Incoherent and Coherent Eavesdropping in the 6-state Protocol of Quantum Cryptography

All incoherent as well as 2- and 3-qubit coherent eavesdropping strategies on the 6 state protocol of quantum cryptography are classified. For a disturbance of 1/6, the optimal incoherent eavesdropping strategy reduces to the universal quantum cloning machine. Coherent eavesdropping cannot increase Eve's Shannon information, neither on the entire string of bits, nor on the set of bits received undisturbed by Bob. However, coherent eavesdropping can increase as well Eve's Renyi information as her probability of guessing correctly all bits. The case that Eve delays the measurement of her probe until after the public discussion on error correction and privacy amplification is also considered. It is argued that by doing so, Eve gains only a negligibly small additional information.Comment: 17 pages, 4 figures: Updated version, discussion on error correction and privacy amplification adde

Dynamical CPA approach to an itinerant fermionic spin glass model

We study a fermionic version of the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model including nearest-neighbor hopping on a $\infty$-dimensional simple cubic lattices. The problem is reduced to one of free fermions moving in a dynamical effective random medium. By means of a CPA method we derive a set of self-consistency equations for the spin glass order parameter and for the Fourier components of the local spin susceptibility. In order to solve these equations numerically we employ an approximation scheme which restricts the dynamics to a feasible number of the leading Fourier components. From a sequence of systematically improved dynamical approximations we estimate the location of the quantum critical point.Comment: 9 pages, 6 figures, revised versio

Reply To "Comment on 'Quantum String Seal Is Insecure' "

In Phys. Rev. A. 76, 056301 (2007), He claimed that the proof in my earlier paper [Phys. Rev. A 75, 012327 (2007)] is insufficient to conclude the insecurity of all quantum string seals because my measurement strategy cannot obtain non-trivial information on the sealed string and escape detection at the same time. Here, I clarify that our disagreement comes from our adoption of two different criteria on the minimum amount of information a quantum string seal can reveal to members of the public. I also point out that He did not follow my measurement strategy correctly.Comment: 2 page

Insecurity Of Imperfect Quantum Bit Seal

Quantum bit seal is a way to encode a classical bit quantum mechanically so that everyone can obtain non-zero information on the value of the bit. Moreover, such an attempt should have a high chance of being detected by an authorized verifier. Surely, a reader looks for a way to get the maximum amount of information on the sealed bit and at the same time to minimize her chance of being caught. And a verifier picks a sealing scheme that maximizes his chance of detecting any measurement of the sealed bit. Here, I report a strategy that passes all measurement detection procedures at least half of the time for all quantum bit sealing schemes. This strategy also minimizes a reader's chance of being caught under a certain scheme. In this way, I extend the result of Bechmann-Pasquinucci et al. by proving that quantum seal is insecure in the case of imperfect sealed bit recovery.Comment: 4 pages, title changed to better reflect what is exactly proven, to appear in Phys.Lett.