Gender discrimination and growth: theory and evidence from India

Gender inequality is an acute and persistent problem, especially in developing countries. This paper argues that gender discrimination is an inefficient practice. We model gender discrimination as the complete exclusion of females from the labor market or as the exclusion of females from managerial positions. The distortions in the allocation of talent between managerial and unskilled positions, and in human capital investment, are analyzed. It is found that both types of discrimination lower economic growth; and that the former also implies a reduction in per capita GDP, while the latter distorts the allocation of talent. Both types of discrimination imply lower female-to-male schooling ratios. We discuss the sustainability of social norms or stigma that can generate discrimination in the form described in this paper. We present evidence based on panel-data regressions across Indian states over 1961-1991 that is consistent with the model¿s predictions

Gender Discrimination and Growth: Theory and Evidence from India

Gender inequality is an acute and persistent problem, especially in developing countries. This paper argues that gender discrimination is an inefficient practice. We model gender discrimination as the complete exclusion of females from the labor market or as the exclusion of females from managerial positions. The distortions in the allocation of talent between managerial and unskilled positions, and in human capital investment, are analyzed. It is found that both types of discrimination lower economic growth; and that the former also implies a reduction in per capita GDP, while the latter distorts the allocation of talent. Both types of discrimination imply lower female-to-male schooling ratios. We discuss the sustainability of social norms or stigma that can generate discrimination in the form described in this paper. We present evidence based on panel-data regressions across Indian states over 1961-1991 that is consistent with the model¿s predictions.Growth, gender discrimination, labor market, allocation of talent, India.

Gender and social norms in economic development.

Gender and social norms in economic development' analyses gender related issues throughout the development process from an economics point of view. Different issues are examined for countries at different stages of the development process. The issues examined here have a gender component and have to do with participation and social norms. In some cases, the motivation for this differential participation or inequality is the focus of the study; in others, we focus on the economic consequences of this differential participation. In the first chapter, we investigate participation in dowry in a very poor area, namely rural Bangladesh. In that chapter we explore the different possible economic motivations for dowries using household survey information from the Matlab area in rural Bangladesh spanning 1930-1996. We find that dowry participation in the area has increased in recent decades. We also find that religion, coupled with social norms, seems to be an important component in explaining the evolution of dowry. In the second chapter we examine the economic consequences of different participation by gender in the labour market in a poor country - India. We develop a model that suggests distortions in the allocation of talent which we then test with aggregate information by sector using panel data from India's states over 1961-1991. Results suggest that even though implications are different by sector, gender inequality in labour participation in several categories hinders development. In the third chapter, we indirectly study participation of women in top level positions, by analising the different hiring by gender in Spanish public exams. The analysis constitutes a relevant randomised experiment with implications for gender parity rules, or gender quotas. We use information about 75,000 candidates to the judiciary over 1995-2004 who were randomly allocated to evaluating committees. Contrary to expectations behind gender parity rules, we find that recruitment committees with a higher share of women hire fewer women than committees with a higher share of men, suggesting that taste discrimination is not behind the low numbers of women in top level positions

Female Representation but Male Rule? Party Competition and the Political Glass Ceiling

A large literature has studied the context that affects womens numerical representation, but few have moved beyond numbers to study the drivers of a gender gap in political influence among elected politicians. Using panel data for the careers of 35.000 Swedish municipal politicians over six election cycles we first document the said gender gap. Women are substantially less likely to be re-elected for office, which is the most important pre-condition for obtaining influential appointments. Turing to the determinants we find that supply factors, primarily family responsibilities, explain some of this gap. Meanwhile, demand factors such as experience, age, education and income do not. Finding that competition between political parties closes the gap, we argue that a negative bias against women among party selectors thrives in contexts where meritocracy is not enforced. Positive correlations between competition and measures of competence for elected politicians of both genders further support this conclusion

Sex Discrimination and Growth

This paper argues that sex discrimination is an inefficient practice. We model sex discrimination as the complete exclusion of females from the labor market or as the exclusion of females from managerial positions. The former implies a reduction in GDP per capita; the latter distorts the allocation of talent and lowers economic growth. Both imply lower female-to-male schooling ratios. Our model predicts a convex relationship between nondiscrimination and growth. Although discrimination is difficult to measure, it will be reflected in schooling differentials. We present evidence based on cross-country regressions that is consistent with a convex relationship between schooling differentials and growth.Economic growth;Labor market policy;Economic models;primary education, sex discrimination, primary schooling, primary enrollment, female education, enrollment rates, primary school, discrimination against women, primary enrollment rates, gender inequality, female population, female entrepreneurs, enrollment ratio, discrimination in education, female workers, sex discrimination in education, gross enrollment, gender discrimination, women entrepreneurs, access to schooling, enrollment rate, primary school age, primary enrollment rate, girls, sexual division of labor, policy research report on gender, gender equality, costs of education, sex discrimination against women

Voter turnout and electoral competition in a multidimensional policy space

We analyze the interaction between electoral competition and voters' decision to vote. We show that when voters consider both the benefits and the costs of voting, politicians offer differentiated policies to motivate citizens to vote. In particular, politicians adapt their policies to the most sensitive voters--thus less sensitive voters abstain on the grounds of perceiving politicians as being too similar. In a multidimensional policy space, this implies that citizens who only care about a few issues do not vote.Turnout Electoral competition

Politicians' Luck of the Draw: Evidence from the Spanish Christmas Lottery

It is well known that incumbent politicians tend to receive more votes when economic conditions are good. In this paper we explore the source of this correlation, exploiting the exceptional evidence provided by the Spanish Christmas Lottery. This is a unique lottery: 75% of Spaniards play, sharing tickets, and every year at Christmas 0.3% of the Spanish GDP is at stake. Because winning tickets are mostly sold by one lottery outlet, winners tend to be geographically clustered. These features allow us to study the impact of exogenous good economic conditions on voting behavior. We find that incumbents receive significantly more votes in winning provinces. Given that individuals are well aware of the random nature of the shock, it is unlikely that this effect is due to voters wrongly attributing economic conditions to the government. Moreover, information from surveys from the same period shows that Christmas Lottery prizes increase the propensity to vote for the incumbent, but they do not affect respondents' assessment of the government. The evidence is consistent with a temporary increase in happiness making voters more lenient toward the incumbent, or with a stronger preference for the status quo.

Voter turnout and electoral competition in a multidimensional policy space

We analyze the interaction between electoral competition and voters' decision to vote. We show that when voters consider both the benefits and the costs of voting, politicians offer differentiated policies to motivate citizens to vote. In particular, politicians adapt their policies to the most sensitive voters—thus less sensitive voters abstain on the grounds of perceiving politicians as being too similar. In a multidimensional policy space, this implies that citizens who only care about a few issues do not vote

Voter turnout and electoral competition in a multidimensional policy space

We analyze the interaction between electoral competition and voters' decision to vote. We show that when voters consider both the benefits and the costs of voting, politicians offer differentiated policies to motivate citizens to vote. In particular, politicians adapt their policies to the most sensitive voters - thus less sensitive voters abstain on the grounds of perceiving politicians as being too similar. In a multidimensional policy space, this implies that citizens who only care about a few issues do not vote