Multiracial Identity and Racial Consciousness: The Problem of an Unencumbered Self

Persons with multiracial identity are now the fastest growing minority group in both the United States and Britain. As the push to acknowledge, express and celebrate multiracial identities intensifies, the ontological status, meaning of multiracial identities and their relationship to monoracial identities is of increasing importance to our understanding of race relations in both countries. The dilemma that philosophers of race are confronted with is how to identify those persons impacted by racisms without reifying the concept of race and/or falling foul of presenting essentialized group categories. Models that seek to grapple with these ethical problems are typically, if not surprisingly, undergirded by an unencumbered liberal framework that prioritises freedom and equality. The unencumbered conception of the self is historically, socially and morally disconnected such that one’s identity can be separated from one’s values. However, I argue that there is a racial consciousness that constitutes social reality in the United States and Britain and impacts the lived experience. This renders unencumbered models of moral reasoning untenable. Rejecting the unencumbered self, I consider multiracial identity from an encumbered ontological perspective, which posits the evaluation and articulation of identity as constitutive of the self and social reality. This model requires us to address the moral content of racial identities imbedded in the racial consciousness and allows us to consider racial identities, not as proxies for moral commitments but rather as part of a multi-layered process in which a person’s racial identity is both a reflection of and a significant factor in shaping a person’s moral commitments. In light of this, I explore a selection of models of collective responsibility. I claim that in a society with racial consciousness, collective responsibility is best described and understood within the framework of an encumbered conception of the self. Ultimately, I contend that if we are to tackle racial injustice, we must revisit our understanding of moral reasoning as rational, objective and fundamentally unencumbered

Implicit bias, (global) white ignorance, and bad faith: The problem of whiteness and anti‐black racism

In Britain, policy-makers tend to view racism as a social attitude rather than an institutional/structural phenomenon. Not until the publication of the MacPherson Report (1999) was the idea of ‘institutional racism’ officially recognised. According to Jules Holroyd, implicit bias as a concept can help us understand and combat the kind of unwitting prejudice the Macpherson report describes. This article explores whether implicit bias is indeed a viable framework for understanding institutional/structural racism. To do so, I bring together Charles Mills’ notion of ‘global white ignorance’ and Lewis Gordon's interpretation of ‘bad faith’. Through Mills’ and Gordon's analyses, which together illuminate both the structural and psychic dimensions of racism I offer an account of the psychodynamics of racism far more consistent with our observations of how racism actually operates in Britain. Specifically, we see that institutional/structural racism is neither unconscious nor is it unmotivated as implicit bias would suggest. As such, I reject implicit bias as a useful or necessary explanatory framework for helping us understand institutional racism as a structural phenomenon