La morale n'est pas le social

Cet article s'appuie sur une synthèse des recherches contemporaines en psychologie pour montrer que les normes morales ne se confondent pas avec les normes sociales. Les situations morales - situations dans lesquelles l'intérêt individuel et l'intérêt collectif s'opposent - présentent un problème spécifique. A la différence des primates qui ne semblent pas coopérer collectivement, les humains ont résolu ce problème non pas par l'altruisme mais en s'aidant de leurs nouvelles capacités cognitives pour construire des institutions mutuellement profitables et culturellement variables. Une disposition morale permet aux humains de gérer ces situations, c'est-à-dire d'afficher leur adhésion aux institutions en ayant au niveau du vécu psychologique d'authentiques préoccupations morales tout en préservant leurs intérêts au niveau individuel. L'existence d'une disposition morale explique également que les normes morales ne s'imposent pas aux individus, en particuliers aux enfants, mais sont évaluées en fonction de critères spécifiques, notamment de justice

Cultural Norms: Transmitted Behaviors or Adaptive Responses?

Economic game experiments have become a prominent method among social scientists developing and testing theories of cooperation. These games provide a valuable opportunity to generate measures of cooperation that can be compared from one place to the next, yet challenges remain in how to interpret cross-cultural differences in these experiments and connect them to cooperation in naturally occurring contexts. I address these challenges by examining framing effects in public goods games (PGGs) with salmon fishers and reindeer herders in Kamchatka, Russia. Combining standard versions of the game with versions that refer to post-Soviet institutions coordinating fishing and herding, I show that (1) average contributions in the PGG in Kamchatka are substantially higher than reported elsewhere and (2) framing the PGG alters the relationship between contributions and expectations, shifting strategies away from unconditional generosity and toward conditional cooperation. My analysis, by synthesizing quantitative analysis of PGG data with long-term qualitative ethnography, including extensive postgame interviews with participants, supports the notion that cooperation in economic games increases along with cultural norms, values, and institutions that emerge from economic interdependence. Framing effects suggest that researchers should devote more attention to investigating the relationship between contributions and expectations

The Restorative Logic of Punishment: Another Argument in Favor of Weak Selection

Strong reciprocity theorists claim that punishment has evolved to promote the good of the group and to deter cheating. By contrast, weak reciprocity suggests that punishment aims to restore justice (i.e., reciprocity) between the criminal and his victim. Experimental evidences as well as field observations suggest that humans punish criminals to restore fairness rather than to support group cooperatio

What Goes Around Comes Around: The Evolutionary Roots of the Belief in Immanent Justice

The belief in immanent justice is the expectation that the universe is designed to ensure that evil is punished and virtue rewarded. What makes this belief so ‘natural’? Here, we suggest that this intuition of immanent justice derives from our evolved sense of fairness. In cases where a misdeed is followed by a misfortune, our sense of fairness construes the misfortune as a way to compensate for the misdeed. To test this hypothesis, we designed a set of studies in which we show that people who do not believe in immanent justice are nonetheless implicitly influenced by intuitions of immanent justice. Strikingly, this effect disappears when the misfortune is disproportionate compared to the misdeed: In this case, justice is not restored and participants lose the intuition of immanent justice. Following recent theories of religion, we suggest that this intuition contributes to the cultural success of beliefs in immanent justice

A Mutualistic Approach to Morality: The Evolution of Fairness by Partner Choice

What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate “how” question or as an ultimate “why” question. The “how” question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The “why” question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. We develop an approach to morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer more will be exploited by their partners. In line with this mutualistic approach, the study of a range of economic games involving property rights, collective actions, mutual help and punishment shows that participants\u27 distributions aim at sharing the costs and benefits of interactions in an impartial way. In particular, the distribution of resources is influenced by effort and talent, and the perception of each participant\u27s rights on the resources to be distributed

Childhood environmental harshness predicts coordinated health and reproductive strategies:A cross-sectional study of a nationally representative sample from France

There is considerable variation in health and reproductive behaviours within and across human populations. Drawing on principles from Life History Theory, psychosocial acceleration theory predicts that individuals developing in harsh environments decrease their level of somatic investment and accelerate their reproductive schedule. Although there is consistent empirical support for this general prediction, most studies have focused on a few isolated life history traits and few have investigated the way in which individuals apply life strategies across reproductive and somatic domains to produce coordinated behavioural responses to their environment. In our study, we thus investigate the impact of childhood environmental harshness on both reproductive strategies and somatic investment by applying structural equation modeling (SEM) to cross-sectional survey data obtained in a representative sample of the French population (n = 1015, age: 19 – 87 years old, both genders). This data allowed us to demonstrate that (i) inter-individual variation in somatic investment (e.g. effort in looking after health) and reproductive timing (e.g. age at first birth) can be captured by a latent fast-slow continuum, and (ii) faster strategies along this continuum are predicted by higher childhood harshness. Overall, our results support the existence of a fast-slow continuum and highlight the relevance of the life history approach for understanding variations in reproductive and health related behaviours

A step-by-step method for cultural annotation by LLMs

Building on the growing body of research highlighting the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) like Generative Pre-trained Transformers (GPT), this paper presents a structured pipeline for the annotation of cultural (big) data through such LLMs, offering a detailed methodology for leveraging GPT’s computational abilities. Our approach provides researchers across various fields with a method for efficient and scalable analysis of cultural phenomena, showcasing the potential of LLMs in the empirical study of human cultures. LLMs proficiency in processing and interpreting complex data finds relevance in tasks such as annotating descriptions of non-industrial societies, measuring the importance of specific themes in stories, or evaluating psychological constructs in texts across societies or historical periods. These applications demonstrate the model’s versatility in serving disciplines like cultural anthropology, cultural psychology, cultural history, and cultural sciences at large

Cultural Evolution from the Producers’ Standpoint

Standard approaches to cultural evolution focus on the recipients or consumers. This does not take into account the fitness costs incurred in producing the behaviors or artifacts that become cultural, i.e., widespread in a social group. We argue that cultural evolution models should focus on these fitness costs and benefits of cultural production particularly in the domain of “symbolic” culture. In this approach, cultural products can be considered as a part of the extended phenotype of producers, which can affect the fitness of recipients in a positive way (through cooperation) but also in a detrimental way (through manipulation and exploitation). Taking the producers’ perspective may help explain the specific features of many kinds of cultural products

Quantifying the Scientific Revolution

The Scientific Revolution represents a turning point in the history of humanity. Yet it remains ill-understood, partly because of a lack of quantification. Here, we leverage large datasets of individual biographies (N = 22943) and present the first estimates of scientific production during the late medieval and early modern period (1300 - 1850). Our data reveal striking differences across countries, with England and the United Provinces being much more creative than other countries, suggesting that economic development have been key in generating the Scientific Revolution. In line with recent results in behavioral sciences, we show that scientific creativity and economic development are associated with other kinds of creative activities in philosophy, literature, music and the arts, as well as with inclusive institutions and ascetic religiosity, suggesting a common underlying mindset associated with long-term orientation and exploration. Finally, we investigate the interplay between economic development and cultural transmission (the so-called “Republic of Letters”) using partially observed Markov models imported from population biology. Surprisingly, the role of horizontal transmission (from one country to another) seems to have been marginal. Beyond the case of science, our results suggest that economic development is an important factor in the evolution of aspects of human culture