Akses terhadap keadilan; perjuangan masyarakat miskin dan kurang beruntung untuk menuntut hak di Indonesia

xiii.; 324 hal.; ill.; 19 c

How clientelism varies: comparing patronage democracies

Clientelistic vote mobilization is a prominent electoral strategy in many of the world’s democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes. Yet the comparative study of this practice, which involves exchanging personal favours for electoral support, remains strikingly underdeveloped. This special issue makes the case that clientelistic politics takes different forms in different countries, and that this variation matters for understanding democracy, elections, and governance. By comparing clientelistic vote mobilization in several countries – Mexico, Ghana, Sudan to Turkey, Indonesia, the Philippines, Caribbean and Pacific Islands states, and Malaysia – we unpack the concept of political clientelism and show that it is possible to identify different types of patronage democracies. In this introductory essay, we develop a comparative framework for this endeavour, showing that clientelism can be fruitfully compared in terms of the character of the networks that facilitate clientelistic exchange, the benefits that politicians offer in exchange for votes, and the degree to which politicians, and especially parties, control the distribution of state resources. These comparisons lead to the identification of different types of patronage democracies, notably community-centred and party-centred varieties. Building on this framework, this special issue shows that the comparative study of clientelistic politics offers analytical promise for scholars of democracy and democratization.This work was supported by Australian Research Council [FT120100742]; Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek [451-12-013

Explaining regional variation in local governance: clientelism and state-dependency in Indonesia

What explains the varied quality of local governance? The worldwide trend to decentralize the responsibilities and budgets of governments has made this question particularly urgent, spurring research that emphasizes the importance of local leadership, civil society and democratic accountability. In this paper we provide an approach to study how informal dimensions of politics impact public service delivery. We seek to explain the varied quality of local governance across Indonesia by focusing on the way in which local economic conditions foster clientelistic practices. To this end we integrate ethnographic fieldwork, an expert survey as well as cross-district statistical regression analyses of local government performance. We argue that the degree of state dependency of local economies impacts the quality of local governance because politicians in state-dependent economies face less constraints when engaging in clientelistic practices. We test this argument through a two-step regression analysis for the period 1999–2013 in which we relate a measure of the quality of public service delivery to expert assessments of the character of local politics, controlling for the potential effects of various local socio-economic and government budget indicators. We find that observed patterns in the variation of the quality of local governance in Indonesia indeed correspond with both variation in perceived intensity of clientelistic practices, as well as the degree of state dependency of local economies. These results suggest that interventions to strengthen local governance need to be attuned to the character of local economies

Parties as pay-off seekers: Pre-electoral coalitions in a patronage democracy

The study of party coalitions largely focuses on national elections in western democracies. How are coalitions formed in political systems in which competition occurs on a clientelistic rather than programmatic foundation? To examine coalition formation outside the context of western party systems, we study pre-electoral coalitions formed in subnational executive government elections in Indonesia. Using a unique dataset of 5048 such coalitions in combination with fieldwork conducted in several provinces, we analyze coalition patterns. In contrast to conventional ideological and office-seeking explanations we find that, at least until recently, in forming coalitions parties regularly prioritized immediate pay-offs from candidates – which mostly come in the form of cash payments – over longer-term office and patronage benefits. Attributing this finding to the limited influence that parties exert over politicians once they are elected in regional Indonesia, we highlight the interaction between coalition formation and the incentives that politicians have once in office.the Dutch Research Council(NWO, grant number 451-12-013

Agents of order? : Brokerage and empowerment in development and conflict

To what extent do brokers empower marginalised communities? This pertinent question connects the articles collected in this special issue and is the focus of this introduction. We propose that a comparative analysis of the empowering capacity of brokers involves paying attention to three key dimensions of brokerage, as well as their interaction effects: the characteristics of the broker, the nature of the brokerage network in which the broker operates, and the structural conditions that give rise to a (fluctuating) demand for brokers. We highlight and analyse variation in the degree to which brokers succeed in empowering marginalised communities, while noting that brokerage often functions as a force for order rather than transformation. We conclude that under certain circumstances, brokers can significantly empower communities, but that this impact is curtailed by the systemic constraints inherent in their social context

Anti-Corporate Activism and Collusion : The Contentious Politics of Palm Oil Expansion in Indonesia

The rapid expansion of oil palm plantations in Indonesia has generated a large and growing number of protests against palm oil companies over, mainly, access to land. So far, these protests have been mainly studied through scattered case studies, which precludes an understanding and analysis of general patterns. Addressing this challenge, this paper presents the results of the first-ever large-scale collaborative effort to document 150 conflicts between rural Indonesians and palm oil companies in four Indonesian provinces (West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Riau and West Sumatra). With this material this article unpacks trajectories of the anti-corporate activism sparked by the rapid expansion of palm oil plantations, discussing the causes, character of protests, conflict resolution efforts and outcomes of these conflicts. We find that palm oil conflicts generate a particular ‘rightless’ form of collective action: instead of invoking legal provisions or rights, communities often avoid formal institutions while adopting largely accommodative forms of protest aimed at improving their bargaining position vis-à-vis companies. Despite regular and intense protests often directed at local governments, we find that in 68 percent of the studied conflicts communities fail to address their grievances. We argue that this limited success is not just due to the inadequacies of legal frameworks but also to the way in which Indonesia's informalized state institutions foster collusion between powerholders and palm oil companies. Such collusion has facilitated the repression of protests and undermined the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms