Mapping China's Global Future. Playing Ball or Rocking the Boat?

Book on Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policie

Japan Again under Abe – Fresh Start or More of the (not so Great) Same? Bertelsmann Asia Policy Brief 2015/01, February 2015

After Japan’s snap Lower House elections called on December 14 by old – and now new – Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, it will hopefully be the former, but probably the latter. This is the very opposite of what Abe promised would happen after his two-year tenure, which included many missed opportunities to adopt badly needed economic reforms capable of leading the country back onto a path of sustainable economic growth. While the jury is still out on whether Abe will focus this time around on economic reforms as opposed to attempts to boost the country’s defense profile and get rid of Japan’s constitutionally prescribed pacifism, his (very) nationalist and at times revisionist political track record suggests that it could be the latter yet again

The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – Responding to the Crisis of the Liberal World Order. Asia Policy Brief 2017/03, December 2017

The EU and Japan are about to adopt two (potentially) ground-breaking agreements: an EU-Japan free trade agreement and the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). The SPA, policymakers in both Brussels and Tokyo cheer, will be the ‘big bang’ of bilateral relations upgrading political and security ties from too passive to very active

Japan and China: Bitter Rivals and Close Partners. Asia Policy Brief 2013/03, June 2013

Japan and China trade a lot between each other. Unfortunately, however, they also argue a lot with each other. Since Tokyo’s purchase of three uninhabited Japanese-controlled islets in the East China Sea from their private owner in September 2012, the main subject of dispute has been that of sovereignty over maritime territories. While bilateral trade amounted to an impressive $333 billion in 2012 (slightly less than in 2011, when bilateral trade reached$345 billion), a bilateral territorial dispute over control and sovereignty of what Tokyo calls Senkaku and Beijing calls the Diaoyu Islands will most probably continue to remain at the very top of the agenda of Sino-Japanese relations in the months ahead

Japan Again under Abe – Fresh Start or More of the (not so Great) Same? Bertelsmann Asia Policy Brief 2015/01, February 2015

After Japan’s snap Lower House elections called on December 14 by old – and now new – Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, it will hopefully be the former, but probably the latter. This is the very opposite of what Abe promised would happen after his two-year tenure, which included many missed opportunities to adopt badly needed economic reforms capable of leading the country back onto a path of sustainable economic growth. While the jury is still out on whether Abe will focus this time around on economic reforms as opposed to attempts to boost the country’s defense profile and get rid of Japan’s constitutionally prescribed pacifism, his (very) nationalist and at times revisionist political track record suggests that it could be the latter yet again

Geopolitics by other means

The Asia-Pacific has become the Indo-Pacific region as the US, Japan, Australia and India have decided to join forces and scale-up their political, economic and security cooperation. The message coming from Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and New Delhi is clear: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is no longer the only game in town and Beijing’s policymakers better get ready for fierce competition. Japan’s ongoing and future “quality infrastructure” policies and investments in the Indo-Pacific in particular make it very clear that Tokyo wants a (much) bigger slice of the pie of infrastructure investments in the region. China’s territorial expansionism in the South China Sea and its increasing interests and presence in countries in South Asia have done their share to help the four aforesaid countries expand their security and defence ties. Beijing, of course, smells containment in all of this and it probably has a point. Who will have the upper hand in shaping and defining Asian security and providing developing South and Southeast Asia with badly-needed infrastructure: the US and Japan together with its allies or the increasingly assertive and uncompromising China and its Belt and Road Initiative

Post-Pandemic Asia

illustratorIn 2020, the way we define “insecurity” has drastically changed. Insecurity can now also be invisible and all around us, in the shape of a virus that disrupts people’s lives, upends the economy, subverts the core functions of national governments and jeopardises the foundations of international cooperation. At the same time, the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has not made traditional security challenges disappear, especially in and around Asia. This Report presents short- and long-term scenarios for each of the hotspots that challenge peace and stability in Asia, a region that, after the pandemic, has become even more crucial for a swift global recovery

The US-Japan security alliance : ready and equipped to deal with China?

In 2021 Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait have made it back into US-Japan joint statements. Tokyo and Washington have talked (more or less) openly and on the record about what to do jointly in the worst-case scenario: a US-Chinese conflict over Taiwan. On 5 July, then Japanese Deputy Prime Minister and the country’s Finance Minister Taro Aso announced that Japan would join the US in defending Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, treating an attack on Taiwan as an «existential threat» to Japanese security and territory. The quality and scope of Japanese contributions to US-led military operations in a Taiwan/Taiwan Strait crisis scenario depend on the circumstances and the crisis scenario. The devil would be very much in the details. However, fortunately, China is very unlikely to attack or invade Taiwan (any time soon) even though Tokyo and Washington – together with other like-minded countries in the region – are preparing for various worst-case scenarios. What China calls Western containment to «suppress» China and secure US (military) hegemony in the region is in reality Tokyo and Washington jointly preparing for various worst-case scenarios in reaction to Chinese very assertive regional security policies in general and policies related to territorial claims in particular

Durchhalteparolen und Falschinformationen aus Peking Zum Kollaps der DDR und der Deutschen Einheit

Article on China-GDR relations in late 1989/early 199

The US-Japan security alliance : ready and equipped to deal with China?

In 2021 Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait have made it back into US-Japan joint statements. Tokyo and Washington have talked (more or less) openly and on the record about what to do jointly in the worst-case scenario: a US-Chinese conflict over Taiwan. On 5 July, then Japanese Deputy Prime Minister and the country’s Finance Minister Taro Aso announced that Japan would join the US in defending Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, treating an attack on Taiwan as an «existential threat» to Japanese security and territory. The quality and scope of Japanese contributions to US-led military operations in a Taiwan/Taiwan Strait crisis scenario depend on the circumstances and the crisis scenario. The devil would be very much in the details. However, fortunately, China is very unlikely to attack or invade Taiwan (any time soon) even though Tokyo and Washington – together with other like-minded countries in the region – are preparing for various worst-case scenarios. What China calls Western containment to «suppress» China and secure US (military) hegemony in the region is in reality Tokyo and Washington jointly preparing for various worst-case scenarios in reaction to Chinese very assertive regional security policies in general and policies related to territorial claims in particular