Microgravity crystallization of macromolecules: An interim report and proposal for continued research

An initial investigation exploring the effects of gravity on the crystallization of macromolecular systems has been completed. Monodisperse poly(ethylene), molecular weight 48,000 was melted and recrystallized under gravitational conditions: 0, 1, and 2 g. No correlations to gravitational environment were noted for the 20 C/min melt, as monitored with a photodensitometer system. However, post-crystallization testing of the recrystallized samples revealed thicker samples with more regions of large, well defined spherulites for the zero gravity crystallization environment. The results of the post-crystallization analysis have been reviewed and the results related to nucleation concerns. Finally, birefringence data, consistent with, but not explained by, the nucleation scenarios is detailed, and further investigations are proposed

The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability

Tort scholars have long been obsessed with the dichotomy between strict liability and liability based on fault or wrongdoing. We argue that this is a false dichotomy. Torts such as battery, libel, negligence, and nuisance are wrongs, yet all are “strictly” defined in the sense of setting objective and thus quite demanding standards of conduct. We explain this basic insight under the heading of “the strict liability in fault.” We then turn to the special case of liability for abnormally dangerous activities, which at times really does involve liability without wrongdoing. Through an examination of this odd corner of tort law, we isolate “the fault in strict liability”—that is, the fault line between the wrongs-based form of strict liability that is frequently an aspect of tort liability and the wrongs-free form of strict liability that is found only within the very narrow domain of liability for abnormally dangerous activities. We conclude by defending these two features of the common law of tort: the strictness of the terms on which it defines wrongdoing and its begrudging willingness to recognize, in one special kind of case, liability without wrongdoing

The Fraud-on-the-Market Tort

Fraud on the market is at the core of contemporary securities law, permitting 10b-5 class actions to proceed without direct proof of investor reliance on a misrepresentation. Yet the ambiguities of this idea have fractured the Supreme Court from its initial recognition of the doctrine in Basic v. Levinson to its recent decision in Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds. Amidst divergent views of the coherence and advisability of liability for fraud on the market a fundamental question lurks: is a suit for damages that invokes the fraud-on-the-market theory a claim for common law deceit, such that liability is properly limited by requirements such as scienter and loss causation, or is it an indirect regulatory enforcement action that should be unconstrained by these requirements so that liability can better serve its deterrent and compensatory purposes? Rejecting both of these options, we argue for a third way. Fraud-on-the-market claims are not private attorney general actions; they are genuine tort claims through which victims seek redress for having been wronged. Yet the wrong differs fundamentally in substance from the wrong of deceit. Building on a careful analysis of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, Basic v. Levinson, and common law, we articulate the unique character of the fraud-on-the-market tort. Rooted not in deceit but instead in the Congressionally recognized right of investors to trust in the integrity of securities markets, it does not protect investors from being deceived, but rather protects them against economic loss caused by intentional distortions of market prices. This simultaneously explains why fraud-on-the-market plaintiffs are properly freed from having to prove reliance and why the Supreme Court was perhaps justified in imposing restrictions on liability that are foreign to the common law

Civil Recourse Defended: A Reply to Posner, Calabresi, Rustad, Chamallas, and Robinette

As part of a symposium issue of the Indiana Law Journal devoted to our Civil Recourse Theory of Tort Law, we respond to criticisms by Judge Calabresi, Judge Posner, and Professors Chamallas, Robinette, and Rustad. Calabresi and Posner criticize Civil Recourse Theory as a bit of glib moralism that fails to generate useful answers to the difficult questions that courts face when applying Tort Law. We show with several examples, both old and new, that the glibness is all on their side. From duty to causation to punitive damages, from products liability to fraud to privacy, our scholarship has had a great deal to say on pressing questions in tort. Posner and Calabresi seem to assume that, because our work engages rather than deconstructs concepts such as \u27duty\u27, it cannot address the ‘practical’ issues raised by tort cases. They have things exactly backwards. Civil Recourse Theory engages Tort Law’s concepts precisely in order to address those issues; that is, to a great extent, the point of the enterprise. In a similar vein, Professors Chamallas, Rustad, and Robinette allege that Civil Recourse Theory is blind to various ‘realities\u27; including that Tort Law’s value resides in part in its furtherance of certain policies, that it sometimes operates as an agent of injustice, and that it departs in practice from theory. Of course we have never denied any of these obvious truths. Rather, we have argued that, if Tort Law’s instrumental value is to be appreciated and enhanced, its content as a body of common law cannot be treated in a facile manner. If its discriminatory impact is to be grasped and eliminated, the particular way in which it empowers injury victims must be made clear. If the behavior of legal actors in the shadow of the law is be understood and evaluated, the structure and content of Tort Law’s rules must be rendered more transparent

The Myths of Macpherson

For a symposium marking the centenary of MacPherson v. Buick, we identify three common characterizations of Cardozo’s famous opinion that purport to explain its importance. Unfortunately, each of these characterizations turns out to be a myth. MacPherson is worthy of celebration, but not because it recognizes that negligence law’s duty of care is owed to the world, nor because it displays the promise of an instrumental, policy-oriented approach to adjudication, nor because it embraces a nascent form of strict products liability. These myths of MacPherson reflect deep misunderstandings of tort law, and of Cardozo’s distinctively pragmatic approach to adjudication. Ironically, although they have been largely fostered by progressives, the myths lend support to the cause of modern tort reform. By contrast, an accurate appreciation of MacPherson’s virtues permits an understanding of negligence, tort law, and common law adjudication that provides grounds for resisting regressive reforms

The Easy Case for Products Liability: A Response to Polinsky & Shavell

In their article “The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,” Professors Polinsky and Shavell assert the extraordinary claim that there should be no tort liability - none at all - for injuries caused by widely-sold products. In particular, they claim to have found convincing evidence that the threat of tort liability creates no additional incentives to safety beyond those already provided by regulatory agencies and market forces, and that tort compensation adds little or no benefit to injury victims beyond the compensation already provided by various forms of insurance. In this response, we explain that, even on its own narrow terms, “Uneasy,” comes nowhere near to demonstrating what it purports to demonstrate. We also identify various “benefits” provided by tort liability for product-related injuries that Polinsky and Shavell entirely fail to consider. In fact, the case for some form of products liability - whether fault-based or defect-based - is really quite easy

WILLIAM HARVEY, SOUL SEARCHER: TELELOGY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANATOMY

The goal of this dissertation is to understand the ways in which teleology structures the natural philosophy of William Harvey (1578-1657), who announced the circulation of the blood in his De motu cordis (1628). I shall incorporate new archival research, as well as the study of a number of texts that have not yet received due attention, including the Prelectiones anatomie universalis (1616-1627) and the De generatione animalium (1651). My study is divided into three parts. The first two parts focus upon on the role of two sorts of teleology. I first discuss the teleology of being, which characterizes the functioning and material organization of the parts of the body, what one would call today ‘physiology and anatomy’. I then turn to examine the teleology of becoming, which characterizes the process of the generation of those parts, what one would call today ‘embryological development’. The third section shifts to examining Harvey’s methods in light of this conception of the subject matter. I start by articulating how, in general, Harvey conceives of anatomy not as a body of pre-existing knowledge, but rather as an active ability, combining skills of hand, eye, and mind. I then turn to look in detail at Harvey’s particular methods. Harvey’s methodology was an innovative reinterpretation and extension of Aristotle and Galen, mediated by certain Renaissance trends in medicine and natural philosophy. I focus specifically on how experience and experiment are used to determine final causes

Explicit Feedback Within Game-based Training: Examining The Influence Of Source Modality Effects On Interaction

This research aims to enhance Simulation-Based Training (SBT) applications to support training events in the absence of live instruction. The overarching purpose is to explore available tools for integrating intelligent tutoring communications in game-based learning platforms and to examine theory-based techniques for delivering explicit feedback in such environments. The primary tool influencing the design of this research was the Generalized Intelligent Framework for Tutoring (GIFT), a modular domain-independent architecture that provides the tools and methods to author, deliver, and evaluate intelligent tutoring technologies within any training platform. Influenced by research surrounding Social Cognitive Theory and Cognitive Load Theory, the resulting experiment tested varying approaches for utilizing an Embodied Pedagogical Agent (EPA) to function as a tutor during interaction in a game-based environment. Conditions were authored to assess the tradeoffs between embedding an EPA directly in a game, embedding an EPA in GIFT’s browser-based Tutor-User Interface (TUI), or using audio prompts alone with no social grounding. The resulting data supports the application of using an EPA embedded in GIFT’s TUI to provide explicit feedback during a game-based learning event. Analyses revealed conditions with an EPA situated in the TUI to be as effective as embedding the agent directly in the game environment. This inference is based on evidence showing reliable differences across conditions on the metrics of performance and self-reported mental demand and feedback usefulness items. This research provides source modality tradeoffs linked to tactics for relaying training relevant explicit information to a user based on real-time performance in a game