NOTES ON INSECT PESTS OF SOURSOP (GUANABANA), ANNONA MURICATA L., AND THEIR NATURAL ENEMIES IN PUERTO RICO

NOTES ON INSECT PESTS OF SOURSOP (GUANABANA), ANNONA MURICATA L., AND THEIR NATURAL ENEMIES IN PUERTO RIC

Security proof of a three-state quantum key distribution protocol without rotational symmetry

Standard security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols often rely on symmetry arguments. In this paper, we prove the security of a three-state protocol that does not possess rotational symmetry. The three-state QKD protocol we consider involves three qubit states, where the first two states, |0_z> and |1_z>, can contribute to key generation and the third state, |+>=(|0_z>+|1_z>)/\sqrt{2}, is for channel estimation. This protocol has been proposed and implemented experimentally in some frequency-based QKD systems where the three states can be prepared easily. Thus, by founding on the security of this three-state protocol, we prove that these QKD schemes are, in fact, unconditionally secure against any attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. The main task in our proof is to upper bound the phase error rate of the qubits given the bit error rates observed. Unconditional security can then be proved not only for the ideal case of a single-photon source and perfect detectors, but also for the realistic case of a phase-randomized weak coherent light source and imperfect threshold detectors. Our result on the phase error rate upper bound is independent of the loss in the channel. Also, we compare the three-state protocol with the BB84 protocol. For the single-photon source case, our result proves that the BB84 protocol strictly tolerates a higher quantum bit error rate than the three-state protocol; while for the coherent-source case, the BB84 protocol achieves a higher key generation rate and secure distance than the three-state protocol when a decoy-state method is used.Comment: 10 pages, 3 figures, 2 column

Quantum Hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum key distribution systems

Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems can send signals over more than 100 km standard optical fiber and are widely believed to be secure. Here, we show experimentally for the first time a technologically feasible attack, namely the time-shift attack, against a commercial QKD system. Our result shows that, contrary to popular belief, an eavesdropper, Eve, has a non-negligible probability (~4%) to break the security of the system. Eve's success is due to the well-known detection efficiency loophole in the experimental testing of Bell inequalities. Therefore, the detection efficiency loophole plays a key role not only in fundamental physics, but also in technological applications such as QKD.Comment: 5 pages, 3 figures. Substantially revised versio

Decoy state quantum key distribution with two-way classical post-processing

Decoy states have recently been proposed as a useful method for substantially improving the performance of quantum key distribution protocols when a coherent state source is used. Previously, data post-processing schemes based on one-way classical communications were considered for use with decoy states. In this paper, we develop two data post-processing schemes for the decoy-state method using two-way classical communications. Our numerical simulation (using parameters from a specific QKD experiment as an example) results show that our scheme is able to extend the maximal secure distance from 142km (using only one-way classical communications with decoy states) to 181km. The second scheme is able to achieve a 10% greater key generation rate in the whole regime of distances

Phase-Remapping Attack in Practical Quantum Key Distribution Systems

Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be used to generate secret keys between two distant parties. Even though QKD has been proven unconditionally secure against eavesdroppers with unlimited computation power, practical implementations of QKD may contain loopholes that may lead to the generated secret keys being compromised. In this paper, we propose a phase-remapping attack targeting two practical bidirectional QKD systems (the "plug & play" system and the Sagnac system). We showed that if the users of the systems are unaware of our attack, the final key shared between them can be compromised in some situations. Specifically, we showed that, in the case of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol with ideal single-photon sources, when the quantum bit error rate (QBER) is between 14.6% and 20%, our attack renders the final key insecure, whereas the same range of QBER values has been proved secure if the two users are unaware of our attack; also, we demonstrated three situations with realistic devices where positive key rates are obtained without the consideration of Trojan horse attacks but in fact no key can be distilled. We remark that our attack is feasible with only current technology. Therefore, it is very important to be aware of our attack in order to ensure absolute security. In finding our attack, we minimize the QBER over individual measurements described by a general POVM, which has some similarity with the standard quantum state discrimination problem.Comment: 13 pages, 8 figure

Quantum key distribution with delayed privacy amplification and its application to security proof of a two-way deterministic protocol

Privacy amplification (PA) is an essential post-processing step in quantum key distribution (QKD) for removing any information an eavesdropper may have on the final secret key. In this paper, we consider delaying PA of the final key after its use in one-time pad encryption and prove its security. We prove that the security and the key generation rate are not affected by delaying PA. Delaying PA has two applications: it serves as a tool for significantly simplifying the security proof of QKD with a two-way quantum channel, and also it is useful in QKD networks with trusted relays. To illustrate the power of the delayed PA idea, we use it to prove the security of a qubit-based two-way deterministic QKD protocol which uses four states and four encoding operations.Comment: 11 pages, 3 figure

Flipping quantum coins

Coin flipping is a cryptographic primitive in which two distrustful parties wish to generate a random bit in order to choose between two alternatives. This task is impossible to realize when it relies solely on the asynchronous exchange of classical bits: one dishonest player has complete control over the final outcome. It is only when coin flipping is supplemented with quantum communication that this problem can be alleviated, although partial bias remains. Unfortunately, practical systems are subject to loss of quantum data, which restores complete or nearly complete bias in previous protocols. We report herein on the first implementation of a quantum coin-flipping protocol that is impervious to loss. Moreover, in the presence of unavoidable experimental noise, we propose to use this protocol sequentially to implement many coin flips, which guarantees that a cheater unwillingly reveals asymptotically, through an increased error rate, how many outcomes have been fixed. Hence, we demonstrate for the first time the possibility of flipping coins in a realistic setting. Flipping quantum coins thereby joins quantum key distribution as one of the few currently practical applications of quantum communication. We anticipate our findings to be useful for various cryptographic protocols and other applications, such as an online casino, in which a possibly unlimited number of coin flips has to be performed and where each player is free to decide at any time whether to continue playing or not.Comment: 17 pages, 3 figure

Phase encoding schemes for measurement device independent quantum key distribution and basis-dependent flaw

In this paper, we study the unconditional security of the so-called measurement device independent quantum key distribution (MDIQKD) with the basis-dependent flaw in the context of phase encoding schemes. We propose two schemes for the phase encoding, the first one employs a phase locking technique with the use of non-phase-randomized coherent pulses, and the second one uses conversion of standard BB84 phase encoding pulses into polarization modes. We prove the unconditional security of these schemes and we also simulate the key generation rate based on simple device models that accommodate imperfections. Our simulation results show the feasibility of these schemes with current technologies and highlight the importance of the state preparation with good fidelity between the density matrices in the two bases. Since the basis-dependent flaw is a problem not only for MDIQKD but also for standard QKD, our work highlights the importance of an accurate signal source in practical QKD systems. Note: We include the erratum of this paper in Appendix C. The correction does not affect the validity of the main conclusions reported in the paper, which is the importance of the state preparation in MDIQKD and the fact that our schemes can generate the key with the practical channel mode that we have assumed.Comment: We include the erratum of this paper in Appendix C. The correction does not affect the validity of the main conclusions reported in the pape

The Political Economy of Natural Resource Use: Lessons for Fisheries Reform

This report discusses key lessons drawn from reform experience in the wider natural resource sector that might inform successful reform in fisheries. This report is a compilation of 12 papers prepared by acknowledged international experts in the fields of fisheries and wider natural resource reform which were reviewed at a workshop convened by the Property and Environment Research Center (PERC) in May 2009.The report forms an important initial input into an ongoing enquiry into the political economy of fisheries reform initiated by the World Bank in partnership with the Partnership for African Fisheries (a United Kingdom Department for International Development funded program of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD))