FURTHER EXPOSITION OF THE VALUE OF RELIABILITY

As the demands placed on transport systems have increased relative to extensions in supply, problems of network unreliability have become ever more prevalent. The response of some transport users has been to accommodate expectations of unreliability in their decision-making, particularly through their trip scheduling. In the analysis of trip scheduling, Small’s (1982) approach has received considerable support. Small extends the microeconomic theory of time allocation (e.g. Becker, 1965; De Serpa, 1971), accounting for scheduling constraints in the specification of both utility and its associated constraints. Small makes operational the theory by means of the random utility model (RUM). This involves a process of converting the continuous departure time variable into discrete departure time segments, specifying the utility of each departure time segment as a function of several components (specifically journey time, schedule delay and the penalty of late arrival), and adopting particular distributional assumptions concerning the random error terms of contiguous departure time segments (whilst his 1982 paper assumes IID, Small’s 1987 paper considers a more complex pattern of covariance). A fundamental limitation of Small’s approach is that individuals make choices under certainty, an assumption that is clearly unrealistic in the context of urban travel choice. The response of microeconomic theory to such challenge is to reformulate the objective problem from the maximisation of utility, to one of maximising expected utility, with particular reference to the works of von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947) and Savage (1954). Bates et al. (2001) apply this extension to departure time choice, but specify choice as being over continuous time; the latter carries the advantage of simplifying some of the calculations of optimal departure time. Moreover Bates et al. offer account of departure time choice under uncertainty, but retain a deterministic representation. Batley & Daly (2004) develop ideas further by reconciling the analyses of Small (1982) and Bates et al. Drawing on early contributions to the RUM literature by Marschak et al. (1963), Batley and Daly propose a probabilistic model of departure time choice under uncertainty, based on an objective function of random expected utility maximisation. Despite this progression in the generality and sophistication of methods, significant challenges to the normative validity of RUM and transport network models remain. Of increasing prominence in transport research, is the conjecture that expected utility maximisation may represent an inappropriate objective of choice under uncertainty. Significant evidence for this conjecture exists, and a variety of alternative objectives proposed instead; Kahneman & Tversky (2000) offer a useful compendium of such papers. With regards to these alternatives, Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) own Prospect Theory commands considerable support as a theoretical panacea for choice under uncertainty. This theory distinguishes between two phases in the choice process - editing and evaluation. Editing may involve several stages, so-called ‘coding’, ‘combination’, ‘cancellation’, ‘simplification’ and ‘rejection of dominated alternatives’. Evaluation involves a value function that is defined on deviations from some reference point, and is characterised by concavity for gains and convexity for losses, with the function being steeper for gains than for losses. The present paper begins by formalising the earlier ideas of Batley and Daly (2004); the paper thus presents a theoretical exposition of a random expected utility model of departure time choice. The workings of the model are then illustrated by means of numerical example. The scope of the analysis is subsequently widened to consider the possibility of divergence from the objective of expected utility maximisation. An interesting feature of this discussion is consideration of the relationship between Prospect Theory and a generalised representation of the random expected utility model. In considering this relationship, the paper draws on Batley & Daly’s (2003) investigation of the equivalence between RUM and elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972); the latter representing one example of a possible ‘editing’ model within Prospect Theory. Again, the extended model is illustrated by example.

State Capacity and Non-state Service Provision in Fragile and Conflict-affected States

How can governments effectively engage with non-state providers (NSPs) of basic services where capacity is weak? This paper examines whether and how fragile and conflict affected states can co-ordinate, finance, and set and apply standards for the provision of basic services by NSPs. It explores ways of incrementally engaging the state, beginning with activities that are least likely to do harm to non-state provision. Through the ‘indirect’ roles of setting the policy environment and engaging in policy dialogue, regulating and facilitating, contracting, and entering into mutual and informal agreements with NSPs, the state can in principle assume responsibility for the provision of basic services without necessarily being involved in direct provision. But government capacity to perform these roles is constrained by the state’s weak legitimacy, coverage and competence, lack of basic information about the non-state sector, and lack of basic organisational capacity to form and maintain relationships with NSPs. The experience of the exercise of the indirect roles in fragile settings suggests: * Governments may be more willing to engage with NSPs where there is recognition that government cannot alone deliver all services, where public and private services are not in competition, and where there is evidence that successful collaboration is possible (demonstrated through small-scale pilots). * The extent to which engagements are ‘pro-service’may be influenced by government motives for engagement and the extent to which the providers that are most important to poor people are engaged. * Formal policy dialogue between government and NSPs may be imperfect, unrepresentative and at times unhelpful in fragile settings. Informal dialogue - at the operational level - could more likely be where synergies can be found. * Regulation is more likely to be ‘pro-service’ where it offers incentives for compliance, and where it focuses on standards in terms of outputs and outcomes rather than inputs and entry controls. * Wide scale, performance-based contracting has been successful in delivering services in some cases, but the sustainability of this approach is often questioned. Some successful contractual agreements have a strong informal, relational element and grow out of earlier informal connections. * Informal and mutual agreements can avoid the capacity problems and tensions implicit in formal contracting but may present problems of non-transparency and exclusion of competition. Paradoxically, the need for large-scale approaches and quick co-ordination of services in fragile and conflict-affected settings may require ‘prematurely high’ levels of state-NSP engagement, before the development of the underlying institutional structures that would support them. When considering strategies to support the capacity of government to engagement with NSPs, donors should: * Recognise non-state service provision and adopt the ‘do no harm’ principle: It would be wrong to set the ambition of 'managing ‘ non-state provision in its entirety, and it can be very harmful for low-capacity states to seek to regulate all NSP or to draw it into clumsy contracts. * Beware of generalisation: Non-state provision takes many forms in response to different histories and to political and economic change. The possibilities and case for state engagement have to be assessed not assumed. The particular identities of NGOs and enterprises should be considered. * Recognise that state building can occur through any of the types of engagement with NSPs: Types of engagement should therefore be selected on the basis of their likely effectiveness in improving service delivery. * Begin with less risky/small scale forms of engagement where possible: State interventions that imply a direct controlling role for the state and which impose obligations on NSPs (i.e. contracting and regulation) require greater capacity (on both sides) and present greater risk of harm if performed badly than the roles of policy dialogue and entering into mutual agreements. * Adopt mixed approaches: The choice between forms of engagement does not have to be absolute. Rather than adopting a uniform plan of engagement in a particular country, it may be better to try different approaches in different regions or sectors

The politics of what works in service delivery:\ud An evidence-based review

This paper examines the evidence on the forms of politics likely to promote inclusive social provisioning and enable, as opposed to constrain, improvements in service outcomes. It focuses on eight relatively successful cases of delivery in a range of country contexts and sectors (roads, agriculture, health, education) where independent evaluations demonstrate improved outcomes. The paper traces the main characteristics of the political environment for these cases, from the national political context, to the politics of sector policymaking, to the micro politics of implementation. The findings indicate that it is possible to identify connections between good performance and better outcomes at the point of delivery and the main forms of politics operating at local, sector and national levels.\ud \ud A number of common factors underpinning successful delivery emerge strongly but need to be tested through further research. In particular, the paper highlights the relationship between inclusive delivery and periods of crisis and transition;the nature of the political settlement;the types of calculations of political returns being made by political actors at all levels, and; the extent to which the state derives or seeks to enhance its legitimacy through the provision of a particular service

Byker: a study of communication between planners and the public in an area affected by slum clearance

This study sets out to examine whether the local community has any political meaning for its residents, in the sense that their relations with the city council are affected by it. On the one hand, it investigates the importance of the community; 1. in supporting certain orientations among residents towards political involvement, and 2. in offering certain organisational means of political communication. On the other hand, it investigates the attitudes of local authority officials and councillors to the involvement of the public in aspects of their decision-making. The study relates an initial analysis of community attachment and political attitudes to an analysis of the attitudes and action of all those involved in a particular decision in the field of town planning. The area of the study (Byker in Newcastle-upon-Tyne) was chosen because it was faced with slum clearance by the council. A questionnaire was applied to 10 per cent of the households in the area to discover and then inter-relate: 1. The degree of residents' attachment to the community in terms of their performance of certain roles, identification of the area and membership of local organisations; 2. Their orientation to local government and to participation in politics; 3. Their response to the demolition plans. By participant observation and the interviewing of local leaders, local organisations were examined to assess their view of their role, and, especially, their role in the demolition situation. The study was here concerned with the potentiality of organisations to act as mediators between the planners and the planned. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with councillors and with officials concerned with planning and rehousing. The object here was to assess the implications of their view of the situation and of their performance for the information andresponse of residents

The politics of public services : a service characteristics approach

SummaryPolitics is widely regarded as affecting and being affected by the performance of public services, yet little research differentiates between services in exploring these effects. The article addresses this gap by proposing a framework for understanding and comparing the politics of different services. It identifies how the nature of the good, type of market failure, tasks involved in delivery, and demand for a service—hitherto regarded largely as economic and managerial concerns—affect political commitment, organizational control, and user power. Policy responses can be targeted to address service characteristics where they present opportunities or constraints to better services

Urban Development: The Redistribution of Persistent Deprivation

SUMMARY It may be worth examining the developing countries' experience of urban development for lessons to apply to Britain. A major difference is that in Britain housing and related services are treated as fully established social sectoral concerns. This 'welfare monism' is institutionalised and obscures the complex relationships between employment and housing. In the Third World social service programmes are less likely to obscure the policymakers' understanding of employment opportunities, class alignment and the ambiguities of state intervention. The attempt to slow London's growth and to develop new towns shows the contradictions which arise when policies for the redirection of employment and policies for social welfare provision are treated separately, even when their relationship in practice is demonstrated. RESUME Le développement urbain: la redistribution de la privation persistante II serait peut?étre utile d'examiner l'expérience des pays en voie de développement en ce qui concerne le développement urbain, pour en tirer des leçons pouvant s'appliquer à la Grande?Bretagne. Une différence majeure réside dans le fait qu'en Grande?Bretagne le service du logement et autres services connexes sont considérés comme des organisations solidement établies s'occupant de certains secteurs sociaux. Ce “monisme des services sociaux” est institutionnalisé et obscurcit les relations complexes entre l'emploi et le logement. Dans le Tiers Monde les programmes des services sociaux risquent moins d'empêcher ceux qui initient les programmes de voir clair sur les questions des possibilités d'emploi, de l'alignement des classes, et des ambigüités de l'intervention par l'état. La tentative faite pour ralentir la croissance de Londres et développer de nouvelles villes montre les contradictions qui surgissent lorsque des projets visant à la redirection de l'emploi et d'autres concernant le budget des services sociaux sont traités séparément, même quand leurs rapports sont démontrés en pratique. RESUMEN El desarrollo urbano: la redistribución de privaciones persistentes Sería interesante examinar la manera en que se lleva a cabo el desarrollo urbano en los países en vías de desarrollo por lo que tendría de ejamplar para Gran Bretaña. Una diferencia básica es que, en Gran Bretaña, los servicios para resolver problemas de vivienda y otros anejos se consideran sectores bien establecidos y completamente autónomos en el ámbito social. Este “monismo del bienestar” se encuentra institucionalizado, impidiendo ver con claridad las relaciones complejas entre el empleo y vivienda. En el Tercer Mundo es más difícil ocultar el problema del empleo, la clase social a que se pertenece y las ambiguedades de la intervención estatal. El intento de frenar el crecimiento de Londres y de crear nuevas ciudades muestra las contradicciones que surgen cuando se tratan por separado las políticas de la reorientación de los medios de empleo y las destinadas a proveer los servicios de bienestar social, aunque se reconozca en la práctica la relación que existe entre ellas

A POLÍTICA DA REFORMA NA PROVISÃO DE SERVIÇOS PÚBLICOS

O artigo identifica os líderes, os defensores e os opositores da reforma do setor público. Utiliza-se o conceito “agente-principal” e compara-se a realidade da reforma com uma situação “ideal”, onde (a) os cidadãos são os “principais” dos formuladores de políticas públicas, que são seus “agentes”, e (b) os formuladores de políticas são os “principais” dos servidores públicos, que são seus “agentes”. Reformas em países em desenvolvimento tornam-se mais complexas pela existência de atores externos – instituições financeiras internacionais e multilaterais. Na prática, agências internacionais e multilaterais, assim como servidores públicos, agem, muitas vezes, como “principais” na determinação das reformas. A análise identifica os interesses envolvidos na reforma do setor público, indicando como o equilíbrio entre diferentes atores é influenciado por fatores institucionais e setoriais. Reformas organizacionais, principalmente nos serviços sociais, apresentam maiores dificuldades de implementação do que as reformas econômicas de primeira geração. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: reforma do setor público, provisão de serviços públicos, “agenteprincipal”. THE POLITICS OF REFORMING SERVICE DELIVERY The article identifies the leaders, the supporters and the resisters of public service reform. It adopts a principal-agent framework, comparing reality with an 'ideal' situation where (i) citizens are the principals over political policy-makers as their agents, and (ii) policy-makers are the principals over public service officials as their agents. Reform in most developing countries is complicated by an additional set of external actors – international financial institutions and donors. In practice, international agencies and core government officials usually act as the 'principals' in the determination of reforms. The analysis identifies the interests involved in reform, indicating how the balance between them is affected by institutional and sectoral factors. Organizational reforms particularly in the social sectors present greater difficulties than first generation economic policy reforms. KEY WORDS: public sector reform; public service provision; agent-principal. LA POLITIQUE DE REFORME POUR LA FOURNITURE DES SERVICES PUBLICS L’article identifie les dirigeants, les partisans et les opposants de la réforme du secteur public. On emploie le concept “agent-principal” et l’on compare la réalité de la réforme avec une situation “idéale”, dans laquelle (a) les citoyens ont un rôle “principal” parmi ceux qui formulent les politiques publiques, qui sont leurs “agents”, et (b) ceux qui formulent les politiques ont un rôle “principal” au sein des fonctionnaires, qui sont leurs “agents”. Des réformes dans les pays en voie de développement deviennent complexes en raison de l’existence d’acteurs extérieurs – des institutions financières internationales et multilatérales. Dans la pratique, les agences internationales et multilatérales, ainsi que les fonctionnaires, ont souvent un rôle “principal” dans la détermination des réformes. L’analyse identifie les intérêts impliqués dans la réforme du secteur public, en indiquant comment l’équilibre entre divers acteurs subit l’influence des facteurs institutionnels et sectoriels. Des réformes organisationnelles, spécialement dans les services sociaux, présentent de plus grandes difficultés de mise en oeuvre que les réformes économiques de première génération. MOTS-CLÉS: réforme du secteur public, fourniture de services publics, “agent-principal”. Publicação Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.b