Deontología o Ciencia de la moral

Copia digital. Valladolid : Junta de Castilla y León. Consejería de Cultura y Turismo, 2012-201

Speech, truth and liberty: Bentham to John Stuart Mill

Bentham’s Utilitarianism transforms earlier free speech doctrine in the service of the pursuit of truth and the control of government, preserving the distinction between statements of opinion and of fact and awarding the latter a lesser degree of protection. The work of James Mill and the early writings of John Stuart Mill retain this distinction, but their accounts are weighed down by the problems of a direct Utilitarian approach, in their consequentialist balancing of different values against each other, and in their dependence on a majoritarian epistemology and their commitment to a naive progressive optimism. Mill goes on in On Liberty to address and resolve these problems on the basis of a new justification for free speech as free deliberative thought. I argue that, contrary to most interpretations, his new justification leaves untouched the basic distinction between absolutely protected expressions of opinion and only functionally and contingently protected assertions of fact, leaving room for restrictions on factual statements, especially when untrue

Deontología ó ciencia de la moral : obra póstuma / de Jeremías Bentham ; revisada y ordenada por M.J. Bowring, y publicada en francés... ; traducida al español por D.P.P. ; tomo primero

Antep.Enc. Past

Bentham’s Theory of Evidence: Setting a Context

Bentham’s massive writings on evidence, procedure and judicial organisation (EPJ) survive in over 13,000 pages of manuscript in addition to 15–20 published works, for some of which full manuscripts no longer survive. These are all quite closely linked. In order to start to understand the Rationale of Judicial Evidence it is useful to consider it in three broad contexts: Bentham’s other works in addition to those on EPJ, especially those works on the pannomion and the constitutional writings; attempts to construct a ‘theory of (judicial) evidence’ in the Anglo-American tradition of common law, especially those of J. B. Thayer and J. H. Wigmore; and recent efforts at UCL and elsewhere to develop evidence as a distinct multi-disciplinary field