The ‘Common Constitutional Traditions’ and the Integration of EU

The central question faced by the article is that of the possible integration of the European Union as a multicultural society through its constitutional principles. These are summarized in the so called Common Constitutional Traditions (CCTs) presumably shared by the Member States. Such “traditions” has been worked out by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The answer to the question can be affirmative and the EU can promote social inclusion if the ECJ and other EU institutions take seriously the EU motto: “United in diversity.

Presentazione [Teorie costituzionalistiche del diritto: prospettive europee]

I contributi pubblicati in questo e nel prossimo numero di Diritto & questioni pubbliche sotto il titolo \u201cTeorie costituzionalistiche del diritto: prospettive europee\u201d rappresentano i testi rielaborati delle relazioni che sono state presentate all\u2019omonimo Convegno internazionale, organizzato presso il Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell\u2019Universit\ue0 di Modena e Reggio Emilia il 23 e 24 ottobre 2015. Nella Costituzione greca l'articolo 3 tratta dei \u201cRapporti tra Chiesa e Stato\u201d e riconosce l\u2019\u201cautocefalia\u201d, ma anche la \u201cpredominanza\u201d della Chiesa greco-ortodossa, Esso rappresenta una vera e propria sfida al principio di laicit\ue0 dello Stato (v. il contributo di Athanasios GROMITSARIS). Nel mondo anglosassone il dibattito su quello che qui da noi viene etichettato come \u201cneocostituzionalismo\u201d si suddivide, principalmente, in tre filoni: quello intorno all\u2019opera di Dworkin; quello sulla connessa discussione sul giuspositivismo inclusivo ed esclusivo; e quello sul \u201cpolitical constitutionalism\u201d e la relativa diatriba sulla legittimit\ue0 democratica della judicial review. Rispetto alla nostra cultura costituzionale, i critici del sindacato di legittimit\ue0 delle leggi, che sostengono la supremazia del parlamento (a partire da J. Waldron), argomentano in modo fuorviante o unilaterale. Essi accentuano il significato democratico della legge, espressione della sovranit\ue0 popolare e della rappresentanza, ma tacciono sul fatto che, se c\u2019\ue8 \u201cqualcosa\u201d che caratterizza in senso moderno il costituzionalismo, questo \u201cqualcosa\u201d \ue8 propriamente il principio antimaggioritario, relativo alla funzione svolta dai giudici nel \u201cgarantire\u201d i diritti (v. il lavoro di Carmen BARRANCO). Tale garanzia concretizza e vivifica il \u201cprecommitment\u201d costituzionale nei confronti dell\u2019invasione della sfera privata dell\u2019individuo da parte del potere della maggioranza (e del potere privato esterno). Stefano BERTEA affronta il tema del costituzionalismo in Inghilterra collegato alle questioni inerenti il rule of law. Il tema del costituzionalismo internazionale/universale \ue8 proposto da Javier ANSU\uc1TEGUI e Thomas GUTMANN, come momento centrale del "moderno". Infine, Aldo SCHIAVELLO e Baldo PASTORE si concentrano su alcuni aspetti salienti del \u201cdiritto nello Stato costituzionale\u201d, svolti dal primo Autore in una prospettiva di giuspositivismo critico, e dal secondo secondo quella dell'ermeneutica giuridica. Le nozioni di \u201ccostituzionalismo\u201d e \u201cneocostituzionalismo\u201d sono \u201cconcetti essenzialmente contestati\u201d, perci\uf2 non \ue8 stato possibile proporne una definizione che sia in grado di amalgamare o collegare anche solo le differenti concezioni degli autori che partecipano al presente dibattito. In fondo, per\uf2, ci\uf2 che \ue8 interessante non \ue8 tanto l\u2019accordo su una loro definizione stipulativa quanto \u2013 piuttosto \u2013 che giuristi costituzionalisti e filosofi del diritto \u201cprendano sul serio\u201d la costituzione, comprendendone le innovative peculiarit\ue0 all\u2019interno delle loro riflessioni in tema di validit\ue0, interpretazione, applicazione ed argomentazione del diritto, ... Naturalmente, gli autori dei contributi che qui si presentano non sono stati chiamati affatto a dimostrare una lealt\ue0 di scuola, ma esprimono il pi\uf9 ampio panorama di opinioni e sensibilit\ue0 in tema di \u201ccostituzionalismo\u201d

Legal Pluralism and Problems of Legal Application

In order to qualify a situation as a case of normative pluralism, it is essential that within the same social environment, rules of different origins are operative, i.e., they are valid and applied, so that the person in question can choose the norms that guide their own behaviour. This is the phenomenon which Boaventura de Sousa Santos defined as 'interlegality.' The author does not propose a pluralist conception of applying law in a multicultural society, but defending a form of jurisdictional monism that is motivated by practical-normative reasons in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination. The claim, in other words, is that we must treat those who are different from ourselves with 'equal concern and respect.' People belonging to different cultures from our own culture may de facto decide within their own group to let their own legal conflicts be dealt with by community 'jurisdictions.' At the same time, however, the democratic-constitutional legal system must guarantee the administration of justice in the 'last resort,' in accordance with the principle set out in the ‘equal protection clause’ (XIV am., sect. 1, US Const.) prescribing that the State cannot 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' It is clear that very often the person asking for such protection will be the most vulnerable person within traditional communities: women

Multicultural society, person and constitution: the immigrant as pariah

Desde una perspectiva constitucional, la dignidad de la persona depende del reconocimiento por parte de la sociedad y del Estado de los derechos fundamentales que hacen posible el desarrollo de la personalidad y de la identidad del individuo. En nuestra sociedad pluralista y multicultural, de acuerdo al sistema político democrático-constitucional que rige, no podemos tratar “los inmigrantes” como “pariah”, humillando, pisoteando su dignidad y sus derechos. Se pueden extraer de la Constitución italiana (particularmente en los artículos 2y 3) algunos principios, como: dignidad de la persona, tolerancia e “igual reconocimientoy respeto”. Los mismos constituyen el núcleo normativo de la “solidaridad entre extraños” y hacen de fundamento para la integración de la sociedad actual. Respecto a este problema la Constitución es entendida como“documento de identidad” normativo que ofrece, tanto a “nosotros”, nacionales,como a los “otros”, los inmigrantes, la posibilidad de integrarse, o mejor de sentirse incluidos en la sociedad, en el respeto de la identidad y de la dignidad subjetivas. En este sentido, lo que se define como “patriotismo constitucional” puede ser entendido no como la esencia de una identidad colectiva estable, sino como un proceso pragmático de identificación con los “principios fundamentales”recogidos en el texto constitucional.From a constitutional point of view personal dignity depends on the societal and State recognition of fundamental rights that makes the flourishing of the individual’s personality and identity possible. In our pluralist and multicultural society, according to its political system, democratic and constitutional in nature, we cannot treat the immigrants as pariah, by humiliating them and trampling upon their dignity and rights. From the Italian Constitution (esp. arts 2 and 3) we may obtain some principles such as personal dignity, toleration, “equal concern and respect”. They shape the normative nucleus of the so-called “solidarity among foreigners” and serve as the basis for integrating today’s society. As far as the latter issue is concerned, the constitution is understood as the normative “identity card” which offers “us” the fellow citizens, as well as to the “others,” the immigrants, the opportunity to integrate, or better to feel included in society, according to the personal identity and dignity of every person. It follows that the “constitutional patriotism” can be understood not as the essence of a fixed collective identity, but as a pragmatic process of identification in the constitutional fundamental principles

Domande intorno alla crisi dell’età dei diritti: un po’ di realismo sui diritti umani

Norberto Bobbio coined the notion of “age of rights”. Taking his conception seriously we cannot argue appropriately that there is a crisis of the age of rights. If we adopt the point of view proposed by Bobbio, which is that of the people involved, we can see that in several places of the world vulnerable persons use the language of rights to sustain with a moral legitimacy their claims for better living conditions. As rights haven’t lost their function of emancipation and inclusion of people the “crisis of the age of rights” doesn’t exist

Princìpi costituzionali: “dalla struttura alla funzione”

Il paper manifesta la richiesta di mutare prospettiva nei confronti dei princìpi costituzionali “costitutivi” (eguaglianza, dignità, libertà, ecc.). Esso intende affrontare il problema di delimitare tale categoria all’interno dell’ordinamento costituzionale italiano. Seguendo Bobbio, propongo di passare dall’analisi strutturale a quella funzionale dei princìpi, per comprenderli in modo adeguato rispetto alla loro presenza nell’ordinamento dello Stato costituzionale. Prima, i princìpi costituzionali “costitutivi” sono distinti dai valori. Si ritiene che essi non siano valori, poiché questi non tollerano compromessi né bilanciamenti, ma pretendono di valere in modo assoluto. Pertanto, i valori non sono adatti come base normativa per una società pluralista come la attuale, poiché sono nemici del pluralismo. Inoltre, i princìpi “costitutivi” non sono neppure norme, poiché non hanno la struttura logica condizionale, caratteristica delle regole giuridiche: “se A allora B”. E non lo sono neppure, se consideriamo la concezione delle norme come “reason for action”. Tuttavia hanno carattere prescrittivo. Da un punto di vista pratico, la loro prima funzione è quella di tutelare la dignità delle persone, in particolare interessate dalle vicende giudiziarie, ma ne svolgono anche una costitutiva nei confronti sia dell’ordinamento giuridico nel suo complesso, sia del significato e delle norme e dei fatti, rilevanti per i casi difficili e nei ricorsi dinanzi alla Corte costituzionale.My argument tries to justify a change of perspective in the analysis of constitutional “constitutive” principles. Following Norberto Bobbio, I argue that jurisprudence should switch from structural to functional analysis in order to better understand the role of principles in the legal order of a constitutional State. First, I draw the distinction between constitutional principles and values. Principles are not values, because values don’t tolerate compromises and balances, and claim validity at the expenses of all other values. The problem of conceiving principles as values is that ours is a pluralistic society, whereas values are, given their very nature, enemies of pluralism. Constitutional principles, like equality, freedom, solidarity, etc., are not legal norms either. If, following Kelsen, we take a norm to be a hypothetical judgement, principles cannot be considered to be norms, for the simple reason that neither they state a triggering condition nor they foresee consequences of the action. I conclude, thus, that constitutive principles are an independent axiological category, with its peculiar logic. They are “constitutive” both of the legal order as a whole and of the normative meaning of the case at stake. Constitutional principles must be adhered to and engaged with. Their proper function is driving judges to develop a peculiar sensitivity for an adequate and fair decision for the case at stake

Neuropsychiatric disturbances in atypical Parkinsonian disorders

Multiple system atrophy (MSA), progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP), and corticobasal degeneration (CBD) are the most common atypical parkinsonisms. These disorders are characterized by varying combinations of autonomic, cerebellar and pyramidal system, and cognitive dysfunctions. In this paper, we reviewed the evidence available on the presence and type of neuropsychiatric disturbances in MSA, PSP, and CBD. A MedLine, Excerpta Medica, PsycLit, PsycInfo, and Index Medicus search was performed to identify all articles published on this topic between 1965 and 2018. Neuropsychiatric disturbances including depression, anxiety, agitation, and behavioral abnormalities have been frequently described in these disorders, with depression as the most frequent disturbance. MSA patients show a higher frequency of depressive disorders when compared to healthy controls. An increased frequency of anxiety disorders has also been reported in some patients, and no studies have investigated apathy. PSP patients may have depression, apathy, disinhibition, and to a lesser extent, anxiety and agitation. In CBD, neuropsychiatric disorders are similar to those present in PSP. Hallucinations and delusions are rarely reported in these disorders. Neuropsychiatric symptoms in MSA, PSP, and CBD do not appear to be related to the severity of motor dysfunction and are one of the main factors that determine a low quality of life. The results suggest that neuropsychiatric disturbances should always be assessed in patients with atypical parkinsonisms

Does the somatosensory temporal discrimination threshold change over time in focal dystonia?

BACKGROUND: The somatosensory temporal discrimination threshold (STDT) is defined as the shortest interval at which an individual recognizes two stimuli as asynchronous. Some evidence suggests that STDT depends on cortical inhibitory interneurons in the basal ganglia and in primary somatosensory cortex. Several studies have reported that the STDT in patients with dystonia is abnormal. No longitudinal studies have yet investigated whether STDT values in different forms of focal dystonia change during the course of the disease. METHODS: We designed a follow-up study on 25 patients with dystonia (15 with blepharospasm and 10 with cervical dystonia) who were tested twice: upon enrolment and 8 years later. STDT values from dystonic patients at the baseline were also compared with those from a group of 30 age-matched healthy subjects. RESULTS: Our findings show that the abnormally high STDT values observed in patients with focal dystonia remained unchanged at the 8-year follow-up assessment whereas disease severity worsened. CONCLUSIONS: Our observation that STDT abnormalities in dystonia remain unmodified during the course of the disease suggests that the altered activity of inhibitory interneurons-either at cortical or at subcortical level-responsible for the increased STDT does not deteriorate as the disease progresses