

Paying the Prize for the German Submarine War 1914-1918: U-boats Destroyed and the Admiralty Prize Fund, 1919-1932.

Dr Innes McCartney,

Leverhulme Research Fellow, Bournemouth University, Department of Archaeology, Anthropology & Forensic Science, Fern Barrow, Talbot Campus, Poole, Dorset BH12 5BB, UK

©2017 The Author

33 Barwis Terrace

Penzance

Cornwall TR18 2AW

imccartney@bournemouth.ac.uk

01736 330769

Key Words

Maritime Heritage, Room 40, Naval History, U-boats, Admiralty, Prize Regulations, WW1, Naval Intelligence, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Royal Navy

Abstract

This paper examines how the Admiralty paid prize money to the Royal Navy for the destruction of U-boats in WW1. The research shows that the method by which it did so was distinct from the standard prize process, primarily because of secrecy surrounding the anti-U-boat effort. Prize payments were only made by the Admiralty to the crew of naval vessels after the war had ended and this was based on reports compiled during wartime.

The research shows that the payments made closely match the detailed analysis into U-boat losses released internally by the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff in January 1919. This listed 186 U-boats destroyed. The Admiralty considered 93 of these cases eligible for prize bounty. At least a further 41 cases were turned down.

Where inconsistencies exist between the work of the Anti-Submarine Division and the prizes paid out, they are explained by the process of post-war reassessments of U-boats destroyed. The final prize payments were made in 1932.

Biographical Note

Dr Innes McCartney (PhD Bournemouth University 2014) is a nautical archaeologist of the modern era, specialising in the relationship between historical texts and the archaeological record. He is currently a Leverhulme Research Fellow at Bournemouth University, UK.

Introduction: The Archaeological record of U-boat wrecks 1914-1918 and the questions it asks of the Historical Text.

The study of the first U-boat war has been undergoing transformation over the last three decades. This is because of the high number of both sunken U-boats and their victims which have been located and identified during this time, in a process which is continuing to accelerate. The writer's role in this exciting field of study has been based primarily on locating, examining and identifying the wrecks of the U-boats and reconciling their remains to the historical record.

Alongside the writer's own work are the discoveries made by many others which collectively have reached a point where around half of the 178 U-boats lost at sea in WW1 have been found and mainly positively identified. Their impact on the historical record has been profound. For example - in the English Channel, where nearly every wreck is now accounted for, the 1919 Admiralty tally of U-boats destroyed (The 1919 List), (TNA ADM 239/26) bears only a 48% correspondence to where the U-boat wrecks have been found and identified in recent years (McCartney, 2014). Such a marked difference between the archaeological record and the historical text is worthy of note and further archival study to seek to establish why such a disparity exists.

One case in the English Channel stood out as particularly notable, prompting the research which has led to this paper. As described in McCartney (2014 and 2015a), the wreck of the minelayer *UC79* was found in the Dover minefield off Cap Gris Nez by Admiralty divers in August 1918. But it appears its true fate was conveniently ignored, because the Anti-Submarine Division (ASD) of the Naval Staff had already decided it was sunk off Zeebrugge in October 1917 and had credited HM Submarine *E45* for doing so. ASD had maintained this assertion despite Room 40 (the Admiralty's cryptographic branch) knowing that from intelligence *UC79* was still operational. Indeed the Admiralty maintained this fiction even after the wreck was found and then continued to claim HMS *E45* sunk *UC79* when the 1919 List was published in January of that year.

That ASD would hide the true facts of the loss of *UC79* to protect its earlier analysis is a somewhat controversial assertion. However it is a view which was seemingly supported by the words of William F. Clarke, Intelligence Officer of Room 40 and later Deputy Director of the Naval Section at Bletchley Park who wrote in his unpublished autobiographical papers:

"The Anti-Submarine Division...had frequently to boost their own efforts, insisted on the success of many attacks that we in Room 40 knew to have been abortive and many officers had received decorations in consequence; when these very gallant men put in their claims for prize bounty, it was my none too pleasant task to turn down their claims." (TNA HW 3/16).

This statement seemed to suggest that perhaps through the detailed analysis of the prize records for the destruction of U-boats during WW1 some differences between Room 40's standpoint on losses and that of ASD might emerge. Perhaps austerity curtailed wartime claims about the sinking of enemy submarines. Research in this area might even uncover other cases where ASD may have insisted on fates Room 40 knew to be impossible.

Clarke does not specify exactly when he was involved in assessing prize claims, but the process is known to have taken place in the immediate post-war years, up to July 1922. Clarke's service record shows that he was demobilised in 1919 (TNA ADM 337/118). But then according to his papers in 1920 he was re-employed to work in what became the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) where he initially worked on the collation of wartime records and it was during this time, alongside many other roles, that he worked on validating prize claims. This seems to fit chronologically because in April 1922 GC&CS was handed over to the Foreign Office coinciding with the time when prize payments to the Admiralty prize fund for U-boats destroyed ceased (see Figure 1).

It should be noted at the outset that the research does not extend to prize payments made to the Auxiliary Patrol (usually at the discretion of the local Admiral in Command and which came to fall outside of the formal ASD assessment process), the Board of Trade to merchant vessels or payments by other national governments. The research was aimed solely at establishing the relationship between the 1919 List of U-boats destroyed and payments made through the Admiralty prize fund; the amounts of money involved were not analysed. A number of small clerical errors and typographic errors were discovered in the records. These were corrected as part of the research and are not described.

The Admiralty Prize Fund and U-boats Destroyed

During WW1 the Admiralty produced by Order in Council a set of guidelines by which prize monies would be paid in accordance with the Naval Prize Act, 1864 (TNA ADM 1/8394/320). Throughout the conflict Admiralty prize money was routinely paid for actions which resulted in the capture or destruction of enemy ships. The results of these payments can be found in the Admiralty prize journal (TNA ADM 238/2).

The journal shows that when a case was approved for the payment of prize monies, the Admiralty paid a set fee into the Admiralty prize fund and it was then distributed in accordance to the currently operating guidelines. The guidelines themselves were subject to change during the war in favour of the lower deck and were the subject of much internal and public debate, which can be followed in the archives (TNA 116/1319C). Evidence for prize payments during the war can be found throughout the journal and include such notable cases as HMS *Highflyer's* destruction of the armed merchant cruiser SS *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* off North Africa, for which a bounty of £2,580 was paid into the fund in July 1916 (TNA ADM 238/2, 11).

The Admiralty Digest for the early months of WW1 shows that initially prize bounties were considered for payment in all cases of U-boats destroyed. For example a payment of £1,000 was made to HMT *Quickly* for sinking *U42* on 19 July 1915 (TNA ADM 12/1539A, ADM 239/26). However by 1916 things had changed. The Admiralty Digest for 1916 shows that claims for U-boat actions were being made but not being resolved until 1919 or later. Of note was a claim by HMS *Firedrake* for the capture of the minelayer *UC5*, which was later salvaged and used to raise war bonds in the UK and USA. Yet this case was not resolved until 1920 (TNA ADM 12/1567A).

The Digest also reveals why cases were not resolved promptly; in 1916 the Admiralty decided to suspend all prize payments for the destruction of U-boats until the end of the war:

“Officers concerned to draw up statements of actions so that they are available when required. Report not to be made public” (TNA ADM 12/1567A). In effect, the professional Navy’s role in the U-boat war was being made secret.

Operations against German submarines evolved over the opening months of the war into one where the need to maintain the secrecy of the sources of operational intelligence became paramount. This explains why there was a double standard for the payment of awards. Whereas prize payments to auxiliaries and merchant ships could be paid in wartime for U-boat actions (with the subsequent publicity and boost to morale), those to the Royal Navy could not. This is probably because it was only inside the professional Navy that operational intelligence was exploited to hunt U-boats, and this had to be kept secret. Examples of cases where operational intelligence was used to destroy U-boats include instances where Royal Navy submarines were vectored to torpedo U-boats tracked by using radio intelligence (McCartney 2014).

The Digest reveals that the Admiralty was aware that this two standard system created some difficulties which had to be resolved after the war. For instance cases where commissioned naval officers were serving on merchant ships which successfully sunk U-boats were not paid in wartime (TNA ADM 12/1567A). A notable case is mentioned in the Admiralty Digest when the liner SS *Olympic* rammed and sunk *U103* on 12 May 1918. In this case the ship was paid prize money but *“R.N. Officers [were] excluded from award which was given on merchant ship basis”* (TNA ADM 12/1607A).

By extension therefore, cases where both naval and auxiliary vessels combined to sink a submarine had to be treated separately, even though they participated in the same U-boat action. A further issue which arose was whether airships were subject to the prize regulations. A note in the Admiralty Digest in 1919 states that they were not considered as part of the Auxiliary Patrol and therefore not eligible for special payments (TNA ADM 12/1623A) and indeed there is no record of an airship receiving prize payments through the Admiralty prize fund.

Once the Armistice came into effect, the process of validating Admiralty prize claims began; the first case, the destruction of *UB16* by HMS *E34*, being paid into the prize fund in March 1919 (TNA ADM 238/2, 62). The obvious question was upon what evidential basis were prize payments being made? In other words, what sources of data would Clarke have used to validate claims? The unequivocal answer to this is the ASD 1919 List, the full title of which is, *“Losses of Enemy Submarines with Summary of Cases, Final Return (Corrected by information received up to 16 January 1919)”* (TNA ADM 239/26). As shown in Table 1, payments were made to the Admiralty prize fund in 93 cases connected to the 1919 List.

As prize cases were validated, the Admiralty prize fund was credited with the monies to be paid out. The last credit made was in July 1922. The Admiralty Digest reveals that in 1927, the claims period for making prize applications was reduced to 10 years, meaning in theory no claim would be accepted after November 1928 (TNA ADM 12/1703). This was somewhat academic as no payments had been made to the Fund for six years previously. Clearly it took time for the fund to identify all eligible parties to be paid. The prize journal reveals that the final payment made by the fund was in March 1932, when the sum of seven pounds seventeen shillings and seven pence was paid out to an eligible party from HMS *Campanula* for the destruction of *UB66* on 18 January 1918 (TNA ADM 238/2, 388).

The Genesis and compilation of the 1919 List

The year 1916 proved to be a turning point in the fight against the U-boats. In the broadest of terms, what had come before had been a threat to Britain; but a threat that could be absorbed; although serious it did not constitute a fatal danger to the war effort. However from 31st January 1917 the new German strategy of “unrestricted submarine warfare” upon merchant shipping represented such a fatal danger to the war effort and indeed the survival of the Allies and the Admiralty had to take far greater steps to counter it. A detailed summary of how the Admiralty developed a more scientific approach to fighting the U-boats from late 1916 onwards is given in McCartney (2014, 6-13, 17-21). The rigorous statistical analysis of U-boat destruction an essential formed part of this process and a brief summary of its development follows.

Following Jellicoe’s appointment as First Sea Lord in November 1916, the ASD came into being the following month, under the command of Admiral Duff. ASD’s role was to coordinate all the Admiralty’s efforts to overcome the U-boat threat. By May 1917, structural reforms within the entire Naval Staff brought Room 40 (now called ID25), the Radio Direction-Finding (DF) Section and the Convoy and Tracking Sections together into a precursor of the Operational Intelligence Centre of WW2 (Beesly 1982, 173-177). Its daily output was available to Duff.

More importantly its output, published by Naval Intelligence Division (NID) and ASD in the form of digests and reports published regularly from mid-1917 formed the foundation of the first truly scientific attempt to get to grips with the U-boat menace. Among the myriad publications was the “Reported Destruction of Submarines” (the Return), first published in March 1917. This edition featured analysis of all U-boat actions where an enemy submarine was considered present and recorded since August 1914. Each action was given a graded assessment of the possibility of its success from “Known” to “Improbable”. With minor changes, this grading system was still in use by the Anti U-boat Division in 1945 (McCartney 2014, 11 & 20).

In effect what ASD had done was to rework all the ASW reports prior to 1917 into a consistent, graded format which it then used for the rest of the war. This was then updated and enhanced each quarter with a new edition of the Return. The final edition of the Return in January 1919, signed off with the most up to date assessment of all U-boats destroyed during the war and this is what is referred to as the 1919 List.

Importantly, a close examination of each Return shows that the declared fate of some of the U-boats was revised as the war progressed. For example as mentioned above HMT *Quickly*’s destruction of *U42* in July 1915 is listed as “known” in the March 1917 edition of the list. But by 1919, it is listed as “non-existent” because by then ASD realised that the German navy never commissioned a *U42* and thus concluded that no U-boat was sunk at the time of *Quickly*’s action (TNA ADM 239/26).

Table 1 lists all 186 U-boat fates summarised in the 1919 List. It included the six U-boats interned during the war. It also shows the cases against which prize payments were made. Prize payments were made in 93 instances, exactly half of the U-boats listed as destroyed. The other 93 cases were considered as ineligible because they were sunk by auxiliaries (the preserve of the Auxiliary Patrol scheme), by merchant ships (administered by the Board of Trade) or by mines (so indiscriminate as to be considered ineligible for prize, except in the cases described below).

Claims turned down for an award through the Admiralty Prize Fund.

Whilst the prize journal only lists the cases where the Admiralty paid into the prize fund, leading us to the 93 cases seen in Table 1, the Admiralty Digest also lists cases where the claim for prize bounties was turned down. The two lists when read together allow us to ascertain the reasons for rejection.

These cases usually referred to in the Admiralty Digest as “not allowed” appear in three tranches in the years, 1918, 1919 and 1920. In all there are 37 such cases where this occurred, together with four described later. There may indeed have been more, because the Digest did not always record every report passing through the Admiralty each day. Nevertheless there are enough cases to give a good indication of the principles governing rejection. Such cases fall into three categories:

- a) There are three cases where ASD showed in earlier editions of the Return that it considered a U-boat was “known” yet revised this later in the war;
- b) There are 21 cases where ASD did not ever consider a U-boat was destroyed;
- c) In 13 cases there is no record of the alleged destruction of the U-boat to be found in any edition of the ASD Returns.

The details of the cases mentioned in b) and c) are listed in detail in Appendix 1. It is hoped this may be of interest to other researchers, especially of early aviation which account for eight of the 34 cases relating to air attacks. It is difficult not to be a little suspicious as to the validity of the some of the claims in c), which may have been more speculative than genuine, but the cases in a) and b) have the ring of truth about them.

Cases turned down where a U-boat was “destroyed”

The three cases where a U-boat was at one time considered by ASD to have been destroyed only to be later discounted are worthy of further examination; the details are noted below:

- The claim by H. C. Marshall for the sinking of an enemy submarine on 4 October 1916 while aboard HMS *E43* was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). This incident was originally listed “Known (Probably UB Type)” in the March 1917 edition of the Return (TNA ADM 239/26). But by the time the 1919 List was published this incident is not recorded amongst those relating to the sinking of a U-boat. The Anti-Submarine Division (ASD) must have finally and correctly concluded that no U-boat was sunk at that time.
- A similar outcome followed when HMS *Ambuscade* made a claim for the destruction of a U-boat on 24 April 1917. The claim was ultimately “not allowed” (TNA ADM 12/1623A) even though the incident was originally recorded as “known” in the second quarter 1917 edition of the Return (TNA ADM 239/26). Similar to the case above, ASD must have discovered that in fact, no U-boat was lost at that time and this incident did not appear in the final 1919 List.
- The HMS *Ambuscade* episode also affected a claim made by the RAF. The claim by Major Hallam RAF for the destruction of a German submarine on 24 April 1917. This was also “not allowed” (TNA ADM 12/1639) though it had been originally listed as a “known” kill by seaplane 8655 in conjunction with HMS *Ambuscade*. Of note is the fact that his claim was one of four Hallam submitted. Whereas all four dates correspond to incidents in the Return,

it was only ever in this case that ASD had originally considered that a U-boat was sunk. The other cases were discounted at the time and are dealt with in Appendix 1.

Cases such as these three clearly demonstrate what Clarke had revealed as attacks ASD had accepted yet Room 40 knew to be false. In these cases wartime corrections were eventually made. But it must have been something of a surprise to find that no prize was to be awarded.

In its own technical history (1919, 6), ASD acknowledged that a tension always existed between it and the Fleet which considered ASD's work to be "unduly pessimistic". Indeed, as Clarke's states it was his "none too pleasant task to turn down their claims".

Inconsistencies between the 1919 List and Admiralty Prize Fund Payments

Table 1 shows that there is a strong similarity between the 1919 List and Admiralty prize payments. Of the 93 cases, all but nine correspond. These nine cases are examined in this section. In a further tenth case, the Admiralty paid out to the fund with respect to the destruction of an "Unknown" U-boat by HMS *Medea* on 25 August 1918. This cannot be reconciled to the Returns, the 1919 List or any other archival source examined during the research (TNA 238/2, 124). It remains the only Admiralty payment which cannot be readily tied to the wartime assessments made by ASD, and an explanation, if there is one, is yet to be identified.

Paying the prize for losses attributed to mines

Table 1 shows that in 1919 no less than 38 instances relating to the loss of U-boats were attributed to mines or mine nets. It appears that in the immediate post-war period clarity was sought by some claimants as to the role vessels may have had in contributing to an enemy submarine diving to escape detection, and as a consequence then being destroyed by a minefield or net system into which it had submerged. For example the Admiralty Digest for the years 1919 to 1922 reveals an ongoing case relating to the destruction of *UB53* in the mine nets off Otranto. In this instance the Admiralty ultimately was "*not satisfied that ships took an active part in its destruction. Claims from ships for prize money - officers concerned may take the matter before the Prize Court if they so desire*". It is not known if the case was brought, but certainly the ledger records no payment being made. In reality, the evidence is sufficient to include this case as a claim turned down (TNA ADM 12/1671).

What the Otranto case reveals is that under normal consideration no prize would be expected to be paid when a U-boat succumbed to a mine unless ships "took an active part in its destruction". Table 1 reveals that prize money was in fact paid out in four cases (marked with a single asterisk), which concerned the loss of *UC3* in mine nets and *U109*, *UB31* and *UC78* to mines, where the vessels concerned were credited with an "assist" in the 1919 List.

In the 1916 case of armed sailing smack *Cheero* snagging *UC3* in her mine nets, a fatal detonation followed (TNA ADM 239/26). In the case of *U109* the edition of the Return for the first quarter of 1918 reveals that HM Drifter *Beryl III* opened fire on the U-boat, forcing it to dive to its destruction in the Dover minefield (TNA ADM 239/26, 118). Similarly in the case of *UB31* the edition of the Return for the second quarter of 1918 reveals that HM Drifter *Lord Leitrim* and HM Drifter *Ocean Roamer* dropped depth charges on a periscope and consequently contributed to the destruction of a U-boat in the Dover minefield. On the same date as the *UB31* incident, in the case of *UC78* the edition of the Return for the second quarter of 1918 reveals that HM Drifters *Our Friend*, *Marys* and *BTB* dropped

depth charges in response to a series of mine explosions and consequently presumably hastened the demise of the U-boat as a result (TNA ADM 239/26, 141). It is noted that in WW1 many fishing vessels such as trawlers and drifters were requisitioned and armed by the Royal Navy for a variety of roles including minesweeping and anti-submarine patrolling; and the designation of HM Drifter has been used above.

While all four of these cases show Admiralty payments to the prize fund which are inconsistent with the 1919 List this can be attributed to an administrative oversight, as in each case ASD had acknowledged in the Returns the active participation of the vessels concerned. If a claim for prize money were made, it would have been difficult to refuse.

In the cases, of the destruction of *UB109* off Folkestone and *UB116* in Scapa Flow the U-boats were detected by personnel monitoring the detector belts and the mines were manually detonated ashore when the U-boats were known to be their proximity. The Admiralty Digest for 1920 and 1922 shows that these cases were refused on the grounds that the personnel involved were “*not part of the crew of any HM Ships of War*” (TNA ADM 12/1633).

The first U-boat “reassessments”

Operational intelligence about the movement of U-boats was of course never perfect in wartime. Little of the German side was known other than from the interrogations of the few captured U-boat officers. It was inevitable that almost as soon as the 1919 List went to print errors would be uncovered as new intelligence emerged. The Historical Section of the Admiralty, which is now the Naval Historical Branch (NHB) is known to have been making corrections to the 1919 List shortly after its publication (McCartney 2014, 10-11).

In fact, the process of “reassessment” ultimately became a formal duty carried out by NHB. It employed a clerk for this purpose into the 1990s. In 1999, when the writer raised with NHB inconsistencies with the 1946 List (TNA ADM 199/1789) he was presented with one such formal “reassessment” of the loss of U480 (NHB FDSN1/98). This is understood to be one of the last official reassessments and that practice is now suspended.

Table 1 shows five cases marked with a double asterisk. These are instances where the inconsistencies to the 1919 List reveal the genesis of the reassessments of U-boat losses in practice in the early years of 1919 to 1921.

The destruction of *UC49*

The case of *UC49* reveals a path by which corrections to the 1919 List were made in the immediate post-war years. In this case the 1919 List stated that *UC49* had been sunk on 31 May 1918 in the North Sea by a combination of vessels and an aircraft and full details are given in the relevant Return (TNA 239/26, 148). The reassessment which followed is the best documented, and the earliest example to come to light during research. In the Admiralty Digest for 1919 and 1920 is an entry which states that:

“Claims in respect of German S/M U.C.49 (alleged to have been sunk off Sunderland on May 31st 1918) withdrawn as vessel subsequently proved to have been operating elsewhere on that date” (TNA ADM 12/1639).

The exact reason why the fate of this U-boat was considered different as early as 1919 can be found in the Room 40 file for *UC49*. In a report dated 12 January 1920 it is stated that:

“This S/M was wrongly allotted to HMS LOCUST &c for an attack on 30 & 31/5/18 in the North Sea, but a German Officer informed us that U.C.49 could not have been there and we now have telephone diaries showing that she joined Flanders Flotilla and giving her movements in and out of Zeebrugge and Ostend up to 1st Aug, when she left. There is however, no mention of her return. German list of mines laid by Flanders Flotilla boats shows that the one which was to lay mines off Falmouth and Plymouth did not return and it is this boat which C in C thinks was sunk by OPOSSUM.

I.D.25 B.

12.1.20.” (TNA ADM 137/3918)

The destruction of *UC49* by HMS *Opossum* on 8 August 1918 off Berry Head, Devon has become the accepted fate of this U-boat, being cited in the Official German History (Spindler 1966, 136) and the British account of the U-boat War (Gibson & Prendergast 1931, 318). The official British history (Newbolt 1931, 338) cites the 1919 List, probably because the files readied in 1919 for the publication of the official history were not updated with the newer fate. This case represents an additional case of a claim that was turned down after the war.

The prize journal shows that the Admiralty paid prize money based on the reassessed fate of *UC49*, not the one cited in the 1919 List. In July 1922, in its final tranche of payments, the Admiralty paid prize money to the fund to be paid to HMS *Opossum* (TNA NA 238/2, 209). This instance certainly conforms to Clarke’s comment that Room 40 knew this boat was operational after the date cited for its loss by ASD (note the reassessment report is signed “ID25”, Room 40’s name from 1917) and is perhaps the best documented example in support of what he says.

Incidentally the Admiralty Digest cites a reference number (X 7067) for this case. Despite thorough research with the assistance of William Spencer, Principal Military Specialist at TNA, this record and a further 60 others throughout the Digest 1918-1927 pertinent to this paper could not be located in the TNA catalogue and are thus presumed lost or destroyed. It was a matter of coincidence that the details of this important case came to light in files from earlier research into it.

The cases of *UC7* and *UC10*

The 1919 List shows that *UC7* was sunk by HMS *E54* on 21 August 1916 and that *UC10* was sunk by the HM Motor Boat *Salmon* on 6 July 1916. Both cases feature in the first edition of the Return and were not subsequently subjected to amendment by ASD (TNA 239/26). However, when prize payments were made to the fund, the fates of the two U-boats had been reversed, so that *Salmon* had sunk *UC7* and HMS *E54* *UC10* (TNA ADM 238/2, 119,142). Although this could have been a clerical error, the fact that payments were made several months apart required investigation.

The Room 40 record sheets for both boats were consulted and the only evidence to emerge is that the fate of *UC10* (to MB *Salmon*) had been crossed out in pencil at some point (TNA ADM 137/3918). By 1931 the fates of both U-boats are shown as being reversed. In Gibson & Prendergast (1931, 104 & 117) the fates are adjusted and a note states that the fate of *UC10* had been “subsequently ascertained”. The authors certainly had access to Admiralty files, as seen in the case of *UC49* and it is

fair to conclude that the loss of both U-boats had also been early post-war reassessments by ID25, (possibly by Clarke) and that they occurred some months before the prize payments were made. The movements of the Flanders Flotilla U-boats were particularly hard to track, as described below.

The cases of UC79 and UB54

Finally are two similar cases. According to the 1919 List on 19 October 1917 HMS *E45* sunk *UC79* and on 11 March 1918 HMS *Sturgeon* sunk *UB54* (TNA 239/26). But notably in July 1919 the Admiralty paid prize money to HMS *E45* for the incident stated in the 1919 List, but the enemy submarine is listed as “Unknown”. In May 1921 HMS *Sturgeon* was also credited in the same way.

In the Room 40 history sheet for *UC79* is a page of comments clearly showing Room 40 thought it was still operational in April 1918 (TNA ADM 137/3918). There is no evidence that an alternative fate for *UC79* could be found. One could speculate that a compromise was reached whereby HMS *E45* received prize money for a successful attack on an “Unknown” enemy submarine. As described in McCartney (2014 & 2015a) the HMS *E45*'s attack as reported is so implausible that when benchmarked against ASD's own assessment criteria it is somewhat surprising it was allowed to stand.

The Room 40 history sheet for *UB54* also has several notes in pencil which could indicate a degree of uncertainty as to the fate of this boat. Even in 1931 an alternative fate was being promulgated (TNA ADM 137/3916). So as with the former case, prize money was paid because an alternative fate for *UB54* could be not ascertained at the time prize claims were being assessed and the attack by HMS *Sturgeon* was considered to have resulted in a U-boat destroyed.

The Flanders Flotilla

All of the five cases examined above involved U-boats which were operating as part of the Flanders Flotilla when they were sunk. This is not too surprising because this unit of the German Navy had instituted a strict policy of radio silence of its boats at sea. This rendered extremely difficult any attempts by NID at tracking the movements of the boats by direction-finding or cryptographic means. The extent to which was the case is analysed in detail in McCartney (2014). It is no surprise therefore to see that additional information relating to the movements of *UC49* came from a surviving German officer and the flotilla telephone directory and not from a re-examination of signals intelligence. Where studied, it is found that many of the discrepancies between the archaeological record and the 1919 List are due to problems encountered in tracking the Flanders Flotilla (McCartney 2014).

Conclusions

A detailed comparison between the 1919 List and the Admiralty prize journal reveals a remarkable level of consistency between them. In total 134 cases were examined. 93 conform to the 1919 List and the others all have valid explanations for being “not allowed”. In only one case (*UC49*) was the refusal of payment in direct conflict with the 1919 List, although others had been subjected to adjustment.

As Table 1 shows, once the cases refused are eliminated, the two sources of data dovetail together perfectly. This confirms that when Clarke (and possibly others) validated claims for prize bounty it was the ASD output in the form of the Returns and the 1919 list, supported when needed by further analysis in the form of ongoing reassessments, which informed the choices made.

So where does this leave Clarke's comments which initially sparked the idea behind this paper? The evidence does show that ASD did make claims for U-boats destroyed which it later had to amend when faced with additional evidence. These are the cases where Clarke had his "none too pleasant task to turn down their claims". Even though some cases (such as *UC79*) appear almost wilfully erroneous, the evidence from this research suggests that in fact this is the exception, rather than the rule. We see in the case of *UC79* that it was already subject to revision by the time prize was paid to HMS *E45*.

It is not really anything more than a matter of speculation as to whether fates were to "boost their own efforts", as Clarke suggests. Thus instead of initially appearing as a criticism of ASD it could be argued that Clarke was being sympathetic to the difficulties ASD faced when analysing U-boat losses during the war; a subject that he, perhaps more than anyone, had come to truly understand when he wrote his comments in the 1950s.

It is easy to overlook that in 1917 ASD was pioneering a new type of scientific undersea warfare. Under the circumstances it is perhaps unfair to be too critical of its work when seen in this historical context.

Appendix 1: Cases Turned Down for Prize Payment which were not considered "Known" losses.

Cases listed in the 1919 List which did not result in the destruction of a U-boat.

Made at the same time as the claim mentioned in the above section, H.C. Marshall also claimed for the destruction of a submarine by HMS *J2* on 7 July 1917, it was "not approved" (TNA ADM 12/1623A). The incident was originally listed in the Return as "Probably Sunk" and not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26).

Made at the same time as the claim mentioned above, Maj. Hallam RAF also claimed the destruction of U-boats on 30 April, 19 May and 3 September 1917. All claims were "not allowed" (TNA ADM 12/1639). All four dates correspond to air attacks listed in the Return, although it is not confirmed that they relate to the ones in the claim. However the fact that all four match recorded events in the Returns suggests that it is not mere coincidence. These three cases are as "Possible", "Improbable" and "Probably Seriously Damaged" and were not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claim by HMS *G8* for the sinking of a submarine on 23 July 1917. The claim was "not allowed" as the "enemy S/M is not considered to have been destroyed" (TNA ADM 12/1607A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as "Probably Sunk" and not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claim by HMS *Landrail* for the sinking of a submarine on 13 Dec 1916 was "not approved" (TNA ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as "Possible" and not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claim by HMS *Patriot* for the sinking of a submarine on 11 Sep 1916 was "not approved" (TNA ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as "Possible" and not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claim by HMS *Tamarisk* (Q11) for the sinking of a submarine on 7 May 1917 was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Possible” and not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claim by Armed Trawler *Urana* for the sinking of a submarine on 21 June 1915 was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Probable” and not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claim by HMS *Aubretia* (Q13) for the sinking of a submarine on 12 January 1917 was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Improbable” and not subsequently adjusted. A note shows that the Germans reported the U-boat escaped the attack (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claims for the destruction of two submarines by aircraft on 23 April and 12 August 1918 by Capt. Boothe and Sgt Day “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). Only the latter date is mentioned in the Return as “Probably Seriously Damaged” (if it is the reported incident) and it was not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claim by HMS *Paxton* (Q25) for the sinking of a submarine on 30 March 1917 was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Improbable” and not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claim by HMS *E50* for the sinking of a submarine on 29 April 1917 was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Improbable” and not subsequently adjusted. A note shows that from German sources the U-boat was known to have survived the underwater collision with *E50* (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claim by HMS *TB86* for the sinking of a submarine on 6 February 1917 was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Possible” and not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claims by Maj. Waugh RAF for 3 U-boat kills on 18 October and 11 November 1917 and on 25 June 1918 were “not allowed” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). Two of the three dates coalesce with air attacks in the Return which did not cause losses (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claim by HMS *Tamarisk* (Q11) for the destruction of a submarine on 1 December 1916 was “not allowed” (TNA ADM 12/1639). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Probable” and not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26).

Claim in relation of the late Lieut. Cdr. Shaw in respect of the destruction of an enemy submarine by HMS *Sylvia* in May 1917 was “not allowed” (TNA ADM 12/1639). This is probably related to the incident listed in the Return on 20 May 1917 as “Improbable” with a note saying the German press reported the safe arrival to base of the submarine (TNA ADM 239/26).

Other cases not cited in the 1919 List

Claim by Lieut G.N. Jones DSO RNR of HMS *Sprightly* for the sinking of a U-boat on 6 April 1917 was “not allowed”. No reason is given (TNA ADM 12/1607A).

Lieut. E. J. Addis RAF for attacks on enemy submarines on “various dates” was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A).

Claim for the destruction of a German submarine by aircraft on 20 and 23 April (no year) by Maj. P. L. Holmes was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). Absence of a year in the dates given means this report cannot be accurately attributed.

Claim for the sinking of a German submarine on 1 February 1915. Report by Col. Samson DSO was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A).

Enquiry as to result of attack by Flying Boat *N4247* on an enemy submarine on 20 May 1918. Also as to an attack by Maj. (unreadable), RAF on 20 February 1918. Also as to attack by DH9 B7642 on 9 May 1918. Claims were “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A).

Claim by Lieut. Willows RAF for the destruction of a submarine on 14 June 1918 was “not allowed” (TNA ADM 12/1623A).

Claim by HMS *Harrier* for the sinking of a U-boat on 24 April 1917 was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A).

Claim by Lieut. Cdr. Stone of HMS *M18* for sinking a U-boat off the Struma River on 3 August 1916 was turned down because “Admiralty do not consider that S/M was sunk” (TNA ADM 12/1639).

Claim by E Lewis of HMS *Q20* for the sinking of a U-boat on 12 March 1916 was “not approved as there is no record of loss of German S/M at that date” (TNA ADM 12/1639).

Claim by Lieut. Mayer RAF for sinking a submarine on 18 August 1918 “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1639). On this date the minelayer *UC70* was sunk by a combination of Aeroplane *BK9983* and HMS *Ouse* (TNA ADM 239/26). The fact that this claim was not approved means that the claimant was most likely referring to another incident, was not sufficiently engaged to warrant payment or had payment denied for disciplinary reasons. In August 1920 the Admiralty paid out on the destruction of *UC70* to both plane and aircraft (TNA ADM 238/2). Clearly Mayer was not a recipient of a prize payment.

References

Beesly, P., 1982. *Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-18*. London: Hamish Hamilton.

Chatterton, E., K., 1923. *The Auxiliary Patrol*. London: Sidgwick and Jackson.

Churchill Archives Centre, (various dates). *The Papers of William F Clarke GBR/0014/CLKE*. Cambridge: Churchill Archives Centre.

Clarke, W., F., 1988. The Years Between. *Cryptologia* Volume 12 No. 1.

Gibson, R. H., and Prendergast, M., 1931. *The German Submarine War 1914-1918*. London: John Constable Ltd.

McCartney, I., 2014. *The Maritime Archaeology of a Modern Conflict: Comparing the Archaeology of German Submarine Wrecks to the Historical Text*. New York, Routledge.

McCartney, I., 2015a. The Historical Archaeology of WW1 U-boat Wrecks and the Compilation of Admiralty History: The Case of (UC79). *Underwater Cultural Heritage from World War I: Proceedings of the UNESCO Scientific Conference on the Occasion of the Centenary of World War I*. Bruges, Belgium, 26 & 27 June 2014.

McCartney, I., 2015b. The "Tin Openers" Myth and Reality: Intelligence from U-boat Wrecks During WW1. *Proceedings of the 24th Annual Conference of the Historical Diving Society*. Poole, UK.

Newbolt, H., 1931. *Naval Operations Vol. V*. London: Longmans, Green & Co.

Technical History Section Admiralty, 1919. *The Antisubmarine Division of the Naval Staff December 1916 – November 1918*. C.B.1515(7). Portsmouth.

The National Archives (various dates). *Prize Courts - Rules for regulating procedure and practice*. ADM 1/8394/320. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1915*. ADM 12/1539A. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1915*. ADM 12/1545A. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1916*. ADM 12/1561A. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1916*. ADM 12/1567A. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1917*. ADM 12/1582A. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1917*. ADM 12/1587B. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1918* ADM 12/1603B. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1918* ADM 12/1607A. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1919* ADM 12/1617B. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1919* ADM 12/1623A. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1920* ADM 12/1633. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1920* ADM 12/1639. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1921* ADM 12/1649. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1921* ADM 12/1654. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1922* ADM 12/1665. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1922* ADM 12/1671. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1923-26* ADM 12/1681. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1923-26* ADM 12/1687. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1927-29* ADM 12/1697. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1927-29 ADM 12/1703*. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1930-32 ADM 12/1705*. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1930-32 ADM 12/1711*. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1933-34 ADM 12/1715*. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1933-34 ADM 12/1719*. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1935-36 ADM 12/1722*. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Digest 1935-36 ADM 12/1726*. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Prize Money Distribution 1914-1919 ADM 116/1319C*. London.

National Archives (various dates). *Original history sheets of UB type German submarines, UB1-UB73. ADM 137/3916*. London.

National Archives (various dates). *Original history sheets of UC type German submarines, UC1-UC105. ADM 137/3918*. London.

National Archives (various dates). *Director of Torpedo, Antisubmarine and Mine Warfare Division: U-boats sunk or damaged and US Fleet Antisubmarine Bulletins, ADM 199/1789*. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Admiralty Prize Branch Journal April 1915 to March 1935. ADM 238/2*. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *Reported destruction of submarines Aug. 1914 to Jan. 1919. ADM 239/26*. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *William F. Clarke OBE Service Record to 1919 ADM 337/118*. London.

The National Archives (various dates). *W. F. Clarke. History of GCCS and its Naval Section, 1919-1945. HW 3/16*. London.

Naval Historical Branch, (various dates). Foreign Documents Section Files, *The Last Patrol of U480, FDSN1/98*. Portsmouth: Naval Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence.

Spindler, A., 1966. *Der Handelskrieg mit U-Booten 1918*. Berlin: Verlag von Mittler.

Acknowledgements

Michael Lowrey reading and advice, Richard Dunley and William Spencer at TNA who guided me to records I was previously unfamiliar with.

Figures:



Figure 1. Paymaster Lieutenant-Commander William F. Clarke RNVR. Intelligence Officer in Room 40 from 1916. Re-employed post war into the GC&CS, he was the co-author of the Admiralty's unpublished three-volume history of the German Navy. During this time he also validated prize claims for U-boats destroyed (Churchill Archives Centre).

Tables:

Table 1: Table of U-boats listed destroyed as per the 1919 List and those upon which a prize payment was made.

Boat	1919 List Fate	Where	Date	Prize	Date
U5	Mine	Zeebrugge	Dec-14	N/A	
U6	HMS E16	5910n 0509e	15/09/1915	Yes	Aug-19
U7	Torpedoed by U-boat	North Sea	Jan-15	N/A	

U8	HMS Gurkha	5056n 0509e	04/03/1915	Yes	Feb-20
U10	Mine	5126n 0250e	May-16	N/A	
U11	Mine	Zeebrugge	Dec-14	N/A	
U12	HMS Ariel	Firth of Forth	10/03/1915	Yes	Feb-20
U13	Mine	Heliogland	12/09/1914	N/A	
U14	HMS Hawk	Peterhead	05/06/1915	Yes	Nov-20
U15	HMS Birmingham	5835n 0156e	09/08/1914	Yes	Aug-19
U18	HM Dorothy Gray	5841n 0255w	23/11/1914	Yes	Jul-21
U20	Stranded	Jutland	04/11/1916	N/A	
U23	HMS C27	Fair Island	20/07/1915	Yes	Jan-21
U26	Unknown	Baltic	Aug-15	N/A	
U27	HMS Baralong	5043n 0722w	19/08/1915	Yes	Feb-20
U28	Accident	7234n 2756e	02/09/1917	N/A	
U29	HMS Dreadnought	Moray Firth	18/03/1915	Yes	Aug-20
U31	Unknown	Unknown	Jan-15	N/A	
U32	HMS Wallflower	3607n 1328e	08/05/1918	Yes	Feb-20
U34	HMS Privet	3556n 0525w	09/11/1918	Yes	Mar-21
U36	HMS Prince Charles	5907n 0530w	24/07/1915	Yes	Jul-20
U37	Unknown	North Sea	Jun-15	N/A	
U39	Interned	Cartagena	18/05/1918	N/A	
U40	HMS C24	Aberdeen	23/06/1915	Yes	Oct-20
U41	HMS Baralong	4910n 0723w	24/09/1915	Yes	Feb-20
U44	HMS Oracle	5851n 0420e	12/08/1917	Yes	Feb-20
U45	HMS D7	5548n 0730w	12/09/1917	Yes	Feb-20
U48	Dover HMDs	5117n 0131e	24/11/1917	Yes	Mar-20
U49	SS British Transport	4617n 1442w	11/09/1917	N/A	
U50	HS Operations	North Sea	1-11 Oct 1917	N/A	
U51	HMS H5	5355n 0753e	14/07/1916	Yes	Sep-19
U56	Russian Patrol Vessels	7020n 3100e	02/11/1916	N/A	
U58	USS Fanning	5137n 0812w	17/11/1917	N/A	
U59	Mine	Heligoland	14/05/1917	N/A	
U61	HMS P51	5148n 0552w	26/03/1918	Yes	Jun-21
U64	HMS Lychnis	3807n 1027e	17/06/1918	Yes	Apr-21
U66	HS Operations	North Sea	1-11 Oct 1917	N/A	
U68	HMS Farnborough	5154n 1053w	22/03/1916	Yes	Feb-20
U69	HMS Patriot	6023n 0132e	12/07/1917	Yes	Nov-19
U74	HMT Searanger	5710n 0120e	27/05/1916	Yes	Mar-21
U75	Mine	5359n 0524e	10/12/1917	N/A	
U76	Russian armed trawlers	Hammerfest	26/01/1917	N/A	
U77	Unknown	North Sea	07/07/1916	N/A	
U78	HMS G2	5602n 0508e	28/10/1918	Yes	Aug-19
U81	HMS E54	5100n 1300w	01/05/1917	Yes	May-20
U83	HMS Q5	5134n 1123w	17/02/1917	Yes	Feb-20
U84	HMS P62	5153n 0544w	26/01/1918	Yes	Jan-21
U85	HMS Q19	4952n 0320w	12/03/1917	Yes	Aug-21
U87	HMS P56	5256n 0507w	25/12/1917	Yes	May-21
U88	HMS Stonecrop	4942n 1318w	17/09/1917	Yes	Dec-21
U89	HMS Roxburgh	5538n 0732w	13/02/1918	Yes	Sep-19
U92	Mine	Northern Barrage (Area B)	09/09/1918	N/A	
U93	SS Braeneil	4935n 0512w	07/01/1918	N/A	
U95	Unknown	Unknown	Jan-18	N/A	
U99	SS Valeria	5220n 1228w	20/06/1917	N/A	
U102	Mine	Prob. Northern Barrage (Area B)	Sep-18	N/A	
U103	SS Olympic	4916n 0451w	12/05/1918	N/A	
U104	HMS Jessamine	5159n 0626w	25/04/1918	Yes	Aug-19
U106	HS Operations	North Sea	5-9 Oct 1917	N/A	
U109	Mine *	5053n 0131e	26/01/1918	N/A	Aug-20
U110	HMS Michael	5549n 0806w	15/03/1918	Yes	May-20
U154	HMS E35	3645n 1200w	11/05/1918	Yes	May-20
U156	Mine	Northern Barrage (Area A)	25/09/1918	N/A	
UB1	Unknown	Mediterranean	Aug-15	N/A	
UB3	Gleaner of Sea	5131n 0250e	24/04/1916	Yes	Jul-21

UB4	HM Decoy G and E	5239n 0217e	11/08/1915	Yes	Mar-23
UB6	Interned	Maas	13/03/1917	N/A	
UB7	Unknown	Black Sea	Oct-16	N/A	
UB12	Mine	South North Sea	Aug-18	N/A	
UB13	Unknown	Unknown	Mar-16	N/A	
UB15	Unknown	Mediterranean	May-16	N/A	
UB16	HMS E34	5206n 0201e	10/05/1918	Yes	Mar-19
UB17	HMS Onslow	5000n 0225w	25/02/1918	Yes	Jun-22
UB18	Mine	5008n 0342w	17/11/1917	N/A	
UB19	HMS Q7	4956n 0245w	30/11/1916	Yes	Sep-19
UB20	SP 8676, 8662	5207n 0227e	29/07/1917	Yes	Mar-20
UB22	Mine	North Sea	19/01/1918	N/A	
UB23	Interned	Corunna	29/07/1917	N/A	
UB26	Drifter & French TB	Le Havre	05/04/1916	N/A	
UB27	HMS Halcyon	5247n 0224e	29/07/1917	Yes	Jan-21
UB29	HMS Ariel	4941n 0630w	06/12/1916	Yes	Aug-19
UB30	John Gillman	5432n 0035w	13/08/1918	N/A	
UB31	Mine *	5101n 0116e	02/05/1918	N/A	Jun-21
UB32	SP 9860	4958n 0138w	18/08/1917	Yes	Aug-19
UB33	Mine	5056n 0117e	11/04/1918	N/A	
UB35	HMS Leven	5103n 0146e	26/01/1918	Yes	Dec-19
UB36	Unknown	Unknown	Jun-17	N/A	
UB37	HMS Q7	5007n 0147w	14/01/1917	Yes	Sep-19
UB38	Mine	5056n 0125e	08/02/1918	N/A	
UB39	HMS Glen	5005n 0125w	17/05/1917	Yes	Jul-21
UB41	Explosion	Scarborough	05/10/1917	N/A	
UB44	HMD Quarry Knowe	4012n 1846e	30/07/1916	Yes	May-21
UB45	Accident	Black Sea	30/10/1916	N/A	
UB46	Mine	Dardanelles	16/12/1916	N/A	
UB52	HMS H4	4146n 1835e	23/05/1918	Yes	Sep-19
UB53	Mine nets	3958n 1901e	03/08/1918	N/A	
UB54	HMS Sturgeon etc. **	5307n 0243e	11/03/1918	Yes	May-21
UB55	Mine	5101n 0120e	22/04/1918	N/A	
UB56	Mine	5058n 0121e	19/12/1917	N/A	
UB57	Mine	Zeebrugge	14/08/1918	N/A	
UB58	Mine	5058n 0114e	10/03/1918	N/A	
UB61	Mine	5325n 0458e	29/11/1917	N/A	
UB63	HMTs WS Bailey & Fort George	5617n 0225w	28/01/1918	Yes	Jul-21
UB65	Accident	5107n 0942w	10/07/1918	N/A	
UB66	HMS Campanula	3535n 1439e	18/01/1918	Yes	Mar-23
UB68	HMS Snapdragon	3556n 1620e	04/10/1918	Yes	Sep-19
UB69	HMS Cyclamen	3730n 1038e	08/01/1918	Yes	May-20
UB70	HMS Basilisk & Lydonia	3808n 0302e	08/05/1918	Yes	Oct-20
UB71	ML413	3558n 0518w	21/04/1918	Yes	May-21
UB72	HMS D4	5008n 0241w	12/05/1918	Yes	May-20
UB74	HMY Lorna	5032n 0232w	26/05/1918	Yes	Oct-20
UB75	Mine nets	Flamborough Head	10/12/1917	N/A	
UB78	SS Queen Alexandria	4950n 0140w	09/05/1918	N/A	
UB81	Mine	5027n 0053w	02/12/1917	N/A	
UB82	HMDs Pilot Me & Young Fred	5513n 0515w	17/04/1918	Yes	Dec-21
UB83	HMS Ophelia	5828n 0150w	10/09/1918	Yes	Feb-20
UB85	HMD Coreopsis	5447n 0527w	30/04/1918	Yes	Aug-21
UB90	HMS L12	5757n 1027e	16/10/1918	Yes	Aug-19
UB103	Mine	5052n 0127e	16/09/1918	N/A	
UB104	Mine	Northern Barrage (Area B)	19/09/1918	N/A	
UB107	HMT Calvia etc.	5424n 0024w	27/07/1918	Yes	May-21
UB108	Unknown	Unknown	Jul-18	N/A	
UB109	Mine	5108n 0114e	29/08/1918	N/A	
UB110	ML263 and Garry	5439n 0054w	19/07/1918	Yes	Aug-19
UB113	Unknown	Probably North Sea	Sep-18	N/A	
UB115	HMS Ouse & Star etc.	5512n 0122w	29/09/1918	Yes	May-20
UB116	Mine	5850n 0304w	28/10/1918	N/A	

UB119	Unknown	Unknown	May-18	N/A	
UB123	Mine	Northern Barrage (Area A)	19/10/1918	N/A	
UB124	HMS Marne	5543n 0751w	20/07/1918	Yes	Apr-21
UB127	Mine	Prob. Northern Barrage (Area B)	Sep-18	N/A	
UC1	SP 8689	5200n 0236e	24/07/1917	Yes	Apr-21
UC2	SS Cottingham	Yarmouth	02/07/1915	N/A	
UC3	Mine nets *	5242n 0224e	23/04/1916	N/A	Mar-23
UC5	Stranded	Shipwash	27/04/1916	N/A	Feb-20
UC6	SP 8676	5137n 0251e	28/09/1917	Yes	May-20
UC7	HMS E54 **	5145n 0320e	21/08/1916	Yes	Feb-21
UC8	Interned	Terschelling	04/11/1915	N/A	
UC9	Own Mines	South North Sea	Oct-15	N/A	
UC10	MB Salmon **	5215n 0154e	06/07/1916	Yes	May-20
UC11	Mine	5155n 0141e	26/06/1918	N/A	
UC12	Own Mines	Taranto	17/03/1916	N/A	
UC13	Unknown	Mediterranean	Nov-16	N/A	
UC14	Mine	Zeebrugge	Oct-17	N/A	
UC15	Unknown	Black Sea	Nov-16	N/A	
UC16	HMS Melampus	5024n 0030w	23/10/1917	Yes	Aug-19
UC18	HMS Medea	5438n 0055w	12/03/1917	Yes	Jul-20
UC19	HMS Llewellyn	5108n 0140e	04/12/1916	Yes	Nov-19
UC21	Mine nets	5130n 0134e	27/09/1917	N/A	
UC24	French S/M Circe	Cattaro	24/05/1917	N/A	
UC26	HMS Milne	5103n 0140e	09/05/1917	Yes	Aug-19
UC29	HMS Pargust	5147n 1140w	07/06/1917	Yes	Feb-20
UC30	Mine	North Sea	19/04/1917	N/A	
UC32	Own Mines	Sunderland	23/02/1917	N/A	
UC33	HMS P61	5155n 0614w	26/09/1917	Yes	May-22
UC35	Fr Patrol Vessel Ailly	3948n 0742e	16/05/1918	N/A	
UC36	SP 8663	5212n 0300e	20/05/1917	Yes	Aug-19
UC38	French DDs	3832n 2034e	14/12/1917	N/A	
UC39	HMS Thrasher	5403n 0002e	08/02/1917	Yes	Jul-20
UC41	HMT Jacinth	Tay	21/08/1917	Yes	May-21
UC42	Own Mines	5141n 0814w	10/09/1917	N/A	
UC43	HMS G13	6057n 0111w	10/03/1917	Yes	Aug-19
UC44	Own Mines	Waterford	04/08/1917	N/A	Aug-19
UC46	HMS Liberty	5107n 0139e	08/02/1917	Yes	Nov-19
UC47	HMS P57	5401n 0022e	18/11/1917	Yes	Sep-19
UC48	Interned	Ferrol	23/03/1918	N/A	
UC49	HMS Locust etc. **	5448n 0106w	31/05/1918	Yes	Jul-22
UC50	HMS Zubian	5047n 0059e	04/02/1918	Yes	Nov-19
UC51	HMS Firedrake	5210n 0230e	13/11/1917	Yes	Jul-19
UC55	HMS Sylvia & Tirade	6008n 0100w	29/09/1917	Yes	Mar-20
UC56	Interned	Santander	24/05/1918	N/A	
UC57	Unknown	Baltic	19-22 Nov 1917	N/A	
UC61	Stranded	Gris Nez	26/07/1917	N/A	
UC62	Unknown	North Sea	Oct-17	N/A	
UC63	HMS E52	5123n 0200e	01/11/1917	Yes	Jul-19
UC64	Mine	5058n 0123e	20/06/1918	N/A	
UC65	HMS C15	5028n 0017e	03/11/1917	Yes	May-20
UC66	HMT Sea King	4956n 0510w	12/06/1917	Yes	Mar-21
UC68	HMS C7	5142n 0317e	05/04/1917	Yes	Aug-19
UC69	Collision U96	Barfleur	06/12/1917	N/A	
UC70	BK 9983 & HMS Ouse	5431n 0040w	28/08/1918	Yes	Aug-20
UC72	SP 8695	5145n 0205e	22/09/1917	Yes	Dec-19
UC75	HMS Fairy	5357n 0009e	31/05/1918	Yes	Feb-20
UC77	Kessingland & Golden Gain	5101n 0119e	10/07/1918	N/A	
UC78	Mine *	5056n 0123e	02/05/1918	N/A	Apr-21
UC79	HMS E45 **	5216n 0246e	19/10/1917	Yes	Jul-19

An additional payment was made to HMS *Medea* for the destruction of an "Unknown" on 28 Aug 1918. This cannot be reconciled to the 1919 List.

*Cases where prize was paid related to incidents ascribed to mines in the 1919 List.

** Cases which do not conform to the 1919 List.