The Archaeology of First World War U-boat Losses in the English Channel and its Impact on the Historical Record

This paper examines how the archaeological record of 35 known U-boat wrecks sunk in WW1 in the English Channel compares with the assessment of U-boat destructions made by the Admiralty’s Antisubmarine Division (ASD) in 1919. Comparison of the two shows that only 48% of the 37 assessments was correct. This divergence between the extant archaeology and the 1919 assessment was partly caused by over optimism at ASD regarding reported attacks. However, it is also observed that ASD’s own processes were on occasion overridden by a need to overstate Allied successes, and should be seen in the broader context of a wider range of inefficiencies that confronted the Naval Staff during WW1. The same mistakes seem entirely absent from the WW2 records in the same geographical area. The research reveals that the radio silence observed by the Flanders Flotilla proved a challenge to combating its U-boats at sea, making the tracking of the U-boats and the rerouting of Allied ships practically impossible. This was a factor in the early adoption of “controlled sailings” in the Channel. It may have also been the driving factor behind the Navy’s pressure to attack the Flanders bases by land in 1917, a key component often overlooked by historians

Paying the Prize for the German Submarine War: U-boats destroyed and the Admiralty Prize Fund, 1919–1932

This paper examines how the Admiralty paid prize money to the Royal Navy for the destruction of U-boats in the First World War. The research shows that the method by which it did so was distinct from the standard prize process, primarily because of secrecy surrounding the anti-Uboat effort. Prize payments were only made by the Admiralty to the crew of naval vessels after the war had ended and this was based on reports compiled during wartime. The payments made closely match the detailed analysis into U-boat losses released internally by the Anti-Submarine Division (ASD) of the Naval Staff in January 1919. This listed 186 U-boats destroyed. The Admiralty considered 93 of these cases eligible for prize bounty. At least 41 additional cases were turned down. Where inconsistencies exist between the work of the Anti-Submarine Division and the prizes paid out, they are explained by the process of post-war reassessments of U-boats destroyed. In 1917 ASD was pioneering a new type of scientific undersea warfare and it is unfair to be too critical of its work when seen in this historical context. The final prize payments were made in 1932