Thinking seriously about Asia's arms control

While much of the attention on the Asian nuclear order is rightly focused on the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang’s increasingly credible nuclear weapons program is only the tip of the iceberg. A region traditionally characterised by nuclear restraint appears to be changing in important ways. The time to think seriously about the prospects for controlling Asia’s nuclear arsenals has arrived. Central to the current nuclear dynamics of Asia are the modernisation projects underway in every nuclear-armed state. This is not just about replacing ageing weapons systems. These nuclear modernisation projects are set to provide states with greater missile ranges, more sophisticated warhead technology, more nuclear-armed submarines patrolling Asia’s waterways, and in some cases, larger stockpiles of weapons. These improvements to the arsenals of key states such as the United States, Russia, China, India and Pakistan — alongside North Korea’s sprint towards a credible deterrent — all point to a very different nuclear future for the region

Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age

Three decades after what is widely referred to as the transition from a First to a Second Nuclear Age, the world stands on the cusp of a possible Third Nuclear Age where the way that we conceptualise the central dynamics of the nuclear game will change again. This paradigm shift is being driven by the growth and spread of non-nuclear technologies with strategic applications and by a shift in thinking about the sources of nuclear threats and how they should be addressed, primarily, but not solely, in the United States. Recent scholarship has rightly identified a new set of challenges posed by the development of strategic non-nuclear weaponry (SNNW). But the full implications of this transformation in policy, technology and thinking for the global nuclear order as a whole have so far been underexplored. To remedy this, we look further ahead to the ways in which current trends, if taken to their logical conclusion, have the capacity to usher in a new nuclear era. We argue that in the years ahead, SNNW will increasingly shape the nuclear order, particularly in relation to questions of stability and risk. In the Third Nuclear Age, nuclear deployments, postures, balances, arms control, non-proliferation policy, and the prospects for disarmament, will all be shaped as much by developments in SNNW capabilities as by nuclear weapons. Consequently, we advocate for an urgent reassessment of the way nuclear order and nuclear risks are conceptualised as we confront the challenges of a Third Nuclear Age

Debating the Quad

In this Centre of Gravity paper, six of Australia’s leading scholars and policy experts debate Australian participation in the ‘Australia-India-Japan-United States consultations on the Indo-Pacific’ - known universally as the ‘Quad’. A decade since its first iteration, the revival of the Quad presents significant questions for Australia and the regional order. Is the Quad a constructive partnership of the region’s major powers to safeguard regional stability, uphold the rules-based order and promote security cooperation? Is it a concert of democracies seeking to contain China? Or is it an emerging strategic alignment that risks precipitating the very confrontation with China it seeks to avoid? Or is it something else entirely

Microbial diversity across compartments in an aquaponic system and its connection to the nitrogen cycle

Aquaponics combines hydroponic crop production with recirculating aquaculture. These systems comprise various compartments (fish tank, biofilter, sump, hydroponic table, radial flow settler and anaerobic digester), each with their own specific environmental pressures, which trigger the formation of unique microbial communities. Triplicated aquaponic systems were used to investigate the microbial community composition during three lettuce growing cycles. The sampling of individual compartments allowed community patterns to be generated using amplicon sequencing of bacterial and archaeal 16S rRNA genes. Nitrifying bacteria were identified in the hydroponic compartments, indicating that these compartments may play a larger role than previously thought in the system's nitrogen cycle. In addition to the observed temporal changes in community compositions within the anaerobic compartment, more archaeal reads were obtained from sludge samples than from the aerobic part of the system. Lower bacterial diversity was observed in fresh fish feces, where a highly discrete gut flora composition was seen. Finally, the most pronounced differences in microbial community compositions were observed between the aerobic and anaerobic loops of the system, with unique bacterial compositions in each individual compartment

Rising Powers and Order Contestation: Disaggregating the Normative from the Representational

One of the central themes of the current literature on rising powers is that new aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and norms that underpin the existing, Western-led order. However, in much of the literature, the nature and significance of rising powers for international order is imprecisely debated, in particular the concept and practice of ‘contestation’. In this article we aim to establish a distinction between normative contestation and what can be thought of as ‘contestation over representation’: that is, contestation over who is setting and overseeing the rules of the game rather than the content of the rules themselves and the kind of order that they underpin. This distinction is important for providing a more nuanced understanding of the nature of the current power transition and therefore for guiding attempts at accommodation on the part of the established powers. Theoretically, the paper engages with debates on international order and international society. Its empirical basis is provided by a thorough analysis of the discourse of rising power summitry, in particular at meetings of the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization groupings

Time for a shield wall? A Ballistic Missile Defence system is no silver bullet for Australia

Turning to a ballistic missile defence system as a way of protecting Australia from a North Korean attack is a bad idea that should never get off the ground, Benjamin Zala writes

Great power management and ambiguous order in nineteenth-century international society

This article considers what the nineteenth century can tell us about the nature of great power management under conditions of ambiguity in relation to the holders of great power status. It charts the development of an institutionalised role for the great powers as managers of international society but with a specific focus on the mutual recognition, and conferral, of status. Such a focus highlights the changing, and sometimes competing, perceptions of not only which states should be thought of as great powers, but also therefore whether the power structure of international society remained multipolar or shifted towards bipolarity or even unipolarity. The article argues that a ‘golden age’ of great power management existed during a period in which perceptions of great power status were in fact more fluid than the standard literature accounts for. This means that predictions surrounding the imminent demise of the social institution of great power management under an increasingly ambiguous interstate order today may well be misplaced

Neither MAD nor even: Looking beyond Trump's Missile Defense Review

In discussions about the Missile Defense Review (MDR), released in mid-January 2019, important questions are not being asked. Is the deployment of missile defence advisable in the first place? Does missile defence stabilise or destabilise strategic relations between nuclear-armed states? Does it make crises more or less likely to occur? Does it make states more or less likely to use nuclear weapons early in a crisis? The normalisation of missile defence, despite the enduring problems it poses, should be resisted and challenged.This item was commisioned by Oxford Research Grou