Bence...

Taha Toros Arşivi, Dosya Adı: Pierre Loti. Not: Ekte 16 Aralık 1967 tarihine ait belge bulunmaktadır.İstanbul Kalkınma Ajansı (TR10/14/YEN/0033) İstanbul Development Agency (TR10/14/YEN/0033)Pierre Loti’ye mektuplar, Zeki Mugaamız bey ve Orhan Koloğlu...Pierre Loti masalındaki “Neyir" Hanımı da Orhan Koloğlu’ya takdim edelim..

The changing market for distribution: implications for Exel Logistics

This paper has been written to compliment a previous Working Paper (The Evolution of a Distribution Brand: The Case of Exel Logistics) and to some extent allows that company’s development (1989- 1993) to be placed in the context of marketplace and industry changes. I wish to examine three of the main trends affecting the distribution industry over the same period. Firstly, the move towards the centralisation of operations by both manufacturers and retailers, secondly at the debate surrounding contracting-out and in-house distribution activities and finally, the issues under consideration must be seen in a wider context - that of distribution and the Single European Market (SEM), which could be said to be the most important development facing the distribution industry for many years. These trends will be discussed in some detail and, where appropriate, from Exel Logistics’ perspective in order to consider how far the company has gone both in dealing with marketplace changes and in achieving its aims.School of Managemen

Do we see apples as edible?

Do we (sometimes) perceive apples as edible? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we see it as having certain shape, size and color and we only infer on the basis of these properties that it is. I argue that we do indeed see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I point out that Susanna Siegel's influential argument in favor of the claim that we represent sortal properties perceptually does not work. Second, I argue that we can fix this argument if we replace the sortal property in question with the property of being edible, climbable or Q-able in genera

Success semantics: the sequel

The aim of this paper is to reinterpret success semantics, a theory of mental content, according to which the content of a belief is fixed by the success conditions of some actions based on this belief. After arguing that in its present form, success semantics is vulnerable to decisive objections, I examine the possibilities of salvaging the core of this proposal. More specifically, I propose that the content of some very simple, but very important, mental states, the immediate mental antecedents of action, can be explained in this manne

The appointment: a communion sermon

1 Corinthians 11:2

Do we sense modalities with our sense modalities?1

It has been widely assumed that we do not perceive dispositional properties. I argue that there are two ways of interpreting this assumption. On the first, extensional, interpretation whether we perceive dispositions depends on a complex set of metaphysical commitments. But if we interpret the claim in the second, intensional, way, then we have no reason to suppose that we do not perceive dispositional properties. The two most important and influential arguments to the contrary fai

Philosophy of perception – The new wave

Overview of recent work in philosophy of perceptio

Transparency and sensorimotor contingencies: Do we see through photographs?

It has been claimed that photographs are transparent: we see through them; we literally see the photographed object through the photograph. Whether this claim is true depends on the way we conceive of seeing. There has been a controversy about whether localizing the perceived object in one's egocentric space is a necessary feature of seeing, as if it is, then photographs are unlikely to be transparent. I would like to propose and defend another, much weaker, necessary condition for seeing: I argue that it is necessary for seeing that there is at least one way for me to move such that if I were to move this way, my view of the perceived object would change continuously as I move. Since this condition is not satisfied in the case of seeing objects in photographs, photographs are not transparen

Three Ways of Resisting Racism

Two widespread strategies of resisting racism are the following. The first one is to deny the existence of races and thus block even the possibility of racist claims. The second one is to grant that races exist but insist that racial differences do not imply value differences. The aim of this paper is to outline a strategy of resisting racism that is weaker than the first but stronger than the second strategy: even if we accept that races exist, we can still deny that there are projectible racial differences. And this is enough to block the possibility of racist claims without appealing to the slippery topic of value differences. I use some considerations from philosophy of biology in order to argue for this claim