavior of the different scales to really handle them at the same time

Moderate Growth Time Series for Dynamic Combinatorics Modelisation

Here, we present a family of time series with a simple growth constraint. This family can be the basis of a model to apply to emerging computation in business and micro-economy where global functions can be expressed from local rules. We explicit a double statistics on these series which allows to establish a one-to-one correspondence between three other ballot-like strunctures

Automata-based Adaptive Behavior for Economical Modelling Using Game Theory

In this chapter, we deal with some specific domains of applications to game theory. This is one of the major class of models in the new approaches of modelling in the economic domain. For that, we use genetic automata which allow to build adaptive strategies for the players. We explain how the automata-based formalism proposed - matrix representation of automata with multiplicities - allows to define semi-distance between the strategy behaviors. With that tools, we are able to generate an automatic processus to compute emergent systems of entities whose behaviors are represented by these genetic automata

Automata-based adaptive behavior for economic modeling using game theory

In this paper, we deal with some specific domains of applications to game theory. This is one of the major class of models in the new approaches of modelling in the economic domain. For that, we use genetic automata which allow to buid adaptive strategies for the players. We explain how the automata-based formalism proposed - matrix representation of automata with multiplicities - allows to define a semi-distance between the strategy behaviors. With that tools, we are able to generate an automatic processus to compute emergent systems of entities whose behaviors are represented by these genetic automata

Fence-sitters Protect Cooperation in Complex Networks

Evolutionary game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from science to engineering. In complex networks, because of the difficulty of formulating the replicator dynamics, most of previous studies are confined to a numerical level. In this paper, we introduce a vectorial formulation to derive three classes of individuals' payoff analytically. The three classes are pure cooperators, pure defectors, and fence-sitters. Here, fence-sitters are the individuals who change their strategies at least once in the strategy evolutionary process. As a general approach, our vectorial formalization can be applied to all the two-strategies games. To clarify the function of the fence-sitters, we define a parameter, payoff memory, as the number of rounds that the individuals' payoffs are aggregated. We observe that the payoff memory can control the fence-sitters' effects and the level of cooperation efficiently. Our results indicate that the fence-sitters' role is nontrivial in the complex topologies, which protects cooperation in an indirect way. Our results may provide a better understanding of the composition of cooperators in a circumstance where the temptation to defect is larger.Comment: an article with 6 pages, 3 figure